


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The Editor invites scholarly articles from researchers in Africa and beyond. Articles should represent original contributions to knowledge and have a bias for the application of historical methodology. The principal regional focus is Africa, but the Editor welcomes contributions on other areas, especially those based on comparative third world experiences.

Manuscripts should be typed double-spaced and submitted in duplicate, with notes and references consistent with the Chicago Manual of styles (14th Edition). Recommended maximum length of each article is 6,000 words including notes and references. All articles and book reviews should be addressed to:

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Contents

- iv* Editorial Board
- iv* Editorial Advisory Board
- v* Contents
- vii* Notes on Contributors

- 1** Introduction
Abimbola O. Adesoji

- 5** Colonial Memories and Emotions in Southwestern Nigeria: How
'Good' were the 'Bad' Old' Days?
Tunde Decker

- 26** Newspaper Editorials and Governance: The Example of the *People's
Daily Graphic*, Ghana in the Early 1980s
Omon M. Osiki

- 50** Millenarian Culture of Islamic Insurgency in Nigeria
Sunday Omotuyi

- 77** The Vegetable Economy of Female Farmers in Nigerian Barracks,
1920-1999: A Survey
Nzemeka Justus Adim

- 102** Gbongan and Odeomu in Ife-Modakeke Conflict, 1981-2004:
Analysing Indigenous Diplomacy and Ethnic Identity
Mayowa Christopher Adeyeye

- 124** A Study in Spatial Focal Points and Social Contestation of Urban Life in Lagos: A History of Glover Memorial Hall, 1889-1960
Mufutau Oluwasegun Jimoh
- 150** Beyond Political Intrigues: The Context of Nigeria's Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with Israel in 1992
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INTRODUCTION:

Abimbola O. Adesoji

There is no end to knowing. New discoveries are being unearthed daily. What is already known is being reinterpreted, refined, broadened or even rejected on the basis of their inadequacy, incompleteness or of being erroneous. This could not be otherwise given the nature of historical scholarship and the nature and adequacy or otherwise of sources available at different times for its reconstruction. In the process, new insights are being gained and people's horizons are being broadened. This is what is amply demonstrated in this volume. The array of topics covered bears eloquent testimony to the dynamic nature of historical scholarship and the versatility of scholars who adequately demonstrated their competence, ingenuity and creativity without compromising the basis of scientific enquiry which is truth, information or knowledge.

Tunde Decker explores the extent to which personal recollections and experiences of individuals who lived as children and young adults in colonial southwestern Nigeria express their fond memory of the period. Using a combination of oral responses and secondary literature, he argues that their emotions and sentiments on everyday life as well as their understanding of the milieu, within which they grew, and which formed the social space of their life experiences, influenced their career and education, vocations, outlook to life, leisure curiosity, sportsmanship, family life and their general perspective about the colonial days. This arguably constitutes an interesting aspect of colonial history that has not been fully explored.

Using selected editorials of the *People's Daily Graphic* to underscore its active role in the politics and governance of Ghana in the challenging decades of

the 1980s, Omon Osiki analyses the pivotal role of the press in the socio-economic, political and intellectual history of Ghana in the period considered as the era of social and political revolution in the country. The newspaper, according to him, did this by shaping public opinion particularly by drawing attention to the feelings of the people concerning governance, and socio-economic and political activities. Arguing further that the newspaper remained a government media even when it accommodated dissenting voices, he concludes that the newspaper was caught between balancing its dual roles of serving as government mouthpiece and being a watchdog of the same government, following mostly in the process the line of a mouthpiece.

Sunday Omotuyi attempts a deconstruction of the Boko Haram insurgent group in Nigeria. Drawing on interview data with ex-combatants of the group and extant literature, he frames the Boko Haram insurgency within the Kaplan's Fifth Wave of terror, arguing that the millenarian and *takfiri* sectarian ideology are central to the crisis. This ideology, he argues, further derives mainly from the conservative and absolutist interpretations of Koranic verses and remains the major factor in the group's rebellion rather than socio-economic narrative. He contends that rather than the current military approach as a major counterinsurgency strategy which paradoxically has alienated the masses of the affected region, government should counter the group's propaganda among the Muslim youth.

Nzemeka Justus interrogates the role and contributions of barrack female farmers to the Nigerian economy. Arguing that the efforts of women in food security have not received sufficient scholarly attention and proper documentation, he contends that women had made meaningful contributions to family living standards by rising from being garden cultivators to producers of large-scale vegetables for feeding immediate and external markets. Stressing that the concentration of women in vegetable production was partly due to gender stereotype and division of labour in the barracks and given the scarcity of fallow lands and ready market in the

urban centres, he concludes that vegetable production has contributed to the food security of the barracks, requiring government support to achieve surplus production.

Mayowa Adeyeye analyses how indigenous diplomacy and intra-ethnic identity differently shaped the conduct of Gbongan and Odeomu during the Ife-Modakeke conflict between 1981 and 2004. He offers a detailed description and critical analysis of the divergent roles of Gbongan and Odeomu in the age-long conflict. Whereas the two towns hold dynamic ethnic affinities with Ife and Modakeke on the one hand, and territorial proximity on the other, Gbongan maintained neutrality during the conflict while Odeomu was an entrenched ally of Modakeke. He conceptualizes the conflict within the fulcrum of intermediary diplomacy, emphasising that Gbongan's conduct of indigenous diplomacy represented a dialectical reconstruction of the old Oyo Empire diplomacy eschewing "entangling alliance" which is detrimental to peace. He concludes that ethnicity should be a mobilizing tool for development rather than a bitter source of division.

Mufutau Oluwasegun Jimoh reflects on the history of the construction and use of Glover Memorial Hall in central Lagos. Built through active collaboration between the British colonial government and prominent and prosperous Lagosians, and meant to celebrate the golden jubilee of Queen Elizabeth, it was designed to illuminate change in the city and to perpetuate the memory of Governor Glover, the colonial administrator of Lagos from 1863 to 1872. Jimoh argues that the construction and use of the Hall highlight the transforming visions of colonial modernity given changing local ideas, and its significance as a lens for viewing the various class and social conflicts in colonial Lagos. Pertinent is its illumination of the changing relationship between the British colonial government and the local elite on one hand, and between the local elite and other segments of the population on the other hand.

Charles Adedeji Ogidan examines the factors that informed the review of Nigeria's decision to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. He contends

that systemic politics until the emergence of several 'Third World' countries as independent polities had been shaped by major countries of Europe and America before and immediately after 1945. But the United Nations concept of 'one nation, one vote', made seemingly innocuous African states irrespective of their military and economic strength to gain visibility at the United Nations General Assembly. This sudden relevance of the Third World countries led to the Sub-Saharan African countries being drawn into Arab-Israeli conflict but also constrained them given the harsh economic realities of the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and their generally poor economies among others, resulting ultimately in the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel. He argues that charismatic leadership rather than hard headed realism motivated the decision to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. He concludes that the nation's national interest consequently became the sacrificial lamb in Nigeria's quest for relevance in systemic politics.

Colonial Memories and Emotions in Southwestern Nigeria: How 'Good' were the 'Bad' Old' Days?

Tunde Decker

Introduction

It is yet unclear if colonialism has been over-researched as a subsection of African History. In the literature, this phenomenon has been portrayed as a point of departure from the 'undisturbed' African past and an entrance into the maturing phase of globalisation in world history. In the process, scholars with socialist orientation have vehemently analysed the phenomenon in such manner that if historical scholarship was capable of deleting certain periods in history, colonialism would have been so discarded. Others have mildly but surely established the fact that this period has been significant with impact on ancient politico-economic systems of the African past. Colonialism has attracted widespread scholarly attention from the beginnings of historical scholarship in Nigeria. The need to respond to the domineering, and later, the reducing influence of a foreign overlord were the first major realities that African historical scholarship had to contend with. Unlike European societies whose scholarship generated enlightenment and directly dictated patterns of politico-economic growth, the earliest preoccupation of historical scholarship in Nigeria reacted to the experiences of foreign domination and the overwhelming influence of the imperialistic adventures of Britain's policy designers. Ingenious efforts were dedicated to debunking Eurocentric and subjective views about the culture and heritage of Nigerian peoples. In the 1960s, an efflorescence of doctoral theses emerged, studying indigenous politics, intergroup relations, traditional economy and transport systems. Essentially, they examined, in

universities in Nigeria, Europe and the United States, colonial encounters and their impact on political economy. The conclusions of the studies, as observed later by other African and non-African scholars have been that colonialism was a significantly influential factor (in many cases, destabilising) in African societies¹. Oral sources, archival records, inclusive of gazettes, correspondences, newspapers, secondary literature and other statistical data which fueled the methodologies adopted by these scholars present evidences of such conclusions. However, the trajectory of African history has moved on from there to other aspects of colonial and postcolonial history covering economy, gender, infrastructure, violence and security, religion, health, international relations, transport, crime, urbanity, poverty, livelihood, and children.

The last four categories are benefitting from the available archival records and point to the great potential of social history in re-interpreting Nigeria's colonial past. In the records, one cannot but be impressed by the attention to details that colonial administrators and the Africans that succeeded them exhibited in the understanding of the dispensation of social challenges and in the initiation and development of policies that administered the colonial economy, and which the Africans individually and collectively reacted to in different cases. So meticulous were the record keeping abilities of the administrative institutions that petitions in the archives indicate the helplessness of officers in the colonial civil service in responding to the socio-economic needs of the victims. Although Abosede George suggested economic constraints as a factor inhibiting the authorities' responses², it was clear that understanding the challenges, despite admirable record keeping, was the mainstay of the disconnect.

Petitions written by or on behalf of children and young adults in the last three decades before 1960 presented the challenging experiences of a section of an urbanising population with regards to keeping up with new realities. Given the clues that children's encounter with colonialism was overwhelming and moved many of them to despair (and in addition, and contradictorily, hope, as many of their correspondences indicated!), this

suggests that such experiences would, in today's context, be considered mixed memory with little fond feelings. This paper thus examines how and why a number of individuals had fond memories of a period that was hugely challenging to the children who 'documented' it in writing.³ The scope of this paper is the period from 1940 to 1960, given that all the respondents (on the average, going by their age) were 25 years old by 1960 - the least age among them being 15 years (Mr. M. A. Shoyemi, a retired locomotive inspector of the Nigerian Railways) and 40 years (Cyprian Ekwensi, Novelist – now late). Taken into consideration the discrepancies in defining a child in the colonial period,⁴ and for the purpose of this discussion, we use the words: children and young adults to refer to our subjects of inquiry and as key words to reiterate our focus. Hence, the recollections of our subjects are analysed along with memoirs of some individuals, in addition to information contained in secondary literature on colonial Nigeria. Although sentiments and subjectivity beclouded their personal narratives of the period, this paper examines the extent to which their recollections and submissions expressed everyday experiences. It presents and reviews their fond attachments, their understanding of the milieu they experienced as teenagers and young adults and how this influenced their career and education, vocations, outlook to life, leisure, curiosity, sportsmanship, family life, and their general submissions about the colonial days.

Children and Young Adults' Assessment of Colonialism

In the scholarly literature, there are evidences that children 'reviewed' colonialism. These reviews were their written petitions that are stored in the archives and now engaged by social historians to reconstruct the colonial past.⁵ Living memories at the time of their documentation, they were ongoing experiences which the individual child had; and which were enmeshed in feelings, sentiments and self-interest. The available petitions of children to the commissioner of the colonies from the late 1930s to 1950s were complaints of children from poor homes, divorced marriages and

orphans.⁶ The accounts were subjective, but nonetheless reveal a narrow view of the prevailing social conditions at the time. Although, some of the accounts may have been written on behalf of some of the children, there are indications that the original expressions belonged to younger minds. In any case, it has not been established that there were individuals in the colonial period who wanted to sabotage efforts of colonial administration through the manipulation of childhood perceptions of the period. Hence, there are strong indications, given the very many varieties of handwritings and conceptualisations in the petitions that many of the accounts are true and could not have been wholly generated by copy writers. Additionally, there are some indications of peer-group interactions in the expressions of the children. Although there is evidence that the children have been mentored in the art of standard written expression in school, there is no doubting the fact that they had additional inspiration from among themselves and some mentors who were aware of official language and the expression of courtesies.⁷

On the whole, the children's' written expressions had the feature of on-the-go stories and accounts. Particularly, their accounts indicate troubles in family life, poverty, educational crisis, delinquency, irresponsible fatherhood, female breadwinners, prostitution, child trafficking, kidnapping and the like. The tendency for manipulation of information to generate the needed favourable sentiments from the authorities by the children was also high. However, such tendency is a strong indication of the desperation to escape poverty and its consequences through assistance that can be rendered by the authorities.⁸ Of course, there were no such petitions that indicate the expressions of children from 'organised' or 'responsible' homes. This suggests a gap in the perspective on colonialism by such children and leads us to a consideration of the accounts of those children, whose experiences in the colonial era are now available, as secondary sources on colonial experiences, since there is little or no evidence that the children who wrote petitions to the colonial authorities rose to become

notable Nigerians who wrote their stories or who had their stories written by someone else.⁹

Recollecting childhood or young adult memory of the colonial period brings to the fore an overlap of three dimensions. First are the archival evidences of 'on-the-go' memories which present unique opportunities for scholars to infer and make significant submissions as to the nature of on-going lifestyle. The potential of this dimension is significant and challenging at the same time, given the 'fixed' or 'static' nature of this particular type of documentation of varieties of trends (some of which were transitional and some longer lasting). Second are the vast array of biographies and autobiographies of individuals who lived as young adults in the period. In this instance, memory is encapsulated in another - this time, substantially elaborate calibration of raw experiences, and whose potency is challenged by analytics of expression and the 'necessity to make a case' for 'the child'. Third is the challenge that this paper confronts, and where its potential lies. Ninety percent of the respondents in this paper neither wrote petition as teenagers or young adults to the colonial administration nor did they have (at the time of writing) autobiographies or biographies to their names, except for three: Chief Philip Asiodu, Mrs Aduke Alakija and Cyprian Ekwensi.¹⁰ Significantly, the respondents provide an alternative, in the manner of fond memory and in the sense that the character of their recollections presents us with interesting versions of everydayness, which have only been glossed over by literature on the colonial period. Consider the perspective of Wole Soyinka in his account of his younger years on the challenges that accompanied new learning¹¹ or the regard by Olu Akinkugbe (in the account of his biographer) of British public celebrations such as the Empire Day as days of pure fun¹² or the admiration of technology in the new forms of transportation¹³ or in the display of skills in sports to the admiration of British teachers.¹⁴ These 'insignificant interjections' in conventional history or storytelling are what this paper accounts for, giving indications that they are potentially viable in helping us to understand the larger framework by which colonialism can be re-visited.

It should be noted from the onset that the recollections of the respondents are treated as remembering – of very senior citizens in southwestern Nigeria who were *once children and young adults*. The usage of fondness or fond memory only qualifies the adults (and not the children) whose experiences as children and young adults served as data for the analyses provided in this paper. Hence, the experiences discussed in this paper should not be misconstrued for information provided by children. Additionally, fond memory is only attributable to the individual who experienced a certain historical moment in his/her life that if recalled, gives a certain nostalgic feeling about the event or epoch so witnessed or experienced.

Instructively, the captivating factors of the new social milieu engendered by the advent of British activities in pre-Nigerian societies had been sowed long before formal colonialism began. Samuel Crowther, for instance, was completely overwhelmed as a teenager by the Christian doctrine introduced by the missionaries so much that he influenced, in later years, the manner of religious worship of his African kinsmen.¹⁵ This was to be the pattern of social interaction of children who grew up, and after absorbing the new norms and values promoted by colonialism, proceeded to redesign and influence the emerging social milieu. Particularly, events, decisions, groups, individuals, travels and neighbourhoods fascinated the children so much that many developed their later attitudes to life, humanity, service, career, leadership, cosmopolitanism and the like as a result of the impressions these things had on them as boys and girls.¹⁶ As rough and unrefined as those feelings were in those early days of the children's' lives, the subsequent events that shaped their adult lives, either solidified or refined the early exposures.

Livelihood and Everyday Living

Livelihood and daily living were fond memories. This is understandable, given the fact that the children were not wage earners and not in position of responsibility in the sense that is normally associated with adults. It is

unclear the extent to which they were aware of the challenges to wage earning as experienced by their parents. Although some earned income for the family through hawking, their belief was to assist their mothers in trade and feel fulfilled by that effort.¹⁷ Hawking wares along the streets in the towns was an interesting experience. It was an opportunity for the young child to be conversant with the then ever evolving urbanisation. Karimu Lawal, who was 15 in 1945 was captivated by the domineering presence of 'awon oyinbo' (Europeans - actually a reference by the respondent to the Lebanese) at the *Gbagi* Market (which was at the time located at present day Ogunpa market in Ibadan).¹⁸ It was an ever present spectacle to be acquainted with the fact that white-skinned merchants could trade in clothing like ankara which was considered by youngsters then as traditional clothing worn generally by indigenous men, women and children alike. Particularly, it was a status symbol to wear lace which was also sold at the market by the 'oyinbos'. Trading was a profession that could be learned and be proud of. This was the conviction of children whose parents considered western education as a way of luring their children into the hands of strangers who could not be trusted enough to impact age-old traditional values.¹⁹ For those who had to hawk in the mornings, it was done hurriedly and the real feeling of a 'sojourner' had to often wait till afternoon when the child came back from school. Sightseeing became a past time alongside hawking, particularly with the presence of interesting features like the movement of the available motorcars, bicycles, and motor bikes.²⁰

It is tempting to conclude that people did not lack food or the basic necessities associated with livelihood, given the repetition of the strong purchasing power of money in the recollections of many of those who were children in the colonial period. Given the fond memories of those who insisted that they could live on one shilling a day, it is safe to conclude that those whose residency was long and consistent and whose kin connections were strong in the villages, towns and cities experienced stable basic livelihood. Given the available archival correspondences between colonial authorities and agencies that indicate livelihood challenges for those who

decided to travel from the inner towns and villages to the cities, livelihood and daily living was far more difficult for those who were caught up in the decision to sojourn in the cities with little or no social network. This trend continued as a major feature of social challenges in cities even after 1960.²¹

Western Education

In the available literature, vast references are made to the attraction of the Yoruba to western education.²² However, in the inner towns, some parents considered it indirectly related to livelihood.²³ The returns of farming in the immediate provision of food for the family and the market value of the surplus appealed to some fathers and mothers. Parents were fulfilled if they were able to provide food for the family. Hence, children went to the farm to till the soil or hawk wares before morning devotions in schools.²⁴ Some of the respondents considered themselves lucky because they desired further education beyond the standard grade and did not have to depend on their parents. This attitude and determination to dare what some parents had reservations for was what some respondents considered as responsible for success and later recognition in life even by the community which bestowed honour on those able to continually identify themselves with the traditional values of the community in spite of western orientation.²⁵ In the inner towns, education was the development of an individual's potential to remain consistent with family trade or vocational traditions.²⁶ The skills were learnt through parents and was polished continually through willingness to learn and to accept alternatives despite the 'attractions' of western education which was already well received but which was in some instances distrusted. In any case, the discipline needed and the ability to excel in those trades and vocations had proven rewarding to living mentors and role models in the towns. In the minds of some parents, schooling in the western sense was unconvincing to compete with skills that had been established and entrenched through generations within the family. For the child to take to arithmetic and writing was to indicate a child who wanted to

'break away' from family traditions. Hence, some fathers were unwilling to be part of such ambition much less to fund it.²⁷ This was not so in some cases whereby the fathers were aware of the incapability of family vocation to sustain livelihood and so encouraged their children to take to schooling. Even at that, they did not assume the responsibility of funding the pursuit. Lamidi Akanmu, who was 13 years old in 1940 recounted his experience:

My father was an herbalist. He was the one who told me to learn another trade and that the returns from his labour as herbalist were not enough to feed the family. Yet people always thronged our house in search of answers to their spiritual problems. I always felt that my father lied to many of those people. Maybe that was the reason he felt this could not be sustained. Anyway, I did not feel like learning such trade so I did not show interest.²⁸

Some children were determined outrightly not to attend school because they did not personally feel attracted to it.

I was told to go to school but I decided on my own not to go. I did not feel like going to school. There was a teacher who continued to force me to go but I was not interested. I liked going to the farm. That was what I liked. My younger brother went to school and became a judge. My father wanted us to attend school but I did not want to. Buying and selling things was what I was interested in. I lived in the village as a child and only visited the town once in a while.²⁹

Leisure and Recreation

Leisure, recreation, competition and sportsmanship were features of the experiences of everyday life among children. The colonial environment was far less urbanised (given today's parameters) and the infrastructures, particularly the railways and the early aerodromes, provided fascinating

experiences. Their daily interactions with those facilities shaped their dreams and predetermined their lifelong careers:

Rail lines passed through my village at Ifo in Ogun State. I was in primary school then. As stubborn as I was, anytime I saw the whiteman driving a locomotive through my village, I would run to tell my mother that I would like to be a locomotive train driver like the white man. At that my mother often took advantage of the opportunity to remind me that I could only become a locomotive train driver if I faced my studies. I grew up and was interested in train engines. The type used to drive the British queen from Lagos to Ibadan was the 1101 locomotive engine, the type I later drove as a locomotive driver after independence.³⁰

Samuel Ohiomah who was 14 in 1946 and who later became one of the three earliest Nigerian pilots was captivated by the Benin aerodrome located close to Edo College in the then Benin province. His recollection is worthy of detailed presentation:

As far as we were concerned, the only secondary school was in Benin. It was miles away from Ishan where I spent my childhood. It was almost a day's trip by lorry because there were few buses. I took the entrance examinations and got admitted. During those times, there was an aerodrome in Benin. It was used once in a day and we heard the sound of an airplane whenever it came. In those days, when you hear the sound, you were expected to look out for it at another direction because we were told that the airplane was so fast that the sound is left behind and so it was believed that the airplane had already passed where you heard the sound. The aerodrome was far away from school and so what we often did was to sneak out of the school, pretending that we were going to the school farm. We had a farm and the agricultural

master would love to see somebody going into his farm. We then hired and rode bicycles to the aerodrome. We hired a bicycle for one pence per hour. I couldn't ride a man's bicycle so I rode on a woman's own. A man's bicycle was too tall for me and I couldn't stretch my legs enough to reach the pedals. This was how we always got to the aerodrome. If we came too near the airplane, the sentry – the security man - would flog us.

During my last year in college, I heard of the Royal Air Force so I applied to join. They replied and sent me photographs of pilots, engineers, radio officers, rear gunners, navigators and trainings. Since I did not have the money to buy myself a ticket to travel to Britain, I decided to work with the railways in Lagos. Later I got to know through the Daily Times that government wanted to send people on scholarship for training as pilots in England, so I applied and got the scholarship.

The result of the application was supposed to be announced through the radio. In those days, if you could not afford a radio, you buy a radio fussion. What this meant was that the news on the radio was relayed through wire, like a telephone. You had a small box with a wire that went into it and through the wire you could hear radio announcements. That was how I heard my name announced as one of the winners of the scholarship. Eventually, three of us – Robert Hayes, Edward Ajakaiye and I were sent to England.³¹

Urbanisation

Urbanisation was a major feature of the realities that our subjects of study and many others like them had to contend with. As children, their ability to influence anything was near absent. As young adults however, references

have already been made to their zeal not only to influence the direction of their ambitions but also to avail the fear of some of their parents whose reluctance to accept the attractions of urbanizing factors like education was 'grounded' in long-held traditional beliefs. As children, they were more of victims of the evolving dispensation rather than determinants. Cities were developing fast and remote outskirts around the cities were gradually evolving into urban centres: "Agege was a farmland and Mushin was a place of serenity where we used to holiday or spend weekends after long periods in the hustle of the Lagos Island."³² Even in the villages, children had to increase their efforts at passing examinations in their determination to search for jobs and better livelihood.³³ The cities were lands of dreams and despite the reservations of some parents in the viability of western education as we have noted, it was considered as a pedestal through which the opportunities could be accessed.³⁴ Children who attended schools were encouraged by their parents, inspired by their teachers and fascinated by the prospects of the rewards of hard work. For those who grew up in the cities, they had the additional privilege of becoming accustomed with the mannerisms, attitudes and the 'enlightened lifestyle' promoted by city life. Even at that, childlike attitudes were compelling: "the gutters in Lagos were so clean that we used to make waterboats, put them inside and allow them to float away while we ran after them in excitement."³⁵

Political Awareness

Mobilisation for the support of political candidates or for the agitation against colonial administrative policies also played significant role in the imaginations of children and young adults. The personalities of indigenous political figures like Tafawa Balewa, Obafemi Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro, Adegoke Adelabu, Nnamdi Azikiwe and their activities in the colonial struggle were hearsays for many.³⁶ The opportunity to participate in any form of political activity was for those who have been mobilised to respond. The nationalists were near-mythical figures because

of the consistent hearsays of their patriotic endeavours. Since many children lacked the ability to gain access to them, they were content with the fascinating stories about the independence struggles from their fathers and mothers, some of who were only vaguely informed of the developments. Since there was no need for confirmation because of everyday interaction with the realities administered by 'white-skinned men' and the admiration their fathers had for the 'Olaju' (i.e those who had been enlightened in the manner of the European and who were capable of the same achievements as displayed by the whites), the children were joyful about the evolving social transformation. For Mosobalaje Raimi who was twenty years old in 1940, this was enough reason to demonstrate support for local politicians like Lalupon, Akinloye and Adalakun:

I grew up to become interested in following politicians to rallies and political meetings. We were always singing in processions and often in uniformed clothes. Some of us knew what was going on with the politicians. For instance, ...(pause) I can't remember the date now... it was on a Tuesday that the body of Adegoke Adelabu was brought from Lagos to Ibadan and it was on the 17th day of the Muslim fasting period.³⁷

In Lagos, Sakuratu Arogundade described how she got to know of a politician's death in 1954:

J. N. Sapas and Company was one of the earliest transport buses used in Lagos. I was in one of their buses, on my way home from school on Lagos Island when I heard that Bode Thomas had died. We have been hearing of Bode Thomas as one of our great politicians.³⁸

Celebrations

One of the most profound events that engendered fond memories and sentimental attachments to the colonial period was the Empire Day

celebrations which was introduced to all schools in colonial Nigeria.³⁹ It was fun-filled and exciting in the memories of living witnesses. Ajayi, a fourteen-year-old in 1957 had near-death experience as a result of the excitement of participating in the games organized to celebrate it in Abeokuta:

I participated in the games that were organized to celebrate it in the primary school I attended at Orile Ilugun in Abeokuta. In the process of participating, a stick, which got broken, pierced through my ribs and I had to be carried out of the field. The school did not take responsibility for the injury and I had to be attended to by my parents. The injury remains to this day.⁴⁰

Although Ajayi also had cause to have regrets, his consolations rested in the fact that he was selected to compete in an event that his mates would have sacrificed anything for to compete in. This decision to relegate discomfort in favour of participation in the Empire Day celebrations was a significant part of children's attitude in colonial days. Hence, Ajayi's attitude, like his mates, indicated the opportunity the Empire had to exploit the naivety of children towards venerating the Crown. The same excitement characterized visitations of important personalities to localities, like that of the British Monarch Queen Elizabeth. In 1956, the queen visited different parts of Nigeria and children were mobilised to welcome the monarch in the various schools:

I was living with my parents at Elebodo in Ilugun which had the Ilugun railway station. The queen travelled by train from Lagos through Abeokuta to Ilugun where she emerged from the coach in a white gown and gloves on the hands. Her husband, the duke of Edinburgh was beside him. She waved to those of us who had gathered to welcome her.⁴¹

In the 1960 independence celebrations, children were once again mobilized, as had been the tradition since the Empire Day celebrations, to demonstrate

patriotism and to celebrate the exit of the colonialists and the dawn of the self-governing territory that had been named Nigeria. It was pure fun and fanciful memory:

We were the children of independence. On October 1, they provided food for all children in primary and secondary schools with very big beef. We were given plastic cups as souvenirs and the Nigerian flags that were distributed that day were imported from England. After the march-past, we ate, danced and enjoyed ourselves.⁴²

Conclusion

Drawing upon the recollections of individuals who lived as children and young adults in colonial Southwestern Nigeria, this paper has been able to present similarities in the expression of fond memory of the period between 1940-1960. These reflections by men and women who lived in a geographical section of a past that has been adjudged by scholars as one of the worst and most challenging periods in the history of the African continent is revealing of an alternative perspective to the colonial period. What speaks greater volume and which cannot be documented by this brief endeavour were the body languages with which the people so interviewed for this purpose expressed their emotional attachment to and fondness of the period. Regrets were minimal. Rather, indications were that if they had to live that experience all over again, they would so do gladly. Hence, this is an indication of a counter memory in the sense that it goes against the scholarly presentation of the period that colonialism affected society in more terrible ways than the positive. Of course, it is argued that those who appraised the period have greater capacity to do so, and that as a result, high level of objective judgment is attained. However, it leaves us with the dilemma that has beset historical scholarship for centuries: who is the best judge of periods in history: the men who lived it or the men who documented it or both? Emotion is a human attitude that play very strong

role in the perceptions of life and the environment man lives in. This has been captured to a great extent by the documentation of the period of the trans-Atlantic slavery and the slave trade. This is possible because the physical non-human evidences are so strong and expressive of the emotions and experiences of the victims that the scholars were able to attain some good measure of the representation of the period in history. The physical evidence of the formal colonial period in many African societies are also verifiable but, in comparative terms, they lack the emotional expressions of say, the slave chains and the cannons in such places as the Elmina castle in Ghana or the slave relics museum in Badagry, Nigeria.

This study therefore, has indicated the need to reappraise certain periods of colonial history, with significant reference to those who lived the period. The growing disadvantage is that a significant number of such men and women have died or are dying. Hence, such virtually receded emotions which are not adequately captured in the literature are rife. True, the expressed emotions and recollections suffer forgetfulness and inability to adequately present the period coherently and logically as some could not recollect specific dates or chronology. But the strength of their recollections is affirmable from the authority that age confers on them. Additionally, what cannot be discarded is the fact that children and young adults - those who lived it at the time covered by this study and in all societies, possess the capacity not only to live intensely the here and the now, but also in a manner that determines the path of adulthood which often prides itself as the most psychologically and emotionally strong of the periods of individual life cycle on earth. This study has indicated that such assumption is false, and that historical study in particular should weave into its engagements the emotions at play in the time periods it investigates. The success of the discipline may depend on its ability to consistently reappraise local humanity within its geographical space, particularly in this century which has continued to witness the debasement of man's humanity in favour of globalization and material advancement.

Endnotes

1. The universe of works is too vast for us to explore. Very few of the pioneering interrogations include the whole series of the Ibadan School of History and the well-known African scholars like Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney and Basil Davidson, amongst others, whose theses raise damning conclusions on the colonial project.
2. Abosede A. George, *Making Modern Girls: A History of Girlhood, Labor, and Social Development in Colonial Lagos*, (Ohio University Press, 2014). Retrieved from <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com>, 14/2/2019.
3. In the petitions of those who wrote to the colonial government. Consider Aderinto's submission in Saheed Aderinto, "O! Sir I do not know either to kill myself or to stay": Childhood Emotion, Poverty and Literary Culture in Nigeria 1900-1960, *The Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth*, 8, No. 2, (John Hopkins University Press, 2015): 273-294.
4. See Saheed Aderinto, "Researching Colonial Childhoods: Images and Representations of Children in Nigerian Newspaper Press, 1925-1950", *History in Africa: A Journal of Method*, 39 (2012): 241-166.
5. 'Reviewed' in the sense that their experiences have inspired interrogations of the colonial period. Consider Alison Izzet, "The Fears and Anxieties of Delinquent Yoruba Children," *Odu*, 1, (1955): 26-34; Ayodeji Olukoju "The Cost of Living in Lagos, 1914-45," In David M. Anderson and Richard Rathbone eds., *Africa's Urban Past*, Oxford: Oxford, Heinemann and James Currey, 2000, 126-143; Elisha P. Rene, "Childhood Memories and Contemporary Parenting in Ekiti, Nigeria", *AFRICA*, 75 – 1(2005): 63-82; Saheed Aderinto, ed., *Children and Childhood in Colonial Nigerian Histories* (African Histories and Modernities) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Abosede George, "Within Salvation: Girl Hawkers and the Colonial State in Development Era Lagos", *Journal of Social History* 44, (2011): 837-859; Simon Heap "Jaguda Boys': Pickpocketing in Ibadan, 1930-1960" *Urban History* 24, (1997): 324-342.
6. N.A.I. Comcol. 1, File No 2766, Vol II. These teenagers amongst others, wrote petitions to the Commissioner for the colonies between 1940 and 1959: Nosiru Lawal, G. A. Aina, Elijah Olu, Out Asuquo, and Rose Ojenughe.
7. N.A.I. Comcol. 1, File No 2766, Vol. II, Letter 816, Correspondence from James Ogedengbe to the Commissioner for the colony, Lagos, November 17, 1949.
8. Consider these lines written by Philip Ogunyemi, a teenager, to the Commissioner for the Colonies, Lagos, in 1949:

My Lord, you are my backbone, my lord and my savior through whom
I can be favoured and grow under its shade. Kindly relief my agony for

me my Lord by helping me to get work. I have knowledge of typing and office written, no obligation done is thrown away but the reward be in heaven. [Errors in the original].

- N.A.I. Comcol. 1, File No. 2766, Vol II, Letter 814, Phillip Ogunyemi to Commissioner for the colony, Lagos, November 11, 1949.
9. There is an exception. A boy named Robert Hayes who did not write any petition and who walked the streets of Lagos aimless in 1947 later became the first Nigerian pilot. I used the archival records pertaining to the efforts to locate the father of this boy by the colonial authorities for my Ph.D thesis. See Decker Jonathan Babatunde, *A History of the poor in Lagos, 1861 – 1960*, PhD Thesis submitted to the Department of History and Strategic Studies and School of Postgraduate Studies, University of Lagos, Nigeria, September 2012.
10. Oladapo Odebiyi, *Philip Asiodu: A Pillar of Nation Building*, (VBO Nigeria Ltd./POG Ltd, 1997); Ernest N. Emenyonu, *Cyprian Ekwensi: A Literacy Celebration of Cyprian Ekwensi's Sixty Fifth Birthday* (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Plc., 1987); “Aduke Alakija”. In Jennifer S. Uglow, Frances Hinton and Maggy Hendry eds., *The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Women's Biography*, (Macmillan Publishers).
11. Consider Wole Soyinka's thoughts as a teenager in 1946 in Wole Soyinka, *Ibadan: The Penkelemites Years, A Memoir 1946 – 65*, (London: Methuen, 1994), 89 – 94.
12. Olu, a five-year-old in 1934,
“...could of course not understand that the day was for any other thing than games and fun. On this day, there was a print event and Ludola (Olu) was one of the runners. The signal went off and everybody raced towards the tape. Up to the point of almost finishing the race, Ludola (Olu) was in the lead. But suddenly he sighted his mother seating under the guests' canopy near the tape. Instead of finishing the race, he veered off the track and made a bee-line for his mother. He flew into her arms, thus exchanging a clear win in the competition for the warm embrace of his mother!” See Udu Yakubu, *An Adjusted Dream: A Biography of Olu Akinkugbe* (Lagos: West African Book Publishers, 2002), 11. Consider also Shafi Lawal Edu' experiences during the Empire Day celebration in 1927 in Siyan Oyeweso, *Journey from Epe: Biography of S. L. Edu* (Lagos: West African Book Publishers, 1996), 50.
13. Consider Samuel Ohiomah's attitude towards the airplane in the 1940s in Samuel Ohiomah, *The African Pilot*, (Lagos: Amanda Communications, Lagos, 1999), 1-5. and Olu Akinkugbe's near death experience in 1935 in Udu Yakubu, *An Adjusted Dream: A Biography of Olu Akinkugbe*, 12.

14. Interview with Chief Cyprian Ekwensi (late), Monday, February 19, 1996, 141 Ojuelegba Road, Surulere, Lagos, 10.30 a.m., 75 years old. See Also Decker, Jonathan Babatunde, A Biography of Chief Cyprian Ekwensi, Long Essay, Department of History, University of Lagos, Nigeria, November 1996, 12.
15. Consider the concluding paragraphs of Samuel Crowther's letter to the Reverend William Jowett (then secretary of the Church Missionary Society) in 1837 detailing the circumstances connected with his being sold as a slave in J. F. Ade-Ajayi, *A Patriot to the Core: Bishop Ajayi Crowther* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2001), 40 - 41.
16. Consider the experiences of the Nigerian nationalist Nnamdi Azikiwe in the 1910s and the 1920s in Nnamdi Azikiwe, *My Odyssey: An Autobiography* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1970), 17 – 30. Consider also the experience of Olatunde Abudu a Nigerian entrepreneur who spent his boyhood days in the 1940s in Yomi Akinyeye, *Olatunde Abudu: The Man with Mission* (Lagos: Diamond Publications, 2009), 10.
17. Interview with Madam Ayoka Owonla Tinuola. Retired Trader, 80+ Resident, 15, Fagbemi Street, Oke Baale, Osogbo. May 29, 2011.
18. Interview with Madam Karimu Lawal, Trader, 83 years, Ile Oloye Atayo compound, Mapo, Ibadan, October 12 2013.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. Interview with Sandra Barnes, Professor of Anthropology, University of Pennsylvania, United States at the Natural History Museum, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife, May 27, 2011.
22. The conditions that nurtured such interests prevailed in several parts of Southwestern Nigeria before the beginning of the period of our focus. Consider for example A. I. Asiwaju, "Formal Education in Western Yorubaland, 1889-1960: A Comparison of the French and British Colonial Systems", *Comparative Education Review*, 19, Iss. 3, (1975): 434-450. Available at: <https://col.org/10.1086/445851>.
23. Interview with Most Senior Apostle Taiwo Ajayi, Horologist and Church Leader, 75 years, Make shift shop, NIPOST Compound, opposite Railway Compound, Dugbe, Ibadan, October 2, 2013.
24. For some parents, money was available but considered useful if diverted to fund other commercial activities engaged in by the family. The body language of some of the respondents interacted with indicated regret and attributed their inability to proceed with their education to lack of foresight on the part of their parents to appreciate western education.
25. Interview with Chief A. A. Abiola, Retired Agricultural Officer in western region of Nigeria, Abobajiroro of Saki, Gbekuba, Apata, behind Moor Plantation, 86 years,

October 2, 2013. Recounting his experience, he remarked:

After attending Baptist Boys High School in Abeokuta, I had to decide what I wanted to do further. I proceeded for training as an agricultural officer at the school of agriculture in Moor plantation in Ibadan. After admission, I was allocated a farm to plant various types of crops like tomatoes, yam and cassava. After my training at the Moor plantation, I was posted to man agricultural divisions as trained agricultural officer in the western region. I was employed to supervise other labourers who were then paid up to three pence individually as daily wage. I was admired by many and my experience and contribution to the local community earned me a chieftaincy title - the *Abobajiroro* of *Saki* conferred on me by the traditional ruler of *Saki*.

26. Interview with Alhaja Folorunso, Trader, 70+ Resident, No 2 Osun State University Road, Oke Baale, Osogbo. June 19, 2011.
27. Interview with Pa Ganiyu Lawal, Retired Carpenter, 75+, Resident, Oshodi Tapa Street, Lagos Island, September 18, 2011.
28. Interview with Pa Lamidi Akanmu, Retired Automobile Mechanic, 86, Oleyelogun compound, Oke Dada, Mapo, Ibadan, September 28, 2013.
29. Interview with Madam Himani Alarape Trader, 78 years, Ile Molade, Mapo, Ibadan. October 2, 2013.
30. Interview with Mr. M. A. Shoyemi, Retired Senior Locomotive Inspector, Nigerian Railways, Ibadan 68 years, Association of Pensioners Branch Secretariat, Railway Compound, Dugbe, Ibadan, October 2, 2013.
31. Interview with Captain Samuel Ohiomah, Retired Pilot, 73 years, 12 Works Road G. R. A., Ikeja, Lagos, Friday February 18, 2005. Samuel Ohiomah became one of the first few Nigerians pilots to fly across the Atlantic and was privileged to fly four serving Nigerian Heads of States at different periods.
32. Interview with Ambassador Aduke Alakija, Retired Diplomat, 86 years, No. 3, Mosafejo Close, Off Queens Drive, Ikoyi, Lagos, Monday March 12, 2007.
33. Interview with Captain Samuel Ohiomah.
34. Interview with Chief Philip Asiodu, Retired Civil Servant, Politician, 73 years, No. 2, Ologun Agbaje Street, Off Adeola Odeku Street, Victoria Island Lagos, Friday 23 February, 2007.
35. Interview with Ambassador Aduke Alakija, Ambassador Alakija was making reference to one of the choice areas of Lagos Island – Customs Street, where she lived as a child almost directly opposite Glover Memorial Hall.
36. Interview with Madam Aminat Oladeinde, Trader, 70+, and Resident 35, Bankole Street, Olowogbowo Area, Lagos Island, May 15, 2011.

37. Interview with Madam Mosobalaje Raimi, Trader, 93 years, Ile Agagagugu, Bere, Ibadan, October 12, 2013, 93 years.
38. Interview with Alhaja Sukuratu Arogundade, Trader, 78 years, Resident, 35, Bankole Street, Olowogbowo, Lagos Island, Lagos, May 15 2011.
39. Many of the respondents could not recollect the exact date the celebrations were held. Some said November 17. Others claimed November 1. Others said it was organized in the month of October. However, the Empire Day was first celebrated on 24 May 1902. In 1958, it was renamed the British Commonwealth Day and later Commonwealth Day in 1966. See Ben Johnson, "Empire Day", <https://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofBritain/Empire-Day/>, Accessed 2017.
40. Interview with Most Senior Apostle Taiwo Ajayi, Horologist and Church Leader, 75 years, Make shift shop, NIPOST Compound, opposite Railway Compound, Dugbe, Ibadan, October 2, 2013. He responded with an attitude that indicated some pride, fond memory and conquest he showed the author his part of the rib affected as a result of that experience.
41. Interview with Most Senior Apostle Taiwo Ajayi. He referred to the Duke of Edinburgh as 'Edinboro' with body language that indicated conviction and assurance of the reference.
44. Interview with Mr. M. A. Shoyemi, Retired Senior Locomotive Inspector, 68, Nigerian Railways.

Newspaper Editorials and Governance: The Example of the *People's Daily Graphic*, Ghana in the Early 1980s

Omon M. Osiki

Introduction

The impact of the press on governance in Ghana was arguably one of the most contentious components of the Ghana Revolution in the 1980s.¹ By actively courting the government, but also coming hard on them when necessary, the press in Ghana of the 1980s tried to create a consensus on the necessity of good governance within the Ghanaian society.² Even though the various media voices and their editorials argued for improvement, accountability, transparency and an egalitarian society where all Ghanaians would contribute their own quotas to national development, but within the confines of the rule of law, they were sometimes perceived as one-sided, exaggerative, apologetic, and above all, harsh and intolerant of dissenting voices, which compelled critical observers to label them “the mouthpiece of incumbency.”³

The paper makes use of the historical methodological approach in terms of data collection and interpretation. Hence, the material for the study was collected at the Public Records and Archive Administration Department (PRAAD), Accra, Ghana in 2015 and 2016. The descriptive and analytical approach is adopted to present an understanding of media roles during the period under review. A brief historical background is provided when needed for a detailed understanding of the analysis. The pieces of information analysed are contained in the various editorials of the *People's Daily Graphic*. The analysis of the information from the selected editorials is done thematically as follows: Introduction; the media as mouthpiece of government: conceptual and literature review; the establishment and orientation of the (*People's*) *Daily Graphic*; the media and

governance in Ghana in the 1980s; critique of media roles in governance: the *People's Daily Graphic* and human freedom; the *People's Daily Graphic* and student agitations; the *People's Daily Graphic*: economic and democratic aspirations; the *People's Daily Graphic*: ideology, gender and governance; the *People's Daily Graphic*: foreign relations and governance; and lastly conclusion.

The Media as Mouthpiece of Government: Conceptual and Literature Review

The media is without a doubt, one of the pillars of every society. Its acknowledged role as the fourth estate of the realm imposes on it the responsibility of interfacing between government and the people. However, in playing this onerous role, the media could be tempted to tilt towards one side of the divide to serve as a mouthpiece of government to manipulate information or to be the watchdog of the society to stimulate good governance for the benefit of the generality of the people.⁴ Sometimes, the media is accused of being a government mouthpiece, a derogatory term that portrays the media as an accessory to an oppressive or exploitative government, as well as its propaganda machine.⁵ This accusation is understandable because, according to Rick Larsen, while some aspects of government's policies and control may be difficult to quantify, its media access is “tangible, measurable and cumulative” and can be directly felt by the people.⁶ However, the media could pursue the interest of the government to the disadvantage of the people by misrepresenting the facts to them.⁷ In that connection, the media may be seen as an appendage of the government in power.⁸ When this is the case, the “independence” of the media is easily compromised,⁹ and its status as the proverbial fourth estate of the realm becomes questionable.¹⁰ Accordingly, the media is expected to strike a balance between its role as the “conscience” of the people and the “mouthpiece” of the government or incumbent.

Interestingly, in her assessment of democratic governance and the relationship between the state and civil society organisations in Ghana from 1982 to 2000,

Christiana Atibil argues that there is bound to be acrimonious relationship between the state and non-state actors, such as the media, if the latter try to assert its independence while the former is bent on asserting its authority over all activities within its territory, including those of the NGOs, civil society organisations and the media.¹¹ The reason for this is that several state actors tend to dislike the idea of media “interference” in governance, expect them to be apolitical and do not expect them to overstep their bounds by demanding government accountability, especially in the area of human rights.¹² Some other scholars such as Gary¹³ and Hyden¹⁴ believe the weakness of the state in Africa is one major reason why it is intolerant of the media and other non-state actors. In contrast, Boone,¹⁵ Shivji¹⁶ and Ekeh¹⁷ have emphasised the effects of colonialism on the relationship between state and non-state actors in Africa. They argue that the nature and workings of the current political structures in most African states are a continuation of colonial authoritarianism, which was apparently opposed to dissenting voices. In the same vein, Chris Ogbondah, in some of his contributions to our understanding of the relationship between the media and good governance, argues that the importance of a free press in the political economy of any country cannot be underestimated because a free press is vital in the developmental process of any society. Conversely, he observed that a controlled press, such as is the case in several African countries, is incapable of unearthing graft, fraud, theft, corruption, bribery, embezzlement, and other related crimes in Africa.¹⁸ On the basis of this premise, Ogbondah concludes that a free press could be a valuable weapon in fighting corruption.¹⁹

However, some scholars such as Aggarwala,²⁰ Sommerlad,²¹ Lee,²² Hachten,²³ and Golding²⁴ have argued that African leaders believe that given the continent's subservient position in the global economic system as well as the continent's colonial legacies of authoritarianism and fragility, a free press in the Western sense could too easily lead to instability and internal chaos.²⁵ This conclusion contrasts with the position that the ability of the press to investigate and uncover unwholesome practices within the government, the bureaucratic or bourgeois class, and the entire society, could provide the necessary panacea for socio-political stability and stem mismanagement in government.²⁶

Besides, media objectivity implies impartial writing, assessment and interpretation of local, national, and international issues. This could also extend to fighting for the truth even when it is unpalatable to the press itself and the willingness to be fair to everybody- “to the man who appears in court on a criminal charge, to the man who accuses and to the politician who makes wise or unwise decisions.”²⁷ On the contrary, when there is an imbalance in the discharge of these dual responsibilities, the media may be seen as the “attack dog” of the government and by extension, anti-people.²⁸

The Establishment and Orientation of the (*People's*) *Daily Graphic*

The *Daily Graphic* is a Ghanaian state-owned daily newspaper published in Accra, the capital of Ghana. The paper was established in 1950 by Cecil Harmsworth King (1901-1987) of the London Daily Mirror Group.²⁹ King was an activist journalist who believed that the press could be used to promote good governance. For this reason, he was described as the giver of news to the proletariat.³⁰ He was the chairman of *Daily Mirror* Newspapers, *Sunday Pictorial* Newspapers and the International Publishing Corporation. His decision to establish the *Daily Graphic* in Ghana was informed by his conviction that the press could be used to direct governance for the benefit of the masses in Ghana. However, during the colonial period the paper regularly received large government funding from British banks, but it assisted in encouraging national unity and raising awareness of events to ordinary Ghanaians.³¹

Following the independence of Ghana in 1957, the *Graphic* became one of the most widely read dailies in Ghana covering political, social, economic and educational issues. During military rule in Ghana, several editors of the paper perceived to be opposed to government policies were sacked.³² In 1979, the newspaper was renamed the *People's Daily Graphic*, to “remind the people that it belongs to them,”³³ but more importantly to reflect the revolutionary inclination of the regime.³⁴ However, it can be argued that the standpoint of the

paper varied from time to time depending on the courage of its personnel as well as the tolerance of the regime in power.

The Media and Governance in Ghana in the 1980s

The early 1980s in Ghana witnessed the military rule of Flt-Lt J.J. Rawlings, which was perceived in some quarters as a “revolutionary” or “people’s government”. Expectedly, many Ghanaians yearned for the media to play the balancing roles of the mouthpiece of the government and the defender of the people’s interests. However, it was perceived more as the mouthpiece of the incumbent government. Of particular importance was the role played by the *People’s Daily Graphic* in promoting the revolutionary aspirations of the People’s National Defence Committee (PNDC). For instance, the newspaper in its editorial of June 4, 1983, claimed that the image of the Armed Forces had been “tarnished by social excesses and indulgence in economic mismanagement” before the government of J.J. Rawlings was inaugurated.³⁵ It also argued that exploitation and corruption were given “free licence” by the political leadership that the government had overthrown. In a sense of majestic finality, the paper averred that it was obvious that “at the end of the day, the average person (in Ghana) felt that his government had come.”³⁶ This was an obvious attempt to burnish the image of the military government of Rawlings.

In the same vein, the paper praised the second adventure of the military by referring to the 31st December 1981 military coup as an attempt to “halt the journey to doom.”³⁷ Interestingly, it referred to accusations of military brutality as “isolated cases of molestation,” to justify military involvement in the governance of Ghana. Indeed, the paper described the “People’s Armed Forces” as “an agent of change” in terms of their physical involvement in agriculture, construction, and communal projects as was the case in some post-World War II (1939-1945) European and Asian countries. Without providing enough reasons for comparison, the editorial made references to the need for Ghanaians to emulate the Japanese, the Germans, the Chinese, and others who had to build on

the ruins and scars left by the Second World War. In fact, it urged the people to learn the lesson that the country had been on a course to rebuild itself because “a journey of a thousand miles must begin with a step.”³⁸

In another editorial of June 22, 1983, the paper commended the mass demonstrations of June 21, 1983, across Ghana in support of the PNDC, as well as the December 31 1981 Revolution. While the two events were targeted at discredited politicians, the editorial claimed that the demonstrations were done “when enemies of the people thought that the temporary incidence of hunger was going to sway people away from the course of 31st December.” It went further to state that “it is quite clear that the enemies of the Revolution are either too slow to accept the irreversibility of the Revolutionary process or are simply incapable of accepting change.”³⁹ Obviously, the paper tried to project a good image for the ruling PNDC in the face of its extra-judicial actions against opposition elements and create some imaginary opponents of the government and the masses. It described the opponents of the government as people who “lacked reasoning” because they refused to appreciate the “PNDC's restraint in the use of force or violence even in the face of obvious provocation.” In contrast, the editorial eulogized the ruling PNDC for being “morally and scientifically correct” in terms of their position on the process of transforming the society politically, socially and economically.⁴⁰

In the editorial of April 13, 1983, the newspaper tried to promote the interest of the incumbent by stressing its supposed disregard for oppression. Based on this, the paper urged Ghanaians to reconcile with one another as well as with the government since the initial anger and hostility that greeted the overthrow of the “exploiting class” had died down and had given way to a great deal of tolerance. In contrast, the paper exaggerated Rawlings' admonition to members of the People's Defence Committee (PDC) to be socialist and revolutionary in their orientation and relationship with ordinary Ghanaians to underscore its pro-government position.⁴¹ In addition, it noted that while “this new thinking may not go down well with a number of people who believe that they should pay back what they have suffered under the previous oppressive ruling classes,” it

was important for all Ghanaians to maintain “cordiality, tolerance, honesty and respect.”⁴² In fact, it admonished all Ghanaians who called themselves revolutionaries to “use simple language, have a lot of patience with the underprivileged, be humble, respect authority, be courteous to the people they serve, be honest, believe in the socio-economic transformation of this country and be prepared at all times to die to save Ghanaians.”⁴³

The position of the editorial aligned perfectly with the expectations of the government and assisted in the propagation of its agenda both within and outside Ghana.⁴⁴ For instance, a Ghanaian student in Cuba, who was obviously influenced by the new dispensation, admonished members of the PDCs to realise “how necessary it is for their survival to hold onto their newly-acquired power jealously and to use it properly,”⁴⁵ because to him the whole revolution was about the PDC.

However, in a different editorial of November 7, 1984, the paper acknowledged that there were allegations of corruption and oppression against PDC members, but it preferred to refer to them as “misconstrued allegations for selfish reasons” against “honest and upright cadres” that were determined to defend the principles of the revolution.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the editorial described those making the “allegations” as “detractors of the revolution.” On the other hand, the editorial defended members of the PDCs by stressing that “when mud is thrown, the honest person is frequently too busy to scrape it off...The mud will fall away, and those who threw it will be recognized,” thereby implying that the opposition was simply “making a scapegoat” out of PDC members.⁴⁷ Lastly, the editorial rebuked some “dishonest or incompetent ones within the Defence Committee (DC) structures,” who by their “muddled inefficiency” or by their “criminal acts” created bad image for the government, as “trouble-makers,” who “bully sensible people,”⁴⁸ to desist from their “fraudulent actions” or be “weeded out of the system.”⁴⁹ In the same manner, the paper in its editorial of November 12, 1984, reminded officials of the PDC that the philosophy of the 31st December Revolution had no room for the idea of power as something to cling to for its rewards, but was to be used “responsibly” to further the process of social transformation in Ghana.

Moreover, the editorial argued that the sacrifices demanded of them were greater than any reward.⁵⁰ In the same vein, it reminded the “power-hungry officers” that considerations of status and prestige were irrelevant in the revolutionary dispensation and stressed the fact that the officers were not career politicians of the past dispensations, who pushed others off the ladder in order to reach the top so that they could “enjoy.” Lastly, it concluded on the note that the revolution was an ongoing process in which every stage was an advancement upon the previous one, requiring different individuals with different contributions to make. The essence of the admonition was to bring about a new sense of urgency, dynamism, and above all, a substantial qualitative change, which would make possible a more vigorous drive forward to a new phase with increased efficiency, productivity and responsibility in the country.⁵¹

On rural development, the editorial of October 22, 1984 argued that the development of the rural areas should be given a priority by the Rawlings' government. However, instead of concentrating on the efforts of the Rawlings' government in rural development, the said editorial shifted the blame for the neglect of the rural areas to the previous government and the elites in Ghana. It argued that until the December 31, 1981 Revolution, the Ghanaian “opinionated” body politic obviously sought the elitist kind of politics which in turn created the conditions for urbanisation leaving the rest of Ghana where the majority lived, cut off from any development effort and “swimming in underdevelopment.”⁵² Indeed, the editorial did not hide the fact that it was bent on discrediting any effort at rural development prior to the revolution. For instance, it stressed that:

The provision of a few ephemeral road networks close to villages or through them are in themselves not ample grounds to claim a love for the rural people. Nor was the provision of unmaintained borehole systems a proven case of rural development. Such facilities were few and far apart but above all did not stand the test of time. They were largely window-

dressing devices for political expediency. But they could not be used to fool the rural people all the time.”⁵³

Besides, the editorial claimed that previous unsuccessful attempts to develop the rural areas simply created the impression in the minds of the people that politicians would only erect some kind of basic facilities in a village or hamlet when the latter needed their political support.⁵⁴ While some of these observations were appropriate, the impression created by the editorial was that the December 31 Revolution had created a situation of Eldorado in Ghana, a complete break from the past and an everlasting bliss for the country.⁵⁵

Critique of Media Roles in Governance: The *People's Daily Graphic* and Human Freedom

It is important to look critically at some of the strategies employed by the *People's Daily Graphic* in the discharge of its role as the mouthpiece of the government. First, most of the reporting and viewpoints of the newspaper were obviously exaggerated without any desire for verification of some of the claims. From time to time, the paper used figurative expressions as if they represented the truth. Expressions such as “It was 31st December which halted the journey to doom”⁵⁶ were created to give the impression that the new government was the messiah that Ghanaians needed for their transformation. However, when events proved otherwise, the editorials were quick to castigate the people for being “too impatient,” even though what was promised was a sudden change!

Moreover, the paper was quick to emphasize the positive aspects of the government. In several of its editorials, it glamourized what it called “the self-help spirit among Ghanaians that has been rekindled by December 31, 1981 Revolution.”⁵⁷ For instance, in the editorial of October 12, 1984, the paper commented on the efforts of the Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperatives to initiate rural-based projects in line with government determination to get the “people's leaders” to plan and execute projects with them.⁵⁸ While on one hand the editorial obviously pandered to the whims and

caprices of the leaders in most of its comments on government policies and programmes, on the other hand it was quick to condemn ordinary Ghanaians for daring to express pessimism about such policies.⁵⁹

The People's Daily Graphic and Student Agitations

On the role of the students on national development, the paper commended those who were “patriotic” enough to join hands with the government to move Ghana forward, while it condemned students who dared oppose what they considered harsh policies of the government.⁶⁰ However, the paper in its editorial of October 13, 1984, commended government's decision to increase the subsidy on the cost of feeding university students in the three universities and described it as “a welcome relief to parents who are currently making the sacrifice.”⁶¹ Besides, it suggested, for the consideration of government, that the feeding subsidy should be given to the students on a monthly basis so they could manage the fund themselves instead of the practice of allowing the university authorities manage the funds. This, the editorial argued, would enable the students choose with care what to buy and get more satisfaction for their money rather than depending on food served in the halls of residence and which cost the country about GHC56 daily per student, thereby promoting wastages and pilferage.⁶² Lastly, the paper maintained that the challenge in managing their own resources would make the students more resourceful, rather than being treated like primary school students by stakeholders.⁶³ This media support came at a time when several other interest groups called on the government to terminate the programme because it was estimated that the feeding subsidy increase would jump from GHC20 to GHC34 per student daily.⁶⁴ Based on the anticipated increase, the government was expected to appropriate about GHC30 million more to meet the commitment for the 1984/1985 session. Hence, there were plans for cut-downs in certain departmental expenditures already budgeted, such as stationery, typewriters, ribbons, fuel, and other services from the ministries.⁶⁵

However, the paper in the same editorial acknowledged the problems inherent in the university student-feeding programme. It noted that the pragmatic question that should be asked with respect to government's expenditure on education should be how long the nation, the government and the taxpayer would continue to foot the ever-increasing university education expenditure single-handedly. Furthermore, it asked, "as the people and the government are currently making considerable sacrifices to make university education possible for our sons and daughters ...in what ways are our products from universities reciprocating the indebtedness they owe to the tax-payers of this nation?"⁶⁶ In particular, the paper observed that soldiers constructed bridges, undertook agricultural projects and so on, but asked:

What have our universities offered to generate supporting incomes for themselves as organizations? What plans have our students to cut down on the cost of feeding them? Is it not our responsibility as parents to feed our children?⁶⁷

The People's Daily Graphic: Economic and Democratic Aspirations

Obviously, the *People's Daily Graphic* was also very much concerned about the relationship between democracy and governance in Ghana during the 1980s. The paper in its editorial of November 23, 1984, claimed that Ghanaians did not need to traverse their political boundaries to understand whether the type of democracy, which was held sacrosanct by some and which they would wish to have ingrained in the country's political system, had proven workable and successful or not. Furthermore, it alluded to the failures and collapse of the three republics in Ghana prior to the establishment of the administration of Rawlings to justify its condemnation of the Westminster type of democracy that was practised in the country.⁶⁸ The editorial, while quoting Justice D.F. Annan, a member of the PNDC and Chairman of the National Commission for Democracy, argued that the establishment of true democracy in Ghana failed because of the tendency of "planting upon the people foreign concepts and ideas

which do not take account of the country's historical events and the values of the people.”⁶⁹ Therefore, it regarded the experiment as “an alien political system which found politicians going to every length to win the votes of the electorate.”⁷⁰ This statement was obviously borne out of the fact that Justice Annan was frustrated with the way things were run in Ghana at the time instead of the actual effects of democracy on the system.

Indeed, the effectiveness of democracy as a concept was dependent on the attitudes of the operators of the system such as the political leadership, the bureaucracy, and the masses themselves. Little wonder the editorial argued that in the said system, the people were easily forgotten the moment politicians got what they wanted, but stressed that with the launching of the December 31 Revolution:

Ghanaians have been offered the opportunity to develop their own political structure with a democratic content which will enable the people not only to express their views freely but also to participate fully in a functioning democracy... to ensure a successful development of “the new” political structure because staying indifferent would not benefit anybody.⁷¹

Interestingly, when the government of Ghana devalued the cedi by 30% and increased the salaries of workers by 100% to compensate for the inflation created by the devaluation, the paper in its editorial of December 5, 1984, criticised the government for derailing from the spirit of the revolution.⁷² It wondered if it was entirely prudent to double wages and salaries at the critical moment of Ghana's history or if the massive additional burden on the government's coffer was warranted and strategically planned, bearing in mind the “low productivity, poor discipline and inefficiency in many work-places” in Ghana.⁷³ In addition, the editorial challenged the government to declare where the money to pay the salaries and wages would be sourced other than from funds, which would otherwise have been invested to provide future economic development for ordinary Ghanaians.⁷⁴

Similarly, the workers got a few knocks from the paper for being “less nationalistic” and “selfish” in their “constant” demand for salary and wage increases. Indeed, it questioned the rationale for the increases when “the prices of basic foodstuffs were within reasonable reach.”⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the editorial enjoined the workers to realise that the decision to increase incomes by 100% was a gesture of confidence that should be repaid with “greater responsibility, efficiency and productivity” by them to justify the confidence reposed in them. In contrast, the editorial argued that it would lead to a “state of apathy, malingering, inefficiency or betrayal of confidence” if the workers failed to double up in their responsibility to the people and the state.⁷⁶ In the same vein, the paper in its editorial of December 3, 1984, urged Ghanaians to take pride that “our modest achievement in food production can be an example to our neighbours who are faced with similar problems.”⁷⁷

Another important issue the paper raised was how Ghana would shore up its revenue base to meet its numerous challenges. Hence, in its editorial of November 15, 1984, the paper highlighted the tourism potential of Ghana, which the leaders had refused to take advantage of by harnessing and developing facilities that would enable the country capture a fair proportion of tourism revenue on the continent of Africa.⁷⁸ It lamented that attempts were made in the past by successive governments in the country to develop infrastructure and superstructures for the tourism industry to take-off but almost all the plans initiated either remained on the drawing board or fizzled out at the initial stages, indicating that Ghana was going in circles over the issue of tourism.⁷⁹ Lastly, the editorial challenged the government to see to it that some of the tourist centres in the country were developed so that they would serve as the starting point for her tourism take-off. In particular, it argued that “the element for sun, sand and sea had become an intricate part of international tourism” and that with a little political will such as the government helping the people to harness their blend of unique traditions and cultures into a composite tourism product, Ghana could benefit from the revenue that went with it.⁸⁰

In the same vein, the paper advocated a rapid approach to the development of

technology as a major strategy to boosting the economy of Ghana. For instance, in its editorial of November 17, 1984, the paper bemoaned the lack of appropriate technology to revolutionise the operation of cottage industries in the country in order to boost the status of local entrepreneurs and facilitate technology transfer. Indeed, the editorial gave an example of the problems, the difficulty, excruciating, and hazardous conditions under which traditional soap-makers at Bawjiase in the Central Region operated, as well as their problems and challenges to call attention to the need to prioritise the development of science and technology in Ghana in the effort to make the country self-sufficient in the production of essential commodities.⁸¹ In addition, it noted that the problem with Ghana's industrial set-up was lack of adequate strategy for the smooth transfer of local and modern technology from one group to another. Besides, it recommended that the Industrial Development Action Committee of the Ministry of Industries, Science and Technology, should place its hands firmly on the problems associated with small-scale and cottage industries to facilitate the transfer of technology to industrialists in various fields of endeavour and ensure that the self-reliance policy of the December 31 Revolution was achieved.⁸²

In the same vein, the paper in its November 17, 1984, editorial urged the government of Ghana to ratify the International Convention on Marine Pollution (MAR-POL) based on geopolitical, environmental, and economic considerations.⁸³ It argued that the need to combat marine pollution because of the danger posed to marine life, coupled with the fact that Ghana's southern base is firmly perched on the Gulf of Guinea, made it imperative for the country to be part of the Convention.⁸⁴

The People's Daily Graphic: Ideology, Gender and Governance

The *People's Daily Graphic* was one of the first government establishments and institutions in Ghana in the 1980s to change their names for ideological reasons to reflect the spirit of the revolution. Prior to that period, it was known as the

Daily Graphic. Hence, when the government decided to restructure the machinery of government by changing the name of the People's Defence Committee (PDC) and the Worker's Defence Committee (WDC) to Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR), the *People's Daily Graphic* in its editorial of December 3, 1984, encouraged Ghanaians to support the ideological change and to see it as an attempt to correct the problem of two parallel chains of command, which had led to “the dissipation of energy in fruitless tensions and power struggle.”⁸⁵ The editorial also noted that the development was to “enable the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution to work together with the people as a team, rather than being seen as separate organs.” This would ensure that there were “qualitative changes” which would enable Ghanaians to see more productive work in their community.”⁸⁶

It was in this connection that the paper in its editorial of December 29, 1984, commended the workers for devoting the yuletide celebrations to community service as well as rendering *pro bono* services to government agencies. In particular, it commended the example of the efforts of the entire Ashanti Regional staff of the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation for spending Christmas Day loading maize at buying centres and off-loading them into warehouses. Similarly, it eulogised the sacrifices of over one thousand workers of the Ghana Cocoa Board and its subsidiaries who assisted in off-loading cocoa at the Tema main harbour, for shipment. Furthermore, the editorial applauded the activities of Sunyani workers and various organs of the revolution who spent several hours evacuating cocoa and cleaning the municipality as a prelude to the celebration of the third milestone of the December 31st Revolution, in 1984.⁸⁷ Interestingly, the editorial concluded that, “Ghanaians have become aware of the fact that until such time that their socio-economic life begins to show a healthy sign of improvement there is no time to stand and stare, let alone hang the hair down in futile and useless merry-making when there is work to be done.”⁸⁸

Moreover, the *People's Daily Graphic* did not leave women out of its assessment vis-à-vis the governance system in Ghana during this period. For

instance, in its editorial of June 20, 1985, the paper acknowledged the efforts made by the PNDC to make laws to give women protection against some of the abuses to which wives and widows were subjected. In particular, the paper commended the government for ratifying the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, thereby creating a level playing ground for all Ghanaians.⁸⁹ The editorial believed the development would help to galvanise a tradition of equality between Ghanaian men and women as regards educational and job opportunities, equal pay for equal work, and equality before the law. However, it acknowledged that equality in law was not the same as equality in fact. Therefore, it urged women to be aware of their rights and to have the guts to challenge those who would deny them the rights, and if possible, seek legal redress and aid where necessary.⁹⁰

The People's Daily Graphic: Foreign Relations and Governance

In the area of foreign and diplomatic relations, the *People's Daily Graphic* was vocal in defending the interest of Ghana and Ghanaians. A few observations made by the paper on US-Ghana relations would suffice to illustrate the paper's disposition to Ghana's foreign image. For instance, on the consideration by the United States of America to cut aid to Ghana following a diplomatic disagreement between the two countries, the paper in its editorial of December 4, 1985, urged Ghanaians to think carefully and critically about the whole question of aid and also to differentiate between loans and grants from foreign countries.⁹¹ It observed that even though the US Government withheld aid from Ghana during the early period of the 1980s, Ghana later earned the respect of the United States because the country demonstrated enough responsibility and determination in restoring dignity to its economy. Hence, the United States had little or no option but to resume aid to Ghana in order "to save face and avoid being the 'odd man out'."⁹² Furthermore, the editorial claimed that it would be wrong for the United States to think that Ghana was dependent on its aid because aid from that country constituted a small fraction of the total or aggregate foreign aid to Ghana. Hence, the editorial reminded Ghanaians not to

regard aid as “goodies handed out with a pat on the head for good boys and girls who toe someone else's line only to be snatched away if they were seen to be disobedient.”⁹³

Moreover, in its editorial of December 2, 1985 the *People's Daily Graphic* alleged that the decision by the United States to “reconsider” aid to Ghana was a “repercussion” of Ghana's expulsion of four US diplomats, two of them Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers, for “unacceptable activities” in Ghana.⁹⁴ To be sure, towards the end of November 1985, the government of Ghana expelled four officials of the United States Embassy from the country. They included Mr. Bruce Dean Tefft, Miss Annette Woodams, and two CIA officials, namely Mr. Laurence Garufi, who was then the Director of the US Information Agency, and Mr. Robert Lee Kile, then Administrative Officer in the Embassy.⁹⁵ The government hinged its reasons for the action on what it described as the need to avoid recurrence of the events that led to the arbitrary arrest and detention of an “innocent” Ghanaian citizen in the United States and to ensure actual compliance of the United States by the understanding reached between the two governments.⁹⁶ Furthermore, the government of Ghana claimed that the activities of the four persons as diplomats were wholly unacceptable and not conducive to good relations between Ghana and the US.⁹⁷ To this end, the *People's Daily Graphic* likened the action of the United States to “a game of draughts or chess” meant to frighten Ghana into submission to the game of a world power.⁹⁸ It also noted that aid should be seen as “assistance from those whom we respect and who respect us, to enable us to free ourselves from dependence on further aid.”⁹⁹ Finally, it observed that when aid became a tool for manipulation, then dependence upon it was “a disease as dangerous as AIDS.”¹⁰⁰ By that submission, the *People's Daily Graphic* reminded Ghanaians that their national interest and pride were more important than foreign assistance.

In contrast to the above position, the *People's Daily Graphic* supported the lifting of ban on the export of yams in 1985, and criticised trade union leaders for their opposition to the policy.¹⁰¹ Specifically, Mr. A.K. Yankey, Secretary-

General of Trade Union Congress, had expressed disapproval of the government's decision to lift the ban on the ground that surplus supply of yams should be allowed to translate to cheap yams for workers. Indeed, in its editorial of November 15, 1985, the *People's Daily Graphic* argued that "harder working farmers, who also have to buy their basic needs, educate their children, pay hospital fees" should be encouraged to benefit from the gains that would accrue from the export of yams.¹⁰² It further noted that if Ghanaians wanted to achieve self-sufficiency in food production, then the farmers must be assured of continued ready markets and "meaningful prices" for their produce. However, in an apparent attempt to support the demands of the labour unions, the editorial urged relevant authorities to make yams available at "rock bottom prices for the poorest among our citizens, and at the same time produce enough returns for the farmer to produce even more."¹⁰³ The contradiction in supporting the export of yams and calling on the government to "reduce" the prices of the commodity at the same time was obvious in the argument of the paper.

Finally, the *People's Daily Graphic* advocated peaceful cooperation between Ghana and other African countries. In particular, the paper argued that Nigeria and Ghana must draw inspiration from their common history and return to their "golden age of solid cooperation."¹⁰⁴ Similarly, it urged Ghanaians and Nigerians to put behind them the episodes of the Alien Compliance Order of Ghana in 1969/1970, and the deportation order of illegal immigrants from Nigeria in 1983, 1984 and 1985. It agreed with other informed analysts that the events were episodes that constituted painful relationship, slow pace of pan-Africanism, and marred political and diplomatic goodwill on both sides.¹⁰⁵ In line with this recommendation, Ghana and Nigeria in 1985 agreed to restore entitlements and emoluments of all illegal immigrants expelled from both countries in 1969, 1983 and 1985.¹⁰⁶

Conclusion

The foregoing has demonstrated that it is the responsibility of the press to set itself free from government manipulation that could impede its dual roles as the

mouthpiece of the government to the society and the watchdog of the government on behalf of the society. In this regard, the *People's Daily Graphic* devoted a chunk of its editorials in the 1980s to balance these dual roles. However, the apparent attempt to accommodate dissenting voices notwithstanding, the editorials obviously showed lopsided assessments, which may have reinforced the general belief in Ghana in the 1980s that the *People's Daily Graphic* was an arm of the government and not necessarily the “voice” of the people, which it claimed to represent. This apparent handicap of the newspaper was occasioned by the exigencies of the period such as the autocratic nature of the military government, which did not tolerate dissenting voices or unfavourable reports, thereby limiting the opportunities available to the newspaper to present both sides of events, however unpleasant they may be.¹⁰⁷

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Millenarian Culture of Islamic Insurgency in Nigeria

Sunday Omotuyi

Introduction

“Our call refuses employments under the government which does not rule by what Allah has revealed. ...any other constitution or system that goes against the teaching of Islam negates the Quran and Sunnah” – (Muhammed Yusuf, 2009: 11).

Boko Haram insurgency is unarguably the single most potent menace threatening not only human security but also the territorial unity and sovereignty of Nigerian state. Since its transmutation into a trans-border insurgent jihadi group in 2010 after enduring a bloody military crackdown in 2009, Boko Haram's vicious campaign has led to the death of over 30,000 people in Nigeria alone.¹ While it was largely viewed as a group of disgruntled youths who were victims of pervasive corruption and governance failure that have characterised the post-colonial Nigerian state, its reality is far more complex than the mere narratives of unemployment and widening economic disparity in the country. Boko Haram's insistence on the implementation of Sharia law across Nigeria as well as its allegiance to Islamic State (IS) make the sect fit into Kaplan's *Fifth Wave* terrorism theory. Its change of name to Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) did not only reflect the goal of the sect as conceived by its leadership but it also highlights the desire of the group to be part and parcel of the global jihadi movement. Its vicious brutality making it the deadliest terror group in 2015² speaks volumes of the group's apocalyptically millenarian³ mind-set as well as its takfiri⁴ ideal which accounts for the sect's

unyielding commitment to the actualisation of its goal. As a millenarian movement, Boko Haram believes in the radical changes to Nigerian society aimed at transforming the country through conquest.

While terrorism of Islamist groups like al Qaeda is often attributed to the 'Clash of Civilizations' particularly between Islam and the 'crusading' West⁵ (Bassam, 2001; Huntington, 2002; Huntington, 2006; Ahmed & Forst 2005; Neumayer and Plumper, 2009), attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram group are viewed differently. Its terrorism is mainly attributed to the pervasive unemployment and governance crisis battling the Nigerian state. As with any other texts of religious groups, verses in the Islamic Holy book can be interpreted in diverse ways. Radical jihadists have a sense of obligation to “fight those who believe not in God... nor acknowledge the religion of truth (even if they are) of the people of the book”.⁶

The position of Islamist militants is succinctly captured by the former leader of Muslims in Tripoli, Sheik Saeed Shaaban, he maintains that:

We must reject democracy in favour of Islam, which is the unique (political) system worked out by the Almighty... Our march has just begun, and Islam will end up conquering Europe and America... for Islam is the only salvation... It is our mission to bring salvation to the entire world.⁷

Boko Haram leaders have not only echoed this world-view, but its founder, late Muhammed Yusuf, had sternly warned his followers that seeking employments or working under a secular government was haram (forbidden) as Muslims.⁸ In other words, Boko Haram, like many Muslims in Northern Nigeria, is not only against western education, as its name (Boko Haram) suggests, the sect frowns at believers working or seeking employments under a government (Nigerian democratic) not approved by Allah.⁹ This is a major feature that differentiates the group from other sects in Nigeria and explains its rejection of the amnesty deal with financial benefits proposed by the Goodluck Jonathan administration to end the crisis.

Therefore, this study attempts a nuanced analysis of the group by deconstructing the common narrative which exaggerates relative deprivation as a reason for the sect's insurgency. Using a historical trajectory and Kaplan's *Fifth Wave* concept, the paper argues that the sect's terrorism is connected to the long history of religiously driven uprisings in northern Nigeria. Its quest to restore 'pure Islam' accounts for the group's takfiri strategy of eliminating 'apostate Muslims' and 'infidels' alike. Boko Haram's transnational intentions coupled with its connections with wider global jihadi movement mark out the group as an existential security threat to Nigeria and other Lake Chad riparian states. To achieve the objective of the study, the paper is divided into four interrelated sections. The first part historicises the religiously-driven uprisings in Northern Nigeria. The next section interrogates the Boko Haram insurgency in the context of the theory of relative deprivation, while section three analyses the Boko Haram's millenarian ideology as a major factor in the group's insurgency in Nigeria, in particular, and Lake Chad region, in general. Finally, the paper concludes by suggesting ways by which vital non-military approaches could end insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Islamic Uprisings in Northern Nigeria: Echo from the Past

Extremist Islamist terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria's predominantly Muslim North. Machal's reflections on the chequered history of this region indicate that religiously driven violence has its antecedent in the Fulani Jihad of Usman dan Fodio in the last decade of 19th century.¹⁰ Ostensibly aimed at ridding Islam of apostasy and syncretism that characterised the religio-political order under the Hausa rulers, the success of the jihad and the subsequent establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, cemented Fulani political and religious leadership of the region. What started as a search for religious purification soon became a search for an Islamic caliphate as yesteryears itinerant evangelist became the Caliph of the newly established Sokoto Caliphate. With the establishment of the Caliphate, Islam has remained the focal veneer for the legitimacy of the Northern ruling elites, and consequently, its

politicians have always prided themselves as soldiers in the defence of the faith.¹¹ The liquidation of the Caliphate by the British invaders in 1903 resulted in the introduction of Indirect Rule with much resistance from the Fulani rulers.¹² Central to their hostility to the British administration was the rejection of Western culture of which non-Islamic educational system was a major component.

Jayeola-Omoyeni and Omoyeni provide an interesting insight into Northern Muslims' aversion to the Western education in the earliest stage of Nigerian state.¹³ They recall that it was this resistance that compelled the colonial authorities to direct the Christian missionaries to limit their evangelical activities to the South and the non-Muslim areas of the region. As Bamidele has pointed out, this "action was part of the British policy of preserving the North's Islamic identity while also avoiding potential inter-groups tension".¹⁴ The mistaken perception that modern/Western education in the North was a Christian infiltration of the largely Islamic society informed the decision of the Muslims led by their Emirs to oppose European educational activities in their domains.¹⁵ While blaming the Northern Islamic elements to the pitiable state of Western education in the North, Jayeola-Omoyeni and Omoyeni recall:

As the wave of Christian Missionary Education (C.M.E) regarded as formal or Western education pushed towards Hausa/Fulani and Kanuri strongholds in the north, the powerful Emirs in the areas rejected this educational system. The powerful Emirs in the territory were against the incursion of the C.M.E because they saw this type of education as a threat to Islam and Islamic culture which had already been firmly established in the northern areas for a long period of time.¹⁶

Aware that the conservative clerical establishment was vehemently against infiltration of Christianity into the core North in any guise, a number of fruitless efforts were made by the colonial administration to modernise the Koranic schools with emphasis on writing and reading in English Language. The efforts failed largely because the British could not be trusted given their Christian

heritage. This is more so given the stance of Attahiru, the last Caliph of Sokoto, who maintained that between Muslims and Infidels (British colonialists, educationists and explorers), there could be nothing but war.¹⁷

Till today, Western education continues to be associated with attempts to Christianise the Muslim North. This explains why a majority of school age children do not attend Western schools across core Northern Nigeria in preference for purely Islamic educational centres. In 2018, for example, according to UNICEF reports, Northern Nigeria has 7.9 million out-of-school-children.¹⁸ In fact, the obsession of the people for Islamic society and their aversion to modern education drew the ire of the former Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, who lambasted the Northern conservative Muslims of being stuck in the 13th century.¹⁹ The monarch says that their claim that children need no other knowledge than Islamic studies flies in the face of reality.²⁰ The hostility to Western education continues to resonate across northern part of the country, frustrating various governments' campaigns for school enrolment. Today, numerous modern primary schools constructed by the Jonathan administration to address the Almajiri issue have been left to rot by its successor. Generally, the extremist Islamic groups are determined to return Northern Nigeria into its purely Islamic past.

The rise of the extremist Maitatsine group led by one Islamic preacher, Muhammed Marwa in the 1980s, represented one of the many violent phases in an attempt to revive an undiluted Islamic tradition that prevailed in North before the advent of Europeans into the country. While the Maitatsine insurrection was crushed and its leader killed by the security forces, the sect's followers, though disbanded, never gave up the call for a Sharia-compliant Islamic society through armed struggle. It is believed that Boko Haram is one of the legacies of Maitatsine sect.²¹ Given the connections between the sect and Boko Haram as well as the widely held view about Western education in the North, it is not difficult to understand Boko Haram's rebellion. Its anti-Western jihad coordinated primarily against Nigerian secular government, Christianity and 'ignorant and apostate Muslims' is built around the common narrative in the

region. The rejection of Western education and Westernisation were the twin pillars which defined the sect.

Before the vicious campaign of Boko Haram to Islamise Nigeria, starting from the North, the Muslim Northern political elites had canvassed for Islamic principles in the country's administration.²² Writing in 2009, when Boko Haram had not become an insurgent group, Ekot notes that "From the onset, Muslims had never given up their quest for Nigeria to be an Islamic state."²³ The introduction of the Sharia legal system in 1999 by the Zamfara State Government reflected the mind-set of these elites with respect to Islam and the Nigerian Constitution. Most Muslim residents of the state were jubilant when the system was introduced. The general approval of Zamfara's experiment by northern Muslims within and outside the state encouraged other eleven core Northern states which are: Borno, Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebi, Niger, Sokoto and Yobe states to adopt the Penal Code. While it was generally applauded and celebrated in these states, the same cannot be said of Kaduna state where it led to widespread violence as Christians in the state vehemently opposed the law.²⁴ In spite of the crisis it has generated and the fact that it was against the spirit and letter of the Nigerian Federal Constitution, no prominent person in the region has called for the abrogation of the law since it was enacted in early 2000s.

The adoption of the Islamic legal system since year 2000 "greatly accelerated the pace of radicalisation in the North."²⁵ However, the operation of the system in subordination to the democratic Federal Constitution is regarded as abomination by the fundamental Islamist groups which demanded full implementation of Sharia law as against Zamfara's model.²⁶ Even the Shiite movement in the country led by Ibrahim El Zakzaky, though a minority Islamic sect which hopes to establish a theocratic state in Nigeria too, "rejected the introduction of the Sharia law as half-hearted".²⁷ The adoption of full Islamic system has remained a consistent demand by most Muslims in the North. For example, in 2001, President Muhammadu Buhari, a leader of opposition party in the defunct All Peoples' Party (APP) was reported to have called for the

introduction of 'total Sharia' across Nigeria²⁸ (Montclos, 2015). In 2001, Buhari, as the presidential candidate of APP assured his supporters that "I can die for the cause of Islam...and that the activities of these youths who are insisting on the full implementation of Sharia are fighting for their right."²⁹ In the same way, Senator Bukar Abba Ibrahim, former Governor of Yobe State, declared that "if necessary, we are prepared to fight another civil war; we cannot be blackmailed into killing Sharia."³⁰ These statements from leading Northern politicians, though at variance with the secularity of Nigerian state, indicate that Boko Haram's insistence on Sharia law is a popular narrative in the region.

The ideology behind the rejection of Western education by the previous Islamic groups in the North is the same ideology driving Boko Haram terrorism. Agbibo has argued that religious terrorists like Boko Haram and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have an anti-modernist goal of returning society to an idealised version of the past.³¹ Along similar lines, Juergensmeyer observes that religious terrorists work towards an anti-modern political agenda. He emphasises that:

They have come to hate secular governments with an almost transcendent passion...dream of revolutionary changes that would establish a global social order in the rubble of what the citizens of the secular societies have regarded as modern and egalitarian democracies. The logic of this kind of militant religiosity has therefore been difficult for many people to comprehend.³²

The difficulty in comprehending Boko Haram's rebellion is largely accounting for the misrepresentations by commentators of the sect's grievances and consequently, its goals. For instance, before his death, the leader of the sect, Yusuf, in 2009, told the BBC that 'Western-styled education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam.'³³ The 'corrupting' influence of Western culture of which modern education is a component is detested in the north, making people to be nostalgic of Sharia-compliant society. Boko Haram presents itself as the agent of change being yearned for by the people.

Governance Crisis, Relative Deprivation and Boko Haram Insurgency

In spite of the restoration of democratic governance in 1999, the yearnings and aspirations of the masses have remained unmet as poverty and unemployment remain pervasive in the country. While the level of poverty in the southern part of Nigeria is worse, it has reached an alarming level in the northern region. Sope Elegbe, the former Research Director of the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG), succinctly captured this when he said:

The increasing poverty in Nigeria is accompanied by increasing unemployment. Unemployment is higher in the north than in the south. Mix this situation with radical Islam, which promises better life for martyrs, and you can understand the growing violence in the north. Government statistics shows that the northern states have the highest proportion of uneducated persons. If you link lack of education and attendant lack of opportunities to a larger male youth population, you can imagine that some areas are actually a breeding ground for terrorism.³⁴

Like every other state in Nigeria, corruption and governance failure have compromised the capability of a large number of people to live above poverty line. Although, the northern region, especially North-eastern states, presents a grim reality of governance failure in Nigeria, poverty and the unemployment rate in these states are alarmingly high. The government agency, National Population Commission (NPC), revealed in its report that literacy rates are much lower among states in the North, and that 72% of children around ages of 6-16 never attended schools in Borno state.³⁵ Generally, peasant Muslim parents prefer their children attend local Islamic learning centres (Madrassa) where the pupils are taught Koranic recitation as against the modern schools. In the same vein, the 2010 National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data on poverty in the country reveal that from the zonal viewpoint, the highest poverty rate of 64.8% is recorded in the Northeast; where Boko Haram has been very active, followed

by 61.2% in the Northwest. Meanwhile, the lowest rate of 31.2% is recorded in the Southeast trailed by 40.2% in the Southwest.³⁶

On the strength of these findings, some commentators have sought to make this crisis comprehensible by identifying terrible socio-economic conditions as the principal cause of the Boko Haram insurgency. The theory of relative deprivation is often cited to provide insight into the rationale behind the Boko Haram crisis. Tedd Gurr, who has done extensive work on social uprisings and rebellion, contends that structured poverty and inequality within countries are breeding ground for violent political movements in general and terrorism specifically.³⁷ Therefore, a large number of observers of Nigerian affairs more often than not conclude that the Boko Haram insurgency is a direct result of deprivation and economic marginalisation of the people, especially the youth who have suffered for a long time.³⁸

From the outset, the government seemed convinced of the socio-economic problem as a precursor to Boko Haram insurgency. As part of the measure to resolve the crisis, the administration of ex-president Jonathan proposed amnesty deal (financial benefit) to the group as advised by the Northern elder statesmen led by the Resident General Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs and Sultan of Sokoto, Sa'ad Abubakar.³⁹ However, Boko Haram, in its response, criticised the proposed deal as worthless, maintaining that they do not need amnesty, and that, as a matter of fact, it is the government that needs amnesty from them.⁴⁰

Its rejection of the deal was completely not unexpected. It had never alluded to economic inequality as a reason for its terrorism, neither has it included financial benefits or economic empowerment as part of its demands from the Government. Since its emergence as a full-blown terrorist organisation, the condition it has given to the Government for the cessation of hostility, among others, was the conversion of the then President Goodluck Jonathan from Christianity to Islam.⁴¹ As an alternative, the sect demanded that the President can resign from his position if he refused to become a Muslim.⁴² In the sect's

view, the resignation of Jonathan will pave the way for the emergence of a Muslim President, since Islam would not recognise an Infidel as its leader.⁴³ The only negotiations that have succeeded so far between the Government and Boko Haram were the swapping of the Boko Haram fighters in government detentions for the release of abducted Chibok girls and the ransom paid for the release of Dapchi school girls. Every other move initiated by the Government to placate the group, with a view to ending the crisis, has been fruitless.

In articulating its goals, Boko Haram, in June 2011, released a list of demands to be met by the Government before considering a ceasefire dialogue. The list states as follows:

- (1) Unconditional release of all imprisoned members of Boko Haram.
- (2) The immediate prosecution of all those involved in the killing of Boko Haram leader, Muhammed Yusuf.
- (3) An investigation into the alleged poisoning of Boko Haram suspects awaiting trial.
- (4) Implementation of Sharia in the 12 northern states of Nigeria.⁴⁴

While the first three demands address the imprisonment and shabby treatments meted out to the members of the sect, particularly the extra-judicial killing of their leader, Yusuf, the fourth demand provides the clearest goal of Boko Haram. Its demand for a full implementation of Sharia law across the 12 states that had already adopted the Islamic Penal code was not an end in itself but a prelude to the Islamisation of the entire Nigeria. This is because several other statements credited to its leaders and spokespersons demand that the Sharia legal system should apply throughout the country. For instance, the former acting leader of the sect, Mallam Sanni Umaru, did not mince words when he declared that:

We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamised which is according to the wish of Allah... We have started jihad in Nigeria which no force on earth can stop. The aim is to Islamise

Nigeria... The bombing will not stop until Western Civilisation is wiped off from Nigeria. We will not stop until these evil cities (Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu, and Port Harcourt) are turned into ashes.⁴⁵

In the same way, Al Zawahiri, one of the sect's leaders, equally submitted, while expressing their refusal to accept the amnesty deal, that:

We would continue to fight until Islam is well established and the Muslims regain their freedom all over Nigeria. We would never be ready to compromise and we do not need amnesty. The only solution to what is happening is for the government to repent, jettison democracy, drop the constitution and adopt the laws in the Holy *Koran*.⁴⁶

The failures of negotiation overtures of the Government with Boko Haram are not really surprising since, according to Morgan (2004), terrorists do not want a seat at the table; they want to destroy that table and everyone sitting at it.⁴⁷ As a millenarian sect, compromising on its ideology is a no-go area.

Intense brain-washing and identity crisis among the alienated Muslims in the North are pivotal in Boko Haram's recruitment drive. There was a very strong pull factor, a sense of brotherhood and identity, the feeling of belonging, and the fact that they were taking part in the greater and nobler project of installing Islamic government in the country. None of the ex-Boko Haram members interviewed said they joined the group for financial benefit. Speaking about his motivation for becoming part of Boko Haram, Nasir Isiaku, from Gusau, Zamfara State, states that 'we wanted to kill Christians because we believe that by killing them, we will enter heaven at death.'⁴⁸ The ex-Boko Haram member blamed his leader for using a Koranic passage that seems to support killing for radicalising him. Nasir recited the Koranic lines in Arabic language. In interpretation, the verse says: 'O you believers, you should not be friendly with your enemies. According to him, believers here mean we, Muslims and enemies are the non-Muslims, especially Christians. Nasir's statement is in perfect

agreement with Shekau's video statement released in January 2012. In the video, the elusive leader said:

You Christians should know that Jesus is a servant and prophet of God. He is not the son of God. This religion of Christianity you are practising is not a religion of God – it is paganism. God frowns at it. What you are practising is not religion... We are trying to coerce (intimidation through vicious attacks) you to embrace Islam, because that is what God instructed us to do... To you Christians, repent! This path we're taking is God's path.⁴⁹

Therefore, at the initial stage of Boko Haram's crisis, churches and properties owned by Christians in the Northeastern Nigeria were targeted.

Talking about his membership of the dreaded sect, Ismaeela, who confessed to his participation in the abduction of the Chibok school girls, said he was brainwashed and forced to commit these heinous killings.⁵⁰ Another detained member of the outlawed group, who gave his name simply as Umar from Banki in Bornu State, said that his friend, Abu Mujaheed, lured him into becoming a member of the sect, telling him that all Nigerians are infidels. Therefore, as enemies of Allah, it is the responsibility of the Muslim faithful to kill all infidels.⁵¹ Although there are reports about some Boko Haram members who are being paid for their services to the group, only a handful of them are actually paid for serving as moles or carrying out high profile attacks.⁵² For example, Muhammed Bashir was a member of Civilian Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF), a local security arrangement created to assist security forces battling Boko Haram. In reality, Bashir was a mole for Boko Haram, working for the success of the sect. In his confession, he says: "Boko Haram sect was ready to pay me for information... I worked for Boko Haram because I didn't earn money as (Civilian) JTF member."⁵³ The detained jihadist maintains that he became an informant for the sect, spying on the troop's movement and getting paid to the tune of ₦10,000 for any information he gave them. It is incontrovertible that the number of paid members is negligible; none of the interviewed ex-members of the group said financial gain or economic benefit was the rationale behind their

membership of the group. Moreover, the fact that the ISIS terrorist organisation paid some of its fighters does not mean that poverty was a driving force behind Daesh's terrorism in the Middle East; neither can anyone argue that poverty was important in the recruitment of members to the deadly group. If Boko Haram has the financial resources to pay several thousands of its fighters, how valid is the contention that it was poverty that caused its rebellion? Poverty only plays marginal role in the terrorism of the jihadist Islamist organisations, Boko Haram inclusive.

Therefore, contending that poverty is central to the radicalisation of Boko Haram members appears to have downplayed the importance of faith in Boko Haram's struggle. If the thousands of young men and women from all parts of Europe and America who propped up in Syria to fight alongside the ISIS terror group were driven by forces other than underdevelopment crisis, then the same factor invariably is responsible for Boko Haram's vicious campaign in Nigeria and its neighbouring countries. Both ISIS and Boko Haram exhibit tendencies consistent with Kaplan's *Fifth Wave* of terrorism. The notorious ISIS executioner, Muhammed Emwazi, known as Jihadi John who was credited with the beheadings of Western journalists, was a product of a comfortable family background in Britain, with a degree in Computer Programming from the University of Westminster. Poverty cannot be blamed for his motivation. Many of the children of some prominent Northerners such as Ibrahim Uwais and Farouk Abdulmutalab are members of high profile terrorist groups. Their fathers were former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Muhammed Uwais, and Umaru Abdulmutalab, the former First Bank Chairman respectively.⁵⁴ Their motivation for taking the path of terrorism has nothing to do with poverty.

Testimonies abound of many Boko Haram ex-members who were kidnapped and later recruited into the group without the option of opting out. A former mechanic for Boko Haram, Luka Tumba Kwatri, said he was abducted in Adamawa State when the terrorists attacked Mubi and Michika. He stated that when he was accosted by the members of the group, they asked him what he does for a living. He replied, saying he is a mechanic and one of them shouted

'Allahu Akbaru'. Then, he was taken to Sambisa forest where he was subjected to brainwashing and later became the group's mechanic.⁵⁵ The radicalisation exercise failed to make him believe in the ideology of the group. He later escaped from the forest and surrendered himself to security forces. Similarly, Ali Goni's confession shows the brutality of Boko Haram to the minors. Ali says he was just ten years old when he was kidnapped in Bama, Borno State and later radicalised by the insurgents. He was in Boko Haram camps for five years, making underwear Improvised Explosive Devices for suicide missions. In his words, he says, 'I was kidnapped along with my mother in Bama's Kawuri street by Baba Kaka, Boko Haram commander. They took us to Sambisa forest and kept us in a camp called Kwalfata where I was trained in bomb-making.' 'I refused initially, but they said they would kill my mother just like the way they killed my father when they stormed Bama. So, I eventually agreed.'⁵⁶ Ali Goni is currently undergoing rehabilitation and deradicalisation at a military detention camp in Maiduguri, Borno State capital. 'I became Boko Haram member unintentionally because I was abducted by the group and they forced me to join against my will.' This is the response of another ex-Boko Haram foot soldier named Bakura Goni, who confessed to the killing of several persons. He says he was brainwashed to believe that "all those bad things we did are in God's way."⁵⁷

Among the Chibok secondary students kidnapped by the sect, many of them refused to be released from their captivity to go home in the aftermath of the successful swapping deal between the Government and the insurgent group.⁵⁸ Their refusal is connected to the high level of brain-washing and intense indoctrination they have been subjected to; it was not based on poverty and unemployment in their respective homes. The upsurge in the number of female suicide bombers is attributed to forced conscription of these women into suicide squad.⁵⁹ None of the repentant former Boko Haram members interviewed attributed his membership of the sect to poverty. In fact, Boko Haram has never touted its movement as an anti-dote to Nigeria's endemic corruption and governance crisis. The sect has refrained from condemning financial corruption and the electoral fraud of the ruling elites. That grievance as a result of chronic

poverty in the region is primarily responsible for Boko Haram terrorism has no empirical basis.

Millenarian Ideology and Boko Haram's Transnational Agenda

Interpreting Boko Haram's insurgency as a protest against the deteriorating living conditions is at odds with the statements and activities of the Boko Haram leaders, who insist on the religious motives of their rebellion. The poverty narrative fails to account for the theological imperatives that dominate Islamist groups like Boko Haram.⁶⁰ The sect's Amir, Shekau, had kept no one in doubt regarding the sect's goal, maintaining that his rebellion is a war between believers and disbelievers.⁶¹ "This is a war between Muslims and non-Muslims. ...This is not a tribal war, nor is it...a war for financial gains; it is solely a religious war. Only when...we establish a system where religion has the final say or religion determines everything that will be the end of this war."⁶² The founder of the group, Yusuf, had once condemned the Muslims working under the governments (democratic government at all levels), warning his followers that they should not seek employments under a government that fails to rule according to Koran.⁶³ By virtue of its body language, Boko Haram, like ISIS, exhibits *Fifth Wave* of terror as conceptualised by Jeffrey Kaplan⁶⁴ that insists on a purely Sharia-compliant state where disbelievers and heretic Muslims are purged.

In his study of global terrorism, Kaplan's concept of Fifth Wave, built on Rappaport's Four Wave theory of modern terrorism,⁶⁵ argues that groups belonging to such a wave have distinct qualities which include:

- (1) a devolution from a pre-existing terror wave; (2) a "hopeful" extreme idealism; (3) a physical withdrawal into the hinterland; (4) a desired aim to recreate a past "Golden Age" by beginning the calendar anew; (5) an intent to destroy the old world and create a new society; (6) an inability to compromise and the use of force against internal dissidents; (7) a belief in a perfectibility

of human and the creation of a new man; (8) a quest for a new society leading to genocidal violence; (9) violence as a way of life; (10) an emphasis on the subjugation of women and children (11) recruitment of child soldiers and child brides; (12) the use of rape as a terror tactic; (13) a continuous cycle of violence engaged by the group across generations; (14) a particularistic emphasis on racial purity and ethno-tribal centrism (15) pragmatic reliance on foreign allies to enhance group survival; (16) charismatic and authoritarian; and (17) an apocalyptic world view buttressed by intense religious commitment.⁶⁶

Boko Haram's activities so far exhibit more than 90 per cent of the Kaplan's *Fifth Wave* hallmarks.

Parallel between 5th Wave and Boko Haram Islamist Insurgent Group

Since its vicious campaign of terror in 2010, Boko Haram's insurgency has been consistent with Jeffrey Kaplan's Fifth Wave hallmarks as presented in Table 1.

As it has been pointed out earlier in this study, the sect has its root in the defunct Maitatsine Islamic terror group of the 1980s. However, while the Maitatsine group hoped to establish a purely Islamic state devoid of anything Western such as radio, television and even bicycles among others in Northern Nigeria, Boko Haram's objectives are far broader. Boko Haram's obsession with the recreation of Dan Fodio's Caliphate; a representation of Islamic "Golden Age" in West Africa, also fits into Fifth Wave theory. The group has not hidden its disdain for a democratically-ordered society in preference for a purely theocratic Islamic state. The jihadists justify their jihad on Christian infidels and Muslim apostate regimes for failing to uphold the divine truth, making their societies unclean. Its desire to re-establish the Sokoto Islamic Caliphate superintending modern Nigeria is an attempt at returning the country into the path of 'truth' as understood by the group. The jihadists argue that, during European colonialism, the accretion of foreign influences made these societies deviate from the

Koran.⁶⁷ Thus, directed by charismatic and messianic leaders, Boko Haram has unleashed an ultra-violent campaign against the largely secular government and its collaborators to 'purify' the land. The sect, like ISIS, denounces colonial-era territorial lines which the modern states in West Africa have vowed to respect. However, for Boko Haram, the restoration of the Caliphate will not only erase the 'ungodly' influence of the West, but it would also restore Muslim honour and erase national borders. The dismantled Sokoto Caliphate stretched across Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Nigeria.

Table 1

S/N	5 th Wave hallmarks	Boko Haram's conformity to the 5 th Wave
1	A devolution from a pre-existing terror wave	Boko Haram has its root in the defunct Maitatsine Islamic terror group of the 1980s.
2	A "hopeful" extreme idealism	Boko Haram believes that the creation of purely Islamic caliphate will automatically result in the <i>Dar al-Islam</i> where total peace will reign. The current one: <i>Dar al-harb</i> (which Boko Haram wants to overthrow) is decadent.
3	A physical withdrawal into the hinterland	Boko Haram, since its formation, has been operating as a state within a state by withdrawing and separating itself from the larger society first to Kanama in Yobe State and lately, Sambisa forest. Their first camp was known as Afghanistan and they were called Talibans
4	A desired aim to recreate a past "Golden Age" by beginning the calendar a new	Within its ideology, Boko Haram aims to recreate the dismantled Sokoto Caliphate which, during its hey days, represented the Golden Age of Islam in West Africa.
5	An intent to destroy the old world and create a new society	Boko Haram's goal remains the destruction of democratic secular Nigeria and the creation of an Islamic theocracy in the country.
6	An inability to compromise and the use of force against internal dissidents	Through its rejection of amnesty deal and negotiations for the cessation of hostility, Boko Haram has demonstrated its rigid goal of Islamising Nigeria. Dissidents within its rank, especially before the division in the group, were ruthlessly crushed.

Table 1 cont'd

7	A belief in a perfectibility of human and the creation of a new man	Through a strictly adherence to the commandments of Allah, Boko Haram believes that the perfectibility of man will be attained. A restoration of the Golden Age of Islam is a necessary condition for the creation of a new man.
8	A quest for a new society leading to genocidal violence	Boko Haram seeks a complete destruction of the godless Nigerian political system leading to the creation of a Sharia-governed society. Opposition to its goal faces annihilation.
9	Violence as a way of life	Ceaseless military campaign of suicide bombings, artillery shelling, car bombs, and the use of Improvised Explosive Devices against security forces, infidels and fellow Muslims opposed to the sect's goal. Opposition to negotiations.
10	An emphasis on the subjugation of women and children	Boko Haram misogyny and forced veiling of female gender. It opposes women's education and employment.
11	Recruitment of child soldiers and child brides	Forced marriages with Boko Haram fighters and forced recruitment of young boys into the Boko Haram group.
12	The use of rape as a terror tactic	Most of the kidnapped girls and women were allegedly subjected to repeated rape by Boko Haram's members.
13	A continuous cycle of violence engaged by the group across generations	Unrestrained violence has been the hallmark of Boko Haram and its predecessor; Maitatsine of the 80s.
14	Pragmatic reliance on foreign allies to enhance group survival	Boko Haram's reliance on other jihadi groups especially in the Middle East is well known. At its incipient stage, its fighters were known as 'Talibans.' It pledged allegiance to ISIS and changed its name to ISWAP.
15	Charismatic and authoritarian	Boko Haram has always been led by highly charismatic Emirs. Abubakar Shekau has been variously described as an authoritarian leader whose authority remains binding no matter how unpopular they are. Both religious and military authorities are vested in him.
16	An apocalyptic world view buttressed by intense religious commitment	Boko Haram's ultimate goal is deeply rooted in the quest for the Millenarian world-view which dictates the destruction of the godless Nigerian political system and apostate Muslim collaborators. It seeks the return of Dan Fodio's pure Islam which will generate happiness as the caliphate takes root again.

Boko Haram sees the Caliphate as part of Allah's providence which must be restored. The group regards the Caliphate as the culmination of Islamic civilisation in West Africa; hence, the lost glory must be restored. This view has its foundation on millenarianism. Numerous scholars have remarked that effort at understanding the Islamic terrorism necessarily demands looking beyond the socio-economic wellbeing of the terrorists.⁶⁸ Central to the terrorism of Boko Haram and other Sunni Islamic terrorist groups is the remaking of their immediate environment in short run and global space in the long run into a caliphate according to their millenarian mindset. The proclamation of the Caliphate in 2014 with headquarters in Gworza, Borno States, marked the culmination of Boko Haram's agenda to return the region to its pre-colonial Islamic tradition.⁶⁹ Boko Haram's commitment to a Takfiri sectarian strategy has continued to target 'apostate Muslims' as well as 'Infidels' for elimination in its savage quest to recreate a transnational Sharia-compliant caliphate in the Chad Basin region. In his ground-breaking book: *Clash of Civilisations*, Samuel Huntington persuasively argues that Islamists' goal is stamped in the history of (radical) Islam itself. The scholar emphasises that:

First, Islam has from the start been a religion of the sword and that it glorifies military virtues. Islam originated among 'warring Bedouin nomadic tribes' and this 'violence is stamped in the foundation of Islam. Muhammed himself is remembered as a hard fighter and a skilful military commander'. No one would say this about Christ or Buddha. The doctrines of Islam, it is argued, dictate war against unbelievers. ...The Koran and other statements of Muslim beliefs contain few prohibitions on violence, and a concept of nonviolence is absent from Muslim doctrine and practice. Secondly, from its origin in Arabia, the spread of Islam across northern Africa and much of the Middle East and later to central Asia, the subcontinent, and Balkans brought Muslims into direct contact with many different people who were conquered and converted (to Islam) and the legacy of this process remains.⁷⁰

The remaining legacy of this process finds its best expressions today in intolerance of anything deemed un-Islamic by the extremist Islamic organisations the world over. This history is profoundly central to the jihadists' quest for a theocratic state in which the subject people are required to completely submit to the dictates of Allah as interpreted by them. It is therefore the mandate of the Islamist Groups such as al Shabbab, ISIS, al Qaeda, Taliban and of course, Boko Haram to ensure people's compliance with this theocratic system by force, if necessary.

Like al Qaeda and ISIS, Boko Haram is averse to 'godless' democratic system, secular constitution and Western civilization and Euro-centric notion of 'nation-state'. The inextricable linkage between Boko Haram and other jihadi elements with millenarian worldview speaks volumes of islamization agenda of the sect. As a result of pragmatic reliance on foreign allies, Boko Haram's metamorphosis has largely been shaped by activities and directives of terror groups in Middle East rather than socioeconomic factor. The 'Think globally and act locally', propaganda message of al Qaeda to its affiliates no doubt, influenced Boko Haram's millenarian philosophy of carving out caliphate that will encompass Lake Chad riparian states. The group's commitment to its 'mission statement' makes it one of the deadly terrorist groups in the world. Various reports and statements from the sect's members are indicative that Boko Haram and central al Qaeda leadership were profoundly connected. Abu Qaqa, former Boko Haram spokesman's statement in an interview with *The Guardian* stresses this linkage. Qaqa had asserted that:

Al Qaeda are our elder brother. During the Lesser Hajj (Umra), our leader travelled to Saudi Arabia and met al Qaeda there. We enjoy financial and technical support from them. Anything we want from them, we ask them (Monica, 2012).⁷¹

Since its transmutation into a terror group, Boko Haram had been identifying with virtually all the Sunni Islamist jihadi groups around the world. As far back as 2012, the Fifth US African Command (AFRICOM) General Carter Ham had said that Boko Haram has links with AQIM and al Shabaab. He maintains that

the Nigerian Islamist insurgents train in camps in northern Mali and most likely received financing and explosive from AQIM.⁷² The transformation of al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, the so-called al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) into ISIS in 2014 had implications for the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, specifically, and Lake Chad region broadly. Before its division in 2016, Boko Haram had sworn allegiance to ISIS and subsequently changed its name to ISWAP, making the group an affiliate of the ISIS in West Africa. In spite of the division, the two factions have continued to mimic the style and strategies of ISIS in their operations. The two groups insist on an Islamic state governed by Sharia where Islam determines everything. Anything less than this is unacceptable. The insurgents present themselves as the true heirs of pure and pre-colonial Islam in Nigeria.

Conclusion

The major argument of this paper is to show how millenarian and takfiri ideologies are central to Boko Haram insurgency rather than the prevailing poverty rhetoric. It argued that Boko Haram insurgency conforms to Kaplan's *Fifth Wave* of terrorism concept. Thus, the study is a departure from generally acceptable dialectical materialism for the rebellion of the group. From the findings so far, the insurgency of the group cannot be reduced to a single narrative of socio-economic grievances. While the study argues that the recreation of Dan Fodio's Islamic Caliphate through jihad is pivotal in understanding Boko Haram's insurgency, it concedes that socio-economic challenges in Nigeria only play a marginal role in the crisis. Like ISIS, which is obsessed with the restoration of the 'glorious' caliphate that prevailed in the Middle East in the past, Boko Haram is also fixated on recreating the Sokoto Caliphate, leading to the practice of 'pure' Islam in the territories once held by Fodio. This is more so given the fact that the Euro-centric notion of state, anchored on values of rule of law, democracy, constitutionalism and human rights, among others, are anathema to the fundamentalist Islam.

Resolving the Boko Haram crisis would involve a whole range of approaches. First, since the strength of the sect lies in its ability to restock its foot soldiers through the propaganda that heaven would reward them richly for fighting Allah's cause, a counter-narrative is needed to counter this propaganda. Such a responsibility should be entrusted in Islamic clerics and scholars with mass appealing. In their Mosques and open-air gatherings, these moderate Islamic scholars should lay much emphasis on the fact that killing in the name of religion is forbidden by Allah and the culprits would suffer hereafter. Secondly, there is an urgent need to prioritize the education of the children who are currently roaming the streets as Almajirai in the North. The abandonment of the Goodluck Jonathan administration educational policy in the north by the northern leaders should be revisited. The modern school buildings constructed by the ex-president to take children off the streets and inculcate societal values in them should not be left to rot. Thirdly, the regional security outfit, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), should operate on a permanent basis to deny Boko Haram insurgents access to arms and men coming in through the largely poorly-policed porous borders in the Lake Chad region. Finally, the Government's effort at reducing poverty through the Presidential Initiative for North-East (PINE) framework is a step in right direction. Concepts such as government intervention schemes, corporate social responsibility and infrastructural development are of little value if they are not considered as serving real function in the poverty-stricken North-eastern Nigeria. The programme should not be politicised, becoming a conduit pipe for enriching politicians.

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The Vegetable Economy of Female Farmers in Nigerian Barracks, 1920-1999: A Survey

Nzemeka Justus Adim

Introduction

Women are the “invisible farmers of the Third World, yet they have been marginalised in economic production and development plans.”¹ The cultivation of vegetables and other food crops began in the pre-colonial period and has continued in modern times. For instance, in pre-colonial Igbo society, women were involved in the cultivation of cocoyam, cassava, melon, and vegetables, informally described as 'women's crops', while yam and other staples that required enormous labour were the prerogative of the menfolk.² This categorisation was borne out of the fact that female crops were without much labour and provide all year-round earnings. In contemporary times, a number of Igbo women and their counterparts in the Niger Delta were engaged in large-scale farming just like the men. The Yoruba and Hausa women, on the other hand, were not so active in farming but were visible in trade, cloth production and other allied industries. This implies that Nigerian women, since the pre-colonial period, have created spaces and influence in domesticity and reproduction, as well as economic production.

Vegetable production was an economic activity that required a little capital and labour to break even. Sometimes, women needed not the support of their husbands in the clearing of farmland, planting and weeding. This means that men and women do not share the burden of field work³ and for this reason, some customs allowed them to retain the income made through farming.⁴ The beauty of vegetable production was that women hired labourers to till the land for pay

as well as shared the activities of farm work with household chores, sometimes carrying babies on their back while weeding and harvesting.

The construction of modern barracks had been completed in Zaria in 1904, prior to the period British officers and men lived in cantonments made up of tents or bush huts as a result of wars of conquest and subjugation of local people.⁵ Therefore Zaria, Jebba, Lokoja, Lagos and Ibadan became the early beneficiaries of permanent accommodation for troops. Most of the towns had strategic and geographical importance. Jebba, Lokoja, Zaria had equable rainfall and sunny weather which supported military activities and agriculture; they were also free from pestilence and diseases.

On the other hand, Lagos and Ibadan had common features as 'garrison cities'. In fact, Ibadan as a 'military republic' was established in c.1829 after the Owu War.⁶ But she assumed power and prominence owing to the prevalence of warriors and war-lords, and the British later profited from this advantage by establishing its barracks in Ibadan in 1898.⁷ Lagos also derived its importance from warfare, agriculture and commerce. It got its name from the Portuguese word *Lago* or *lagoa* meaning the lagoon.⁸ As Nzemeka explained, "Lagos was favoured by the factors of geography and location, it is also noted for its rainy season which often began in April and lasted till September/October during which it was heavier due to the proximity to the lagoon."⁹ This was followed by a period of sunshine which supported the growth of crops and perennial fruit trees. It was a combination of these factors that favoured vegetable production in the area.

The objective of this study was to explore the vegetable economy of female farmers in Nigerian barracks, 1920-1999. Indeed, several scholarly works exist on the role of women in agriculture, production and trade. These include Oculi; Ijere; Oluwasola; Fatile; Marjorie; and Nzemeka.¹⁰ These works, no doubt, provide perspectives on wide-ranging issues relating to women and farming, trade and distribution. In the analysis of gender and rural development, some of the authors remarked that no meaningful development could take place in Nigerian economy without incorporating women into cooperative societies.

This argument became useful when we consider the contributions of the BLRW's cooperatives to the economy of Nigeria.

However, it was discovered that some of the authors had no explanatory note on the vegetable economy of female farmers in Nigerian barracks in spite of their contributions to food security. To broaden our understanding of this paper, it is divided into four sections. Section one discussed the emergence of women in colonial barracks. Section two explored the development of compound garden in colonial barracks, and section three examined the involvement of female farmers in vegetable economy in the barracks after independence. Additionally, the paper highlighted the challenges of vegetable economy, and draws a conclusion.

The Emergence of Women in Colonial Barracks

Before the advent of women in colonial barracks, there were problems of poor quality of food and homesickness which led to desertion of soldiers in colonial service.¹¹ To fill the gap in 1905 “soldiers were given the opportunity to persuade their wives to join them, none of the women agreed to leave the town.”¹² The towns in question were Gombe and Benue districts identified during the period as a martial race. The refusal of women was attributed to perceived brutality of soldiers and general hatred of the force. This was corroborated by Sir Ahmadu Bello in the following lines, “We did not like the soldiers; they were our own people and had conquered us for strangers and had defeated our people on the plain just before us. The feeling was very common all over the North.”¹³

In other parts of the country, it was the same story because a lot of Igbo and Yoruba men were at first indifferent to conscription because of the epithet *afomaco* and *abobaku*, meaning, young men ridicule an old man who gets his work done thoroughly, while *abobaku* refers to one whose loyalty to the government is so much that he would work and work even to the point of death.¹⁴ For this reason, the army gained a reputation as a place for illiterates and

criminals.¹⁵ Related to the above was the question of gratuity and poor wages. Since the first demobilisation of troops in 1919, payment of soldiers' gratuity had become problematic and when they returned home there was nothing to show.¹⁶ Poor monthly wages had also been a challenge even before the Second World War. According to Miner:

Army pay was not very attractive in 1956. A recruit received 2s.6d. when fully trained. At this time unskilled daily-paid government labourers were paid 4s. 8d a day in Lagos, 3s.6d a day elsewhere in Southern Nigeria and it was only in the remotest parts of the North that the lowest government rate dropped to 2s. 4d. a day.¹⁷

When this is compared with Police salaries of the period, a Police recruit received 5s. a day, rising to 9s. a day as a first-class constable; a Police Lance-Corporal received 10s. 4d. a day, more than an army Regimental Sergeant major (RSM) who received 10s.¹⁸ It was the totality of these problems that led to desertion in the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). To forestall this ugly trend, the Wilkinson Commission was established in 1905 and consequently recommended that:

Every effort should be made to encourage the wives to join their husbands in the cantonments; captured deserters should be subjected to severe corporal punishment since they would forget their drill if imprisoned, and recruits should be enlisted locally, since it would be much easier to detect a local deserter than one who had left the colony.¹⁹

This proclamation marked the official incorporation of indigenous soldiers' wives into the British West African Barracks. European wives later came in 1920, following the pronouncement of Col. Amery, "It was the desire of the Secretary of State that married life should be the rule rather than the exception in the Crown colonies and Protectorates."²⁰ Though a few European wives had been in Nigeria on the official recognition of their husbands before 1920, such

as Flora Lugard, Constance Larymore, and Lady Alan Burns, to mention but a few. Following the reversal of policy, a robust barracks culture and inter-group relations with neighbours in the outlying villages evolved. It also eroded the initial conception of the barracks as a masculine domain, and also helped women contest for inclusion in the colonial project.

Two questions are useful in this study – First, what is a food culture? And second, what was the nature of food culture in the system before the advent of women in the barracks? This will help us to understand the origins of vegetable production in Nigerian barracks. “Food culture simply refers to the practices, attitudes, and beliefs as well as the networks and institutions surrounding the production, distribution, and consumption of food.”²¹ A food culture could be anything one wanted it to be, and could incorporate many ethnic flavours, dishes and traditions.²² The British imported their food culture into the colony and these were basically tinned foods and provisions. It was easy to adapt to the environment and, more importantly, protect soldiers from food poisoning. It was in this context that food culture was used. It should also be emphasised that European missionaries also spread Victorian culture and values in colonial Nigeria, a practice still sustained in modern times.²³

Describing the food culture in 1901, Haywood and Clarke wrote, “Fresh food was mostly not available, so diet had to be supplemented by tinned provisions, usually packed in chop-boxes.”²⁴ Also in 1927, Pritchard recalled: “During the eleven months of my stay in Agbor, I lived on tinned food almost exclusively. There were practically no fresh vegetables, no bread or fish, and meat was a great rarity.”²⁵ Similarly Crocker underlined in 1933 that:

The food is such that Europeans living away from the coast, and especially those living in the bush, suffer from chronic malnutrition. It is not merely that they subsist for eighteen months straight off on a diet of local fowl... eked out with native vegetables, with African eggs... and in some places, coarse river fish and in some places milk, anything additional thereto being tinned food.²⁶

The British had no solution to the food problem till it caused desertion of troops in the WAFF. The foregoing has shown that there was an urgent need for improved food culture in the barracks for health reasons.

The question was: what did the British government do to improve agriculture before the coming of women? This would deepen our understanding of compound garden in the barracks. As Miller pointed out:

Sir C.A. Moloney, the first independent Governor of Lagos, had already started a nursery garden and done much tree planting at Kokomaiko, near where the football ground now is. By his recommendation, a Botanic Station covering $3\frac{3}{4}$ acres was established in 1888 at Ebute Metta in a compound belonging to a house once the property of Bishop Crowther. This enterprise was well supported by Kew Gardens.... Many of the cash crops on which the country now depends were originated, raised, and distributed from this Botanic Station.²⁷

There were also a number of institutions for the advancement of agricultural production in the country, such as the Moore Plantation at Ibadan, experimental stations in Zaria, Umuahia and Benin.²⁸ The primary function of these agricultural stations was the encouragement of farmers to improve their system and technique of production; they were also to disseminate new ideas to the farmers who were prepared to adopt the new methods.²⁹ The establishment of agricultural stations demonstrated the effort of government to achieve food sufficiency in the country. It also showed the determination of the colonial administration to train agricultural experts to manage individual farms. This situation led to the development of compound garden in colonial barracks in Nigeria.

The Development of Compound Gardens

It was conspicuous that most European wives had lessons in housekeeping and domesticity before coming to Nigeria. This is also observed by Callaway:

“Most of the European wives were well-resourced for the challenges of empire, language, and charity work.”³⁰ It was the determination and training that helped most of the women to survive colonial challenges. For instance, in Europe, there was the Victoria gender ideology of separate spheres as a result of culture, gender and sex. It was the ideology that helped European wives specialise in home life. In colonial barracks, Larymore said, “I learnt a new language, made thousands of new friends in the animal and flower world, as well as valued human ones.”³¹

The question arose as to what was compound garden bearing in mind that the contents of compound garden are mostly leafy vegetables, orchard and seasonal crops dictated by women? According to Ikpe, “Compound garden is a farm located around the house. It varies from about two to four hectares depending on the size of the household, especially the number of wives it harbours....In the compound garden, intensive and continuous cultivation is practised while rotational bush fallow is practised in the farm.”³² She added that the development of compound garden in the nineteenth century was a necessity to have sources of food supply in the vicinity of the home, as well as protect women from kidnappers and slave raiders.³³

Writing on gardening in Kaduna Cantonment, Appall and Adeniyi also explained, “As is the case with most barracks, farming activities are allowed but restricted to the undeveloped outskirts of the cantonments. A few animals are raised, and these include livestock, poultry, and pigs. Seasonal crops cultivated include maize, sorghum, millet, okro, groundnut and cowpea.”³⁴ When we juxtapose the views of the two authors, it became clear to state that compound garden was intended as a source of food security in the household, and vegetables and livestock are the essential features of a compound garden. Compound garden was also aimed at keeping women close to the home, and providing them the opportunity to obtain vegetables and other farm content at convenience even while cooking. Apart from being a source of food security, the clearing of cultivable lands reduced the spread of rodents and other dangerous reptiles, including mosquitoes in a tropical climate. It helped the

environment to be tidy compared to abandoned fallow land which posed health hazard in some areas.

The other question is what was the role of European wives in compound garden? The role of European wives in compound garden could not be overemphasised. Most of them were active in the cultivation of flowers and perennial fruit trees. Primarily it was to provide vegetables and fruits to complement tinned food. It was also to ward-off loneliness in the colony. The seedlings were transplanted from the enclosures to the gardens, and others planted along the paths where they served as objects of beautification, decoration of tables and corridors. On special occasions, flowers served as symbols of love. In one of the private correspondences of Flora Lugard, dated July 28, 1902, she wrote:

I have begun today to organise some little improvements in Government House garden, which is at present merely a cleared enclosure. The black labourers are absurd, just like a crowd of children, but I think I can get on with them and both in the house and garden they seem to be working quite willingly... The table is easy to make pretty with good linen and a new lampshade and fresh flowers.³⁵

This explained that some European wives were actively involved in compound garden where they planted perennial fruit crops. It was not only Flora Lugard who engaged in compound garden; others include Lady Alan Burns, Constance Larymore, and Violet Bourdillon. These women were known to have left remarkable imprint in vegetable production and orchard in Nigeria. Also significant was the fact that some of them imported perennial fruit trees from Sierra-Leone and Europe into the country, and a lot more of these plants have been domesticated in several parts of Lagos. Writing on compound garden in Lagos, Burns noted:

We were the first occupants of this house and my wife succeeded in making the garden a thing of beauty. We planted many fruit

trees, but, as has happened to so many colonial officials, we left Nigeria before any of them had borne; it has been little consolation to hear from men who have since occupied the house that the fruit was plentiful and delicious.³⁶

Also, during the period, Larymore planted a wide-range of crops in her garden. These include Zinnias, balsams, merigolds, castor oil plants, and petunias. Others were sunflowers, *cacalia*, *gysophilia* and *browallia*, to mention but a few.³⁷ She explained, “On my first arrival, I brought from Sierra Leone, twenty seeds of *Clitoria*, the beautiful sapphire blue pea, a tiny packet of *Ipomea quamoclit*, and a few seeds of a brilliant scarlet miniature convolvulus. Their descendants are now spread all over the country...others are mauve climbing pea imported from Malta.”³⁸ Other fruit trees planted by European wives included, bananas, lemon, pine-apples, mangoes, guavas and custard apples, to mention but a few. All of these abounded in Lokoja Cantonments.³⁹ When we relate the efforts of these women in compound garden, it was easy to affirm that they contributed extensively to vegetable production and food security of the barracks.

One remarkable event in Lagos Barracks was the fact that Violet Bourdillon maintained a garden from where she sent flowers to the Lagos hospitals and also organised dinner parties for socialites and women's groups. According to R.D. Pearce, “It was reported that in 1946, Ajai [sic] was still sending flowers to the hospital 'From Lady Bourdillon', a practice she had started ten years earlier and which she continued from affection which time and space could not alter.”⁴⁰

This showed that Violet Bourdillon had a garden from where she sent flowers to the hospitals. The dinner parties that were held in her garden also explained that she had perennial fruit trees in her compound which offered beautiful scenery for social gathering. All these factors pointed to the fact that Lady Bourdillon was a great socialite who combined beauty with hospitality. It was these sterling qualities and “dedication that inspired her husband to pay glowing tribute to her human sympathy and exceptional lack of all sense of class or colour, adding that her attitude had influenced his policy towards a range of problems.”⁴¹ The

question that attracts our attention is what was the role of indigenous soldiers' wives in compound garden? Drawing on the views of Gann and Duignan:

All African soldiers except recruits had wives in barracks, who cooked for their husbands and swept the huts and the company grounds. Each company had its headwoman, the *magajia* – responsible for the cleanliness of the barracks and for the dress, deportment, and morals of wives... She accompanied officers on their inspection rounds, and when matters did not come up to her expectations, her wrath was more fearsome than the RSM's.⁴²

The foregoing helps to explain that a vibrant political and social organisation had developed in colonial barracks before the advent of European wives. It was these political and social arrangements that incorporated women in the social system, the same way vegetable production re-defined the food pattern of military family in contradistinction to tinned or canned provisions.

Indigenous soldiers' wives were involved in compound gardens where they planted a number of crops. For instance, soldiers' wives in Southern Nigeria planted bitter leaf, green vegetables, cassava, pepper, *effirin*, tomatoes, and other garden contents. This was noted by Larymore: "There is, however, native spinach, which is quite as good as the English kind, and grows like a weed. Country tomatoes, garden eggs, okros, sweet potatoes, green paw-paws, and yams are all of great use in supplying the table with the necessity green food."⁴³ Indeed, indigenous soldiers' wives in northern Nigeria planted carrot, tomatoes, onions, water melon, ginger, garlic, green vegetables and sugar cane, to mention but a few. They also planted perennial fruit trees such as oranges, citrus, guava, pea, cashew and others.

In Nigerian barracks, some Hausa women in partial seclusion combined compound trade with compound garden to make ends meet. After working in the garden in the mornings, the women returned to trade and dress-making. The reason for this was to complement the home front and also challenge the conception of a full-time housewife. In the barracks, there was no rigid

seclusion because of the traditions and ethics of the military. It is a place where the 'rank of a husband is the rank of a wife', therefore protocols and precedence superseded religion. In this case, a woman has to 'take the rear and hoist the flag' in the absence of her husband. The benefit of compound garden was immense - Cultivated crops in the gardens were no longer bought in the markets. Also, income generated from the sale of surplus crops augment the salaries of military husbands.

Additionally, compound garden made women relevant in economic development of not only the barracks but Nigeria in general. However, the challenges of compound garden in colonial Nigeria cannot be ignored. First, there was the scrambling for scarce fallow land, as land was often taken over by infrastructure development. Second was the frequent posting of military husbands which indirectly affected economic production of wives, and third was the use of traditional implements and the lack of loans for further production. It is clear from the foregoing that both the European wives and indigenous soldiers' wives were actively involved in compound garden. Their contribution to food production helped improve food security in colonial barracks.

Vegetable Economy after Independence

There was no doubt that compound garden laid the foundations of vegetable economy in the barracks after independence. It became an economy following the involvement of female farmers who employed modern farm techniques and hired labour in vegetable production. In the early years of independence, the Nigerian Army Officers' Wives Association (NAOWA), a philanthropic and non-profit association began to sensitize women on how best to assist their husbands, and at the same time engage in productive activities.⁴⁴ For this reason, the association "got land from the Lagos State Government and started a farm on the Ojo-Badagry stretch."⁴⁵ Other women were also encouraged to cultivate fallow land around their backyard for crop production.

Due to the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), vegetable production in Nigerian barracks suffered a set-back; consequently, there were food shortage in post-war period, similar to the experience in the Second World War which affected the overall development of the Nigerian economy.⁴⁶ It should be recalled that during the Second World War (1939-1945), colonial barracks were greatly affected because most of the European wives enlisted into the force, helping out in language translation, confidential typing, occasional coding and decoding, and other administrative duties.⁴⁷ Lady Bourdillon and a few European women were actively involved in charity and diplomatic protocols.⁴⁸

Similarly, indigenous soldiers' wives were engaged in the war as adjunct security personnel, watching and taking surveillance of the movement of people in and out of the barracks. Consequently, most of the farms were left fallow and perennial fruit trees unkempt as men and women directed their efforts at the war and this brought about shortage of food during the period. The Nigerian Civil War was more demanding for women.

What action did the Nigerian government take to alleviate the crisis and perhaps improve agricultural production in post-war Nigeria? Available evidence showed that General Yakubu Gowon's Regime introduced the Second National Development Plan (1970-74), shortly after the war. The capital expenditure programme was about N3.192 billion in four years and was shared between the public and private sectors.⁴⁹ Apart from this economic recovery plan, government also intensified its extension services by increasing the supply of fertilizers and other requirements to farmers. At the same time, government established food production companies which cultivated over 60,000 acres of food crops, including maize, rice, cassava, sorghum, beans and others.⁵⁰

To complement other projects, the government launched the National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP) in 1973 which was a step in the right direction but the government of the day did not monitor it. The project would have been an agricultural laboratory and a resource and scientific centre for improved seedlings, fertilizers, pesticides, farm management and farm technology for farmers.⁵¹ Another effort during the period was the construction

of dams and irrigation in Northern Nigeria by the Gowon's administration. Also, large acreages of fruit trees were cultivated by the government of Western State, which planted 15, 417 acres of cocoa and 12,000 acres of oil palm to boost cash crop production.⁵²

In all of these projects, female farmers in Nigerian barracks were not integrated into the economic recovery plan until 1976 when the Obasanjo administration introduced "The Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) programme." This scheme turned out to be the answer to the woman question in Nigerian barracks where gender division of labour was visible. The OFN was officially launched in Dodan Barracks by General Olusegun Obasanjo in 1976. According to him:

I urge institutions like the schools, colleges, universities and the armed forces to endeavour to grow part, if not all of their own foods. I appeal to traditional authorities, communities and individuals who have farmlands that are not being cultivated by them to release such lands temporarily to institutions and organisations to grow food crops. Individuals who have access to farmlands should start farming, if all you have is a little backyard plot, grow vegetables or keep poultry.⁵³

This programme marked the transformation from compound garden to female farming in Lagos and other barracks in Nigeria. Female farming was also given a boost by three principal institutions. First was the NAOWA and second was the, Better Life for Rural Women (BLRW) initiated by Maryam Babangida in 1987, a grass root economic empowerment programme for Nigerian women,⁵⁴ and third, was the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985).

Beginning with NAOWA, its critical agenda was to integrate army officers' wives into the mainstream of gender, economy and society, as well as, erase the perception that army officers' wives were indolent and incapable of directing affairs either in the public or private sphere. By 1966, when they began to rule Nigeria with their husbands, a number of opportunities were exploited including economic and social programmes on how to better the lot of women.

Also, NAOWA and her sister associations of the Nigerian Air Force Officers' Wives Associations (NAFOWA) and the Naval Officers' Wives Association (NOWA) focused on humanitarian and economic development of women in their respective barracks.

Similarly, the NAOWA under the auspices of the BLRW encouraged soldiers' wives to form cooperative societies in order to obtain loans from the Peoples' Bank Plc⁵⁵ to boost their activities in trade and vegetable farming.⁵⁶ Through this avenue, trade fairs and literacy campaigns were organised in Nigerian barracks which improved the lot of women. During the period, women rented cultivable lands from traditional rulers, land speculators and civilian neighbours around the barracks. Other plots of land used by soldiers' wives in vegetable production were either bought or leased by the BLRW and called the BLRW Farms.⁵⁷ The funding of "BLRW projects came from International Labor Organization (ILO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Mac-Arthur Foundation, United Nations Fund for Population Activities and the Ford Foundation, to name but a few."⁵⁸ It was the financial support from these agencies and organisations that the BLRW used for women cooperatives, literacy campaign and trade fairs.

Notable barracks with large number of female farmers included, the Ojo Military Cantonment, Nigerian Army barracks, Ikorodu, Nigerian Army Barracks, Badagry, and Army Resettlement Centre, Ipaja, all in Lagos. Outside Lagos, female farmers could be found in Nigerian Army Barracks, Obinze, and the Nigeria, Navy School of Finance and Administration, Owerri, Abia State. In Enugu, state, large scale farming by army officers' wives were visible in Awkunanu and Abakpa Cantonments. In Ibadan, most of the vegetables consumed in Oyo State were produced in Odogbo Barracks.

Similarly, the undeveloped fallow lands in Kaduna Military Barracks and Air Force Bases were utilised by female farmers in the barracks. In the Air Force Tactical Command, Benue State, Sadiat Sikiru, an informant, noted that female farmers in the barracks were supported by the military authorities and

NAFOWA with repayable loans similar to the activities of NOWA and NAOWA.⁵⁹ The vegetables cultivated included, bitter leaf, green vegetable, *effirin*, *ewedu*, carrot, cabbage, spinach, onions and pumpkin leaves, lettuce, tomatoes and pepper. The preponderance of these vegetables added to the food culture of the barracks. It also put an end to malnutrition of soldiers as experienced in the early years of colonial enterprise.

The role of NAOWA and her sister associations in the barracks cannot be overemphasised. These associations partnered with the Ministry of Defence on many occasions in the area of seminars and workshops for women in agricultural production. They also produced manuals, précis and handbooks on the effective use of land, fertilizers, modern farm equipment and hired labour.⁶⁰ Also, the Better Life Cooperatives syllabus highlighted aspects of farm education, crop production, fishery, and animal husbandry. As Pat Okoye pointed out:

As reflected by the numerous projects embarked upon by the Better Life Cooperative Societies, there are rice farms, yam farms, maize, wheat, millet, and other grain farms, cassava farms, bean, soya-bean farms, cowpea farms, groundnut farms, palm plantations, plantain plantations, and vegetable farms.”⁶¹

In Nigerian Armed Forces Resettlement Centre, Oshodi, Lagos (NAFRC), Scientific and Agricultural officers of the Ministry of Defence were part of the resource persons involved in the training of female farmers in the barracks. In fact, seedlings, stalks, and high yield vegetable seeds and pawpaw were procured for these women for a fee to boost production. It was these activities that transformed vegetable production to vegetable economy as female farmers began to supply vegetables to big hospitality industries and neighbouring markets.

By the turn of 1990s, the economic fortune of female farmers in Nigerian Barracks had become noticeable as they began to purchase motorcycles, pick-up vans and buses for distribution of vegetables to various markets in Lagos

metropolis. For instance, in Ojo Cantonment, Lagos, female farmers transported their vegetables to Mile 2 and Oshodi Markets for sale. Those in Badagry created ready markets with hotel owners, and those involved in food business around their neighbourhoods, others were sold in markets around the barracks, particularly, in periodic markets of three and seven days respectively.

For instance, in Imo State, the bulk of vegetables consumed by the people came from Obinze and Owerinta Barracks where women utilised surplus fallow lands for their farming activities. Civilian buyers sometimes trailed the women to their farms to avoid unnecessary competition and haggling with other buyers. In Uyo, Abak, and Calabar, female farmers in the barracks also had enough fallow lands which they utilized for vegetable farming. These women were often supported by their military husbands during off-duty, at such times they assisted in distribution using their wives' buses and tricycles. The buses were also used for commercial purpose after vegetables had been conveyed to the markets.

The question is why were military husbands involved in women's economy? The men were involved because they had seen the economic power of their wives which complemented their monthly wages. Through this, women created spaces of influence in gender relations, it also minimised women battering in the 1980s/ 1990s compared to past years, as men discovered that women were indispensable in the family.⁶² In the heyday of the BLRW, female farmers attended fairs and exhibitions in different states and through this avenue, most women's cooperatives received loans for further production, and repayable at a given period of time.⁶³ To consolidate their profession in the barracks, female farmers began to form associations to guide against the infiltration of other women into the business. It was also to enable them steer their profession and achieve bonding. More importantly, it was to have a channel to ventilate ideas, and in the words of an informant “solicit for assistance from NAOWA and other sister associations, including the military authorities.”⁶⁴

Therefore, for effective organisation, a structure was developed; at the head of the Female Farmers Association were the president, treasurer, secretary,

protocol, discipline officer and others. The women equally use the association to support themselves, through weekly, monthly and yearly contributions which helped sustain their business and social life. With these earnings, female farmers expanded their vegetable economy by procuring modern equipment, hired labour and cultivable lands. Angelina Okoh, another informant, remarked that she trained her children in the university from the proceeds of her farm without relying on her husband; this means 'doing what men do.'⁶⁵ She added, "Without vegetable production it would have been difficult for me to be a proud owner of two buses in the barracks, now men respect me everywhere."⁶⁶ Through their activities, these women established links with other associations in the outlying villages whose services they required. These include: Seed Distribution Association, Fertilizer Distribution Association, Government Agro-Development Programme, Micro-Finance organisations and others.⁶⁷ These associations and organisations assisted female farmers in their operation; they sometimes provided collateral through which loans were advanced to the women without much difficulty. And at other times, they obtained seedlings and fertilizers on credit.

Challenges

The challenges of vegetable production in the barracks could not be overlooked. This was because in contemporary times, female farmers still had problems in getting loans and other facilities. Two kinds of challenges affected army officers' wives in vegetable production: these were internal and external variables. The internal variables were those actions within the control of female farmers and external variables were those outside their control. Beginning with internal variables, these included membership of cooperatives, for a female farmer in Nigerian barracks to be relevant in economic life in the 1980s; she needed to be a member of women's cooperative but to become a registered member was often a difficult process, and sometimes laden in bureaucracy which caused discouragement. This was one of the difficulties that faced female farmers in the barracks.

Another problem that affected vegetable production in the 1980s and 1990s was the use of simple farm tools as most female farmers could not afford mechanised and scientific equipment that would facilitate production. Though, the women's association had link with Agricultural Development Projects and extension workers in some states in Nigeria, yet, efforts to attract their services often proved difficult as they preferred to deal with big time mechanised farmers who paid good money for their services as against vegetable producers. For this reason, a lot of female farmers opted for hired labour which was rather expensive or the use of barracks' boys.

Female farmers were also affected by the postings of military husbands, as the army is interested in security and welfare of servicemen. Therefore, whenever a soldier was posted to another location, he was bound to evacuate his family to the place of primary assignment. This invariably called for female farmers to abandon their farmland and customers, to have a fresh start in a new environment. This was one of the factors that affected European wives in compound garden system in colonial days leaving the orchard unkempt.

Apart from the postings of military husbands, there was also the problem of collateral as a qualification for agricultural loans. It was this challenge that contributed to the establishment of the Peoples Bank Plc in the 1980s to alleviate the plight of barracks women in economic production. As collateral was a factor militating against the advancement of women in agriculture so also was the challenge of land in the barracks and neighbouring villages. Sometimes, arable land was taken over by infrastructure and road construction, and thus deprived women the needed land for vegetable production.

The external variable centred on climate change and environmental factors.⁶⁸ Some of the agrarian zones were affected by climate change leading to low productivity in vegetable production. Sometimes, desertification, erosion, and drought took the better part of the land. In Nigerian communities of Benue, Adamawa, and the Niger Delta region, there were flooding of the areas many times which affected female farmers, leading to food shortages in the country.⁶⁹ Another challenge that affected vegetable economy was the activities of cattle

herdsmen. The cattle herders often allowed their stock to stray away in search of feeds. In the process, they stray into vegetable farms and destroy the better part of the crops without compensation. Some women who dare challenge the herders lost their lives in the fracas which brought discouragement and fear to other women.

In recent times, the activities of kidnappers and militants had become a cause of worry for many female farmers in Nigerian barracks. The insurgency had contributed to food shortage and death, especially in Northern Nigeria. Consequently, women who obtained loan from banks for agricultural production found it difficult to pay back and this had become a problem in most homes.⁷⁰

Conclusion

This study examined the vegetable economy of female farmers in Nigerian barracks. In the early years, women were excluded from the barracks due to gender and sex. This eventually led to homesickness and desertion of soldiers in the force. It also brought about frequent vacation leave of British officers to England, including those that were invalided for a change of environment. The coming of women into the barracks was the outcome of the Wilkinson Commission that investigated the desertion of soldiers in British West Africa, and consequently recommended that wives be allowed to join their military husbands in the barracks.

Prior to the incorporation of women, there was the phenomenon of poor quality food and malnutrition, as soldiers were fed only on tinned food without commensurate vegetables and protein. With the coming of women, a new food culture evolved, as women tried to supplement the food regime through vegetable production to avoid malnutrition of their husbands. Consequently, indigenous soldiers' wives began to experiment with compound gardens where they planted staple root crops. For the European wives, flowers, vegetables, and orchard were their delight. These activities were not only subsistence in nature

but gradual because of the use of simple farm tools, lack of collateral and traditional method of farming.

At independence, there was continuity and transition in compound garden system. This means that some women in the barracks continued with the traditional garden system while others changed the system to farming. With the establishment of NAOWA, NOWA, and NAFOWA, female farming developed and was given impetus by the UN Decade for women 1975-1985, the Obasanjo's regime, and the BLRW. Between 1989 and 1991, vegetable production had transformed to vegetable economy as soldiers' wives began to buy buses, pick-up vans, and tricycles for the distribution of their yields. Some of the farm produce created market for big hotels and those in hospitality industry. This paper discovered that wives of military personnel would not have achieved much in food crops farming without the support of NAOWA and the BLRW cooperatives. It is also noted that the BLRW literacy education helped army wives in the mastery of elementary book-keeping and bank transactions. Similarly, workshops, seminars, trade fairs, and cooperatives served as catalyst in the vegetable economy of female farmers.

The study also revealed that the role of female farmers in the economy helped to change gender stereo-type in the organisation; it also integrated barracks women into economic history. More importantly is the fact that the economic life of these women deflated popular assumption that soldiers' wives were indolent and only capable of reproduction and domesticity. This paper affirmed that the jingles and songs in praise of Maryam Babangida, were in recognition of her contribution to food security and development of the economy, thus: “Vegetables for me! Vegetables for you! Vegetables for everybody, every day!

This study demonstrated that with government empowerment and sustainable food production, food security would be achieved in our society. Another important aspect of this study is that it contradicted the arguments of some scholars, particularly Oluwemimo Oluwasola's article titled “Women in Agriculture in Nigeria,” in which he declared that “Women do not earn enough income from their agricultural production activities to invest in farming as they

are engaged mainly in the production of arable crops.”⁷¹ The author perhaps, was affected by his environment and culture, and such a sweeping generalisation, to say the least, was inimical to learning and scholarship.

Available evidence has shown that apart from female farmers in Nigerian barracks, Calabar and Ukwuani women in Lagos have made tremendous progress in food crop production that transformed to farming. These women could be found in the suburbs of Ikorodu, Mowe and Badagry areas of Lagos. The study recommended that government needed to understudy the activities of female farmers in Nigerian barracks, empower them with loan; seminars and workshops to enable them achieve set goals in vegetable economy.

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Gbongan and Odeomu in Ife-Modakeke Conflict, 1981-2004: Analysing Indigenous Diplomacy and Ethnic Identity

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Introduction

Contemporary history of Nigeria has been dotted by communal clashes. Few of the most recent were the Yoruba-Hausa community in Sagamu, Eleme-Okrika in Rivers State, Zango-Kataf in Kaduna State, Tiv-Jukun in Wukari, Taraba State, Ijaw-Itshekiri in Delta State and Ijaw-Ilaje in Ondo State.¹ However, the oldest intra-ethnic clash was between Ife and Modakeke in Osun State.² A striking feature of the Ife-Modakeke intra-ethnic conflict is that it has traversed three centuries; 19th, 20th and slightly into the 21st centuries. The 19th century was a period of severe twists for the Yoruba people. The trouble that led to the collapse of Oyo Empire, the desertion of Oyo-Ile and the mass movement of Oyo people southwards precipitated series of occurrences that left radical impacts on every part of Yorubaland.³ There was an unprecedented shift in population distribution as well as a great deal of mixing among the various sub-ethnic groups of the Yoruba.⁴

Moreover, Ibadan emerged a new “hegemon” after the Owu war and several Yoruba towns and villages like Ogbomoso, Iseyin, Osogbo, Gbongan, Iwo, Ikire, Ipetumodu and other Origbo towns gained increased demographic prominence resulting from the incursions of the fleeing, refuge-seeking Oyo people who had preferred the more forested region to the grassland savanna open to attacks from Ilorin and Nupe. Most of these refugees, basically the most war-like among them,⁵ fled to Ile-Ife and intermingled with the aborigines.⁶ Though Ife was considered to be their ancestral home and origin of civilization, it should be noted that these refugees were different from ordinary migrants:

they were inhabitants of some homelands, displaced, thrown into some anguish and forced to seek refuge elsewhere.⁷

The refugees and Ife people had intermingled and lived peacefully since the reign of Ooni Akinmoyero, alias *Odunle bi ojo*, who welcomed and accommodated the refuge-seeking migrants.⁸ However, the cordial relationship became strained in 1830 when the refugees conspired with other Oyo elements led by Kurunmi of Ijaiye to oust Maye Okunade, an Ibadan leader of Ife origin. The Ife people who had hitherto enjoyed fair treatments and favour under Okunade attempted to regain their primacy but failed. This led to the death of Okunade and the dislodgment of the Ife elements from Ibadan. Many Oyo people were killed in retaliation as the Ibadan scenario reverberated back home in Ile-Ife, where refuge-seeking Oyo elements had thronged and settled.

By the close of 1830s, a sense of oneness, identity and anti-Ife sentiment had grown among the Oyo refugees. This was worsened by the antipathy of the Ife people towards the Oyo elements.⁹ These deep-seated acrimony, mutual suspicion and antagonism did not only fracture the existing peace but also laid the solid foundation for the contemporary crises between Ile-Ife and the new tenants. It is within this context that this paper attempts to analyse the place of indigenous diplomacy as conducted in Gbongan and intra-ethnic identity and alliance as intensified in Odeomu during the internecine conflicts between 1981 and 2004. This aspect of the war has not been given adequate attention in literature, in spite of the copious intellectual productions on the war.

Ife-Modakeke War: A Historical Appraisal

The commencement of open conflict between the Oyo refugees in Ile-Ife and their hosts, the Ife people, can be traced back to 1849 after the death of Ooni Adegunle, alias *Abewela Gberengede* (1839-1849). The Ooni had separated and resettled the Oyo migrants in *Iraye*, one of the six aboriginal quarters in Ile-Ife, ostensibly to avert outbreak of bloodshed between the host, Ife people and the migrants.¹⁰ The decision of Ooni Abewela to resettle the refugees further

heightened tension between the two warring parties. The new settlement offered strategic, military and economic advantages to the migrants who were at pole positions to control the Apesan Market, an Ondo-Ijebu trade route which did not only usher in economic prosperity to the Oyo migrants but also led to monopolization of arms and ammunition.¹¹ This perceived injustice on the part of the Ife hosts led to an attack on the new settlement in 1849 after Ooni Adegunle Abewela had been murdered by his Ife subjects who felt his policies were against them. The war led to the sack of Ife by the Modakeke people during the reign of Ooni Degbin Kumbusu (1849-1874) who relocated his people to *Isoya*, and *Okegbo* until 1858 when normalcy was restored by Ibadan under Bashorun Ogunmola. Violent clashes re-erupted in 1882 when Obalaaye, an Ife Chief in charge of Iraye Quarters was murdered and this led to complete destruction and desertion of Ile-Ife which was neither inhabited nor rebuilt until 1894.¹² Ibadan which had become the undisputed hegemon in Yorubaland after the Osogbo war of 1840 and Jalumi war of 1878 used its position to restore Ife in 1894 but disregarded the evacuation treaty of 1886 which was meant to relocate the Oyo migrants to a different location.

However, the loss of Ibadan in the Kiriji war, the control of the Ondo trade routes by Ife, the trauma of the forced exile, the vassal position of Ile-Ife and the intervention of the British in the protracted war encouraged Ife people to demand the evacuation of Oyo migrants from Ife territory. This demand was met in 1909 when Ooni Adelekan Olubuse I, alias *Eriogun*, *Akitikori*, *Ebitikimopiri* (1894-1910) effected the 1886 evacuation treaty and dislodged the Modakeke “tenants” from Ife territory.¹³ His successor Ooni Ademiluyi, *Ajagun Lawarikan* (1910-1930) restored the Modakeke people to Ife territory under the Native Authority System to have more population, extended tax net and increased salary. With the approval of the colonial authorities, the Modakeke people were returned to Iraye quarter in Ile Ife under the leadership of Obalaaye. It was equally agreed that the Modakeke tenants would continue to pay Isakole (royalty) to the land-owning Ife people on whose farmlands they operated.¹⁴

Contemporary Issues in Ife-Modakeke Conflict

As a corollary of the earlier clashes, cases of war re-erupted between the Oyo people and their Ife hosts in 1981, 1983, 1997-1998 and 2000.¹⁵ It should be noted that the 1909 war between Ife and Modakeke¹⁶ had resulted in the dispersal of the Modakeke settlers from the Ife community to other different Yoruba towns like Gbongan, Ikire, Apomu, Famia, Ayetoro, Tonkere, “Origbo Meje” and the eventual founding of Odeomu in 1909.¹⁷ War broke out between the antagonists again in 1981, specifically after one year coronation anniversary of Ooni Okunade Sijuwade, Olubuse II which ushered in the resurgence of the age-long Ife-Modakeke conflict in the post-independence Nigeria. Apart from the skirmishes between 1946 and 1949, there were no significant incidents during the British colonial rule (1914-1960).¹⁸

However, the 1978 Land Use Act in Nigeria, which was interpreted differently to suit individual purposes, became an instigating factor for the commencement of post-independence conflicts between the Ife and Modakeke people. Ife people construed the Act as merely ratifying their land ownership and maintaining the *status quo* while the Modakeke people believed the Act had effectively stripped their hosts of their land ownership right and tenure. This was the foundation of the war in 1981.

In addition, the politics of the First and Second Republics in post-independence Nigeria further fuelled the division between the two communities resulting in the 1983 crisis between the two contending opponents. As far back as 1955, the Ife people had joined the Action Group (AG) and Modakeke people joined National Council of Nigeria and Cameroun (NCNC) in order to further their separate interests. This also reflected in 1979 when the Ife people supported the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and Modakeke people defected to the National Party of Nigeria (NPN).

The causes of the Ife-Modakeke conflict were basically ethnic identity issue, partly political and partly economic, revolving around land ownership, payment of *Isakole* (royalty) and alleged insubordination to imperial control.¹⁹

The Modakeke people had contended that they should be accepted and integrated into the Ife territory based on the account of the age of their settlement and the sacred status of Ife as their ancestral home and source of the Yoruba race.²⁰ Added to the 1976 Local Government Reform, which equally peeled off old wounds, was the minority agitation between Ife and Modakeke people. Under this Reform, Ife and Modakeke people had been incorporated as part of the Ife Divisional Council, before it was renamed Oranmiyan Local Council with headquarters at Enuwa.²¹

The new reform split Oranmiyan Local Council into Ife North Local Government with headquarters at Ipetumodu, Ife Central Local Government with headquarters at Enuwa and Ife South Local Government Area headquartered at Ifetedo, the impasse went through many twists and turns before the creation of Ife East Local Government with headquarters first at Modakeke, later at Enuwa and finally at Oke Ogbo. Subsequent creation of Ife East Area Office with the headquarters at Oke D.O (a hilly location favoured by the colonial District Officers during the colonial period) in the heart of Modakeke brought about the peace of the graveyard.

Nevertheless, the Modakeke people felt that Ooni Okunade Sijuwade, Olubuse II was hell-bent on furthering the war by continuing where his father, Ooni Adelekan Olubuse I (alias Eriogun, Akitikori, Ebitikimopiri) stopped in 1909.²² To further give credence to this claim, the 1981 war broke out barely a year after the coronation of Ooni Olubuse II. However, Ife accounts blamed the crises on lack of caution and aggressive tendencies of the Modakeke people.²³ Again, the Modakeke people accused the Ife of denying them their ethnic distinctiveness by trying to rename Modakeke as *Isale Ife*. They claimed that even if they were not granted a distinct entity, the name of the town, tied to the sound (Mo-da-ke-ke) of a mysterious nest of stork, should remain intact.

Also, the 1983 crisis was tied to a political conflict between the Ooni Olubuse II and an influential Modakeke chief, Olaniyan Alawode. It was alleged that the UPN under the leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo had promised the Ooni that the Modakeke people would be resettled away from Ile-Ife, if the party

came to power. This was with the proviso of an emergent Awolowo Presidency in 1983. The information was intercepted and Chief Alawode then defected to NPN to work against the possibility of the plan. He encouraged the Modakeke people to vote massively for NPN and if possible, to ensure that their votes surpass those of Ibadan (a mega-city) in 1983.²⁴ The conflict then attained political dimension with ensuing mayhem occasioned by the killing of a UPN stalwart, Chief Oluwole Odelola, by the Modakeke people. War reverberated in Ife villages and farmlands, where both parties suffered casualties; people were killed and their farmlands pillaged. Further efforts were made to regain the Ife East Local Government Area and the protest that followed were the results of the war in 1997-1998 and year 2000. The year 2004 heralded the cessation of hostility in contemporary times after peace accord was brokered with notable Gbongan indigenes as part of the armistices.²⁵ Meanwhile, this effort was preceded by the efforts of the Presidential Conflict Reconciliation Committee under the leadership of Chief Olabode George in 2000. These initiatives were precursors to the eventual coronation of the Ogunsua of Modakeke, Oba Francis Adedoyin in 2009.²⁶

Trajectory and Nature of the Conflicts in Literature

Exciting literature on the Ife-Modakeke conflicts leaves a yawning gap not just in the identification of other actors of the conflicts but also on the roles of individuals and corporate umpires in the settlement of the conflicts. Ade Ajayi and Akintoye;²⁷ Oguntomisin and Falola²⁸ discussed the collapse of Oyo Empire and its attendant chain of events that impacted every part of Yorubaland. While analyzing the impacts of the collapse on the Yoruba political culture and the emergence of cities and urbanization, Akinjide Osuntokun²⁹ noted that Yoruba cities from that moment were no longer in their pre-war locations. He alleged that some were replicated by ambitious princes who lost the right to rule in the original homestead or by defeated rulers who were fleeing from their conquerors. Osuntokun reiterates the fact that though Oyo Empire was destroyed and burnt down, the thick smoke of the imperial debris smoulders on.

This paper draws a parallel between Gbongan and the old Oyo. Having been founded by an Oyo prince and direct descendant of Alaafin Abiodun called Olufioye, Gbongan is examined here as a replicated city.

To be clear, the concept of indigenous diplomacy enunciated in this paper deepens our understanding of system of interactions and relational processes amongst entities operating within the same national corridor. On his own part, Iweriebor³⁰ opined that Nigeria is a fusion of several ancient societies. He stressed that the communities, kingdoms, chiefdoms, and cities, existing in contiguous boundaries, such as the Kanem-Bornu, Kwararafa and Oyo empires, Hausa city-states, the Benin and the Ife kingdoms among others, necessarily had all forms of inter-group interactions and inter-community relations such as political interactions, diplomatic relations, economic and commercial dealings, cultural exchanges, religious and even military encounters expected of neighbours.³¹ He further asserted that over time, these complex relations may bring about consciousness, often expressed in traditions of origins or ancient brotherly relations, which sometimes turned violent, but at most times reflects generally peaceful interactions.

The foregoing exhibits remarkable disparity from the general notion of diplomacy that emerged after the Second World War which was mostly shaped and conducted by states and governments within the international contexts. This falls within Satow's definition of diplomacy as the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between governments of independent states.³²

Falola,³³ Ade-Ajayi,³⁴ Anifowose,³⁵ Akinyele,³⁶ and Asiyanbola³⁷ addressed the issues of ethnic violent relations in Yorubaland. Asiyanbola contended that ethnic attachment in Ife-Modakeke area was responsible for their attitudes towards violence against one another. He stressed that the constituents of ethnic identity include ethnic consciousness, historical background and traditional customs attached to individuals and groups which culminated in marks of differences. While Ajayi, Falola and Anifowose offered profound analyses of the nature of violent dissensions that engulfed the Nigerian entity, especially the

southwestern part of the country in the mid-1960s and 1970s, Akinyele explored the theme of pressure group politics, civil society organization and the shaping of local government in southwestern Nigeria. He further reiterated that the communities struggled to draw local government headquarters to themselves and attract development thereof. He also described the Ife-Modakeke crises as a conflict between hosts and settlers or tenants and landlords where the tenants were seeking undue advantages over the landlords as reflected in the quest to have a local government headquarters in Modakeke instead of Enuwa. He likened this to the contest between Ogbe-Ijaw (Ijaw) and Ogidigben (Itshekiri) in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Regardless of all these intellectual productions, the diplomatic exploits and trappings of Gbongan in the Ife-Modakeke conflict have not enjoyed any scholarly attention.

In their briefs on diplomacy, R.P Barston³⁸ and Ehiedu Iweriebor³⁹ discussed the changing nature of diplomacy within the context of external relations since the 1960s. Barston analysed the task of diplomacy, diplomatic settings, players in diplomacy, contents of diplomacy and methods. For Barston, diplomacy entails advising, shaping and implementing external relations through correspondences, lobbying, visits, threats, private talks, exchanging of views and treaties of friendship either openly or secretly conducted. Ajayi and Alagoa,⁴⁰ A.A Boahen,⁴¹ and Leo Otoide⁴² addressed the diplomacy of state formation in Africa, state building and the vicissitudes of African indigenous international relations. Ajayi and Boahen decry the dearth of academic productions on the topic of traditional African diplomatic practices calling for the need to engage in the study of African diplomacy. On this premise, the neutral disposition of Gbongan in the events of Ife-Modakeke conflicts, emphasizing that military alliances deepen conflict, becomes significant subject of study.

Ile-Ife, Gbongan, Modakeke and Odeomu: A Historical Nexus

Before the state creation exercise of 1991, Ile-Ife, Gbongan, Modakeke and Odeomu were within the confines of Oyo State. The creation of Osun State

severed the communities from Oyo enclave. Geographically this area of study is located roughly along longitude 4.6° N and latitude 7.5° N situated on an elevation of about 275metres above the sea level⁴³ within the humid rainforest region of Nigeria with plain land and recognizable hills. The area is situated in the tropical region where temperature can be as high as 85° F in the dry season as low as 78° F low temperatures in the rainy season. The climate encourages forest growth that serves as necessary inducement for refugees seeking protection from Fulani marauders.⁴⁴ Notably, Gbongan, the headquarters of Ayedaade Local Government Area of Osun State is flanked by powerful towns and cities like Orile-Owu, Ikoyi, Ibadan, and Oyo to the south and Ile Ife, Modakeke and Ijesaland to the North. The town is approximately 16km away from Ife –Modakeke axis and some 6km away from Odeomu along Osogbo axis.

The fall of Oyo Empire was a watershed in the establishment of many Yoruba towns, kingdoms and chiefdoms. While many existing ones gained increased demography, some were totally deserted and new ones established. The refugees that peopled the Ife territory had initially lived peacefully with their Ife hosts before socio-political troubles ensued significantly during the reign of Ooni Adegunle Abewela Gberengede (1839-1849).⁴⁵ The benevolent Ooni had resettled the Oyo refugees in the community earlier called *Isale-Ife* now known as Modakeke according to the sound of a mysterious nest of stork (*Eye Ako*) from which the town gained its name and the traditional maxim of “*Akoraye*.”

Significantly, Odeomu was founded *en mass* by the dispersed Modakeke people who left Ife territory during the reign of Ooni Adelekan Olubuse I (1894-1910).⁴⁶ The town had been established in 1908 further to the 1886 relocation treaty signed between the Oyo people led by Ibadan and Ife. But the 1909 war eventually enforced the treaty, creating Odeomu as a replicate of Modakeke. Odeomu, therefore, is a town regarded as an extension, annex or satellite town to Modakeke with all the social and cultural features of Modakeke replicated in the town. As such, family lineages in Odeomu have their roots firmly ingrained in Modakeke with their compound names, cults, cultural practices and chieftaincy titles replicated such that a Modakeke chief is eligible (if capable) of becoming a king in Odeomu.⁴⁷

Gbongan, on the other hand, elicits a remarkable difference from Odeomu. Gbongan had been founded before the collapse of Oyo Empire shortly after the death of Alaaḡin Abiodun Adegorolu when Oyo Empire got to the apogee of its suzerainty. Olufi (a short form of Olufioye) was said to be a prince, a direct son of Alaaḡin Abiodun Adegorolu, who contested the throne but lost to a bitter rival. According to the prevailing tradition, Olufioye together with his loyalists like Oluoje had to leave the capital to allow for peaceful reign and they founded Gbongan-Ile in the open savanna around *Igbori* and later moved to *Songbe*. But the Fulani/Ilorin threat led to the evacuation of the town (Gbongan-Ile) prompting Olufi and his followers to take refuge in Ife.⁴⁸ Oyo refugees felt free to stream into Ile-Ife which attracted them as a veritable place of sanctuary.⁴⁹

Hardly had Olufioye got to Ife when he started behaving kingly and like an heir apparent to the throne of Ooni. Oral account indicated that Olufioye's mother was a princess of Ife and Olufioye himself a prince of Oyo. A benevolent Ooni later resettled Olufioye and his followers at the present site in the much humid rainforest about 16km north of Ife. Hence when Oyo Empire finally collapsed, several Oyo refugees swelled the population of the town and later in 1909 when Modakeke, another Oyo settlement in the heart of Ile-Ife was evacuated, the migrants easily comingled with their kiths and kins in Gbongan before they finally moved to Odeomu having refused to return to Modakeke after the settlement of dispute.⁵⁰

Gbongan and Odeomu in the Ife-Modakeke Crises

The first king of Odeomu was titled Ogunsua⁵¹ and later Alayegun of Ayegun before the final change of the town's name to Odeomu. But the title of Alayegun was retained. One Alayegun of Odeomu, Oba Lamidi Oke was Seriki Adinni of Modakeke land before his installation as Alayegun. Not surprisingly, Odeomu was an entrenched ally of Modakeke during the crises. The town did not only supply war materials and reliefs to her mother town, but also sent fighters and reinforcements, donations and military aids to the Modakeke mainland. In any of the outbreaks of wars between 1981 and 2000, many Odeomu indigenes lost

their lives in the battle, many severely injured or permanently disabled, but no part of the town was physically burnt down or destroyed since it was quite a distance from the theatre of war.⁵²

Odeomu became a haven for fleeing Modakeke people including children, women and the aged people who could not physically participate in the conflict. Some fighters evacuated their families to Odeomu and returned to defend their “homelands” against total evacuation. The population of Odeomu swelled and this came with attendant social malaise such as touting, bullying, and outright assault emanating from the war-mongering psyche of the newly displaced young ones. The economy of Odeomu boomed in a way that reinforced the assertion that population can stimulate necessary impetus for economic growth.⁵³ It is noteworthy that there were no obvious social disparities between the migrant Modakeke people and the aboriginal Oyo people in Odeomu. Farmlands were owned on the basis of equality and no discrimination in the areas of chieftaincy and obaship.

Gbongan on the other hand was about 16km away from the theatre of war, yet the echo of the war reverberated distinctly in any of its outbreaks. It should be emphasized that Gbongan was peopled by three categories of migrants. First were those who left Oyo-Ile with Olufioye before the collapse of Oyo Empire. This category claimed aboriginal rights including the position of obaship and ownership of palm tree, being a symbolic economic tree. The second category were those that moved in after the collapse of Oyo Empire escaping the ravages of Fulani attacks from the north but did not move southwards to Ile-Ife.⁵⁴ The third category were the immigrants who left the Ife-Modakeke territory after the conflicts of 1909 and the contemporary ones between 1981 and 2000. They found refuge and holed up with relatives who had been around before their own arrival. These migrants acknowledged the authority of Olufi and attached themselves to distinguished relations and close lineages.

During the 1909 crisis, thousands of Modakeke people fled to Gbongan while some proceeded to found Odeomu. Those who had given up the thought of returning to Modakeke even after the 1921 proclamation of Ooni Ademiluyi,

(1910-1930) that returned the Modakeke people to Ife territory, had felt at home and they constituted almost half of the population of Gbongan.⁵⁵ Even Oba Francis Adedoyin, the Ogunsua of Modakeke, contended that two-third of the Gbongan people are from Modakeke.⁵⁶

Between 1981 and 2000, the number of Modakeke people in Gbongan swelled as a result of more virulent internecine crises that affected most Oyo-dominated settlements like Tonkere, Odeomu, Akiriboto and the Origbo Meje towns like Yakoyo, Ipetumodu, Edunabon, Moro, Asipa, Akinlalu and Isope that share contiguous boundaries with Gbongan, Odeomu, Ife and Modakeke. The crises between 1981 and 2000 were especially devastating because of the intrusion of more sophisticated weapons and an influential political class who encouraged the proliferation of arms and ammunition like AK 47, SMG, MAC 4, and other assault rifles that formed a paradigm shift from the old war that heavily relied on cartridge, gunpowder and charms.⁵⁷

The migrant Modakeke could not aspire to be a king in Gbongan even in spite of the incursions of modernity into the traditional practices; the institution of obaship still remained intact for the lineage of Olufioye according to tradition. This is in contrast to what obtained in Modakeke and Ibadan where a system of hierarchical order in the Balogun formation within the military class produced the Ogunsua or Olubadan. In Modakeke, the military class dominated the refugees and different lineages were thrown together without any apparent ruling houses, where becoming an Oba was (and is still) based on promotion from the lowest cadre of designated chieftaincy to the highest rung of the ladder.⁵⁸

One point of note was the economic discrimination against the migrant Modakeke people in Gbongan. The migrants were not allowed to own palm tree, a symbolic economic tree which was the most buoyant agricultural holding of the period in history. Rather, the migrant Modakeke were to own the tree in lease on behalf of an aborigine; a situation that is reminiscent of the hosts/settlers situation in Ife territory and farms. Notable among these farmlands in Gbongan villages were *Jagba*, *Onimu*, *Olooke*, *Jenlowo*, *Moru*,

Elekiri, Oloparun, Alaba Kan, Lagbaka, to mention a few. In all these farmlands, there were palm trees only owned by indigenous Gbongan people who claimed aboriginal rights.

Analysis of Gbongan's Indigenous Diplomatic Practices

The trappings of Intermediary Diplomacy underscore the diplomatic practices of Gbongan in the Ife-Modakeke conflict. The term intermediary or shuttle diplomacy is a form of *Track II* model that first gained prominence in the work of George Lenczowski in 1990, where he detailed the activities of the United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, which led to the cessation of hostilities in the Yom Kippur War.⁵⁹ Intermediary diplomacy entails the use of dynamic and structured interactive mediation process, while serving as an intermediary between or among principals in disputes without direct principal-to-principal contacts. Mediator, a neutral third party, often travel from a principal location to that of another when one or both principals refuse to recognize the other, prior to mutually desired negotiation. For example, Henry Kissinger's shuttles in the Middle East between 1969 and 1977 during the Nixon's and Gerard Ford's administrations ushered in the 1975 Sinai Interim Agreement and laid the track for Israel-Syria Golan Height arrangements in 1974.⁶⁰ Turkey, having contiguous boundaries with Israel and Syria, has equally been known to carry out intermediary or shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Syria.

Despite the fact that Gbongan was made up of, about two-third of Modakeke migrants, the town did not form any military alliance with Modakeke during the war.⁶¹ The clear policy of the town was that such an alliance was detrimental to peace and capable of escalating tension. Even though some Gbongan indigenes supported Modakeke, it did not translate to the overall policy of the town to tilt towards the side of any of the belligerent towns.⁶² In the heat of the crisis between 1997 and 2000 when the Ife fighters declared the “*Oyo l'Oyo nje* battle” (referring to any Oyo Yoruba person easily identified by their tribal marks and

dialects as marks of difference from other groups) many Oyo indigenes including Gbongan who had a misfortune of carrying marks lost their lives. It was noted that this act did not drag the town into the war against Ile-Ife.

Contrary to the charge of cowardice against the ancient town, oral tradition revealed that Akinjole “eleburu ibon” (Akinjole the owner of a mystic gun), now proudly mentioned in Gbongan's ancestral chants, was a very powerful warrior who came from Oyo with a staff called “*saare*”. He was said to be so powerful that he was never defeated in battle but only turned himself into a stream for the use of the people. His younger brother, “Olubula,” was equally touted to have followed suit by turning himself into a lake that never runs dry. Akinjole stream could be found close to Olufi market and surrounded by some mysticism. Also, there were two war masquerades in Gbongan; “Ajanaku,” owned by Odebunmi Oyediran lineage and “Lemojagba” owned by Odelade lineage. These war masquerades were said to have been brought from Oyo-Ile and replicated in Gbongan specifically to rebuff external aggressions and prosecute war.⁶³

Also, Edun Fijabi of Gbongan was the 8th Aare-Ona-Kakanfo of Yorubaland that did not only perform heroics in the Kanla war but also played prominent roles during the contest between Ojo and Siyanbola after the death of Adegun.⁶⁴ Edun came from Oyo with a deity called “Oosa Akire” worshipped every year by the reigning king to attract peace and good fortune to the town. Rather than marshalling this entire martial prowess into the Ife-Modakeke battle, Gbongan decided to remain neutral and conducted subtle diplomacy to cautiously thread the hostile terrain of intra-ethnic relations.

Indeed, during the 1983 crisis, which wore a political façade, Gbongan not only tilted towards the support of UPN favoured by Ooni Olubuse II against NPN supported by Alawode of Modakeke, but also the town massively voted for UPN with Honourable Olabiyi and Olabode as elected representatives of Gbongan constituencies. Gbongan put in place a lot of efforts to broker peace and find lasting solutions to the conundrum. Prominent among the Gbongan elements that moved to broker peace was Chief Abiola Morakinyo (main

figure), Dr. Solomon Babayemi, the Sooko and later the Olufi of Gbongan. Others included Professor Rufus Adegboye, Onpetu of Gbongan, Mrs S.O Kehinde, then Chief Accountant of Oyo State, Reverend O.A Adeyemi and J.O Wuraola, Otun Olufi of Gbonganland. All these figures intervened to quell the crisis and calmed the Modakeke quarters. A delegation was sent to the Alaafin of Oyo to call for mutual understanding and peace through subtle indigenous diplomacy.⁶⁵ Even when it could be agreed that the efforts to broker peace did not prevent the attendant mayhem, Gbongan did not change her stance on neutrality and indigenous diplomacy.

With Gbongan as the headquarters of Ayedaade Local Government, a lot of diplomatic practices came to play. From 1997, Modakeke people had resolved to boycott all local government activities bearing the name of Ife. They found solace in Aiyedaade Local Government with Gbongan welcoming them with open arms without discrimination. A lot of Modakeke students enjoyed bursaries and other free educational materials disbursed and distributed by the local government. It was also recorded that a lot of marriage registry activities were fixed at Ayedaade Local Government Secretariat by Modakeke people. This was in protest against the denial of their separate local government in the Ife territory.⁶⁶

Gbongan indigenes played prominent roles in the process of peace building and negotiations that led to eventual ceasefire and end of hostility up till 2004. The Justice Kayode Ibidapo-Obe's Judicial Commission of Inquiry in 1987, the Arthur Mbanefo Panel of Inquiry in 1996, Commodore Olabode George's Presidential Conflict Resolution Committee in 2000 and Chief Alex Akinyele's Panel of Enquiries all laid solid foundation for peaceful resolution of conflict by the year 2002.⁶⁷ The Committees recommended, among others, that Modakeke be renamed Modakeke-Ife, an Ife East Area Office with headquarters at Oke D.O should be created for Modakeke-Ife and several police formations should be established along flash points like Akarabata lines 1 to 3, Eleyele, Mayfair, Lagere, Isale Agbara, Sangan, Oke Yidi, Surulere, Odo-Okun, Oke Eso, Agbara Alapo, and Egbedore all within the contiguous boundaries.⁶⁸

However, between 2000 and 2003, there were still cases of skirmishes, tension, war-mongering, mutual suspicion, distrust and combat readiness among the belligerents resulting in casualties and loss of properties on both sides. Human and material resources, trade and commercial activities were affected and excruciating poverty reclaimed the hitherto flourishing cities. Ile-Ife holds the status of strategic commercial nerve centre in Osun State and the ancient city is host to the Obafemi Awolowo University and the Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hospital. The activities of the two institutions were paralysed by the war. Ile-Ife routes were important access to Ondo State and eastern part of Nigeria from Ibadan and also Lagos at the time Benin-Ore route was a nightmare. For the most part between 1997 and 2000, travellers had to bypass Ile-Ife through Gbongan junction en route Odeomu linking Osogbo-Ilesa axis. The foregoing negatively impacted socio-economic buoyancy in Ile-Ife and contributed immensely to the recipe for conflict resolution.

Additionally, there existed a much held notion in Gbongan that Ile-Ife should not be attacked ostensibly in regard for the *Ita Ajero* pact. It has equally been added that Olufioye's mother was an Ife Princess and Olufioye sought refuge in Ife when Gbongan was sacked by the Fulani before the benevolent Ooni Gbgbaje (1823-1835) resettled him and his followers in 1825.⁶⁹ This must have accounted for the myth to defend Ile-Ife at best, or to remain neutral at worst. Relating to this was the fact that Oyo could not attack Iwere-Ile, being the maternal home of Alaafin Abiodun. This was the major cause of conflict between Alaafin Aole and Aare Afonja which led to the internal disintegration of the empire. This contributed immensely to the neutral stance of Gbongan in the event of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Gbongan's kiths and kins in 2004 made efforts to douse tension and broker lasting peace through high power communal mediation, constant visits to the Alaafin of Oyo, the Ooni of Ife and Ogunsua of Modakeke. The Gbongan Anglican Cathedral Church equally played prominent roles of soft diplomacy through the Christian Association of Nigeria.⁷⁰

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has been able to affirm that just like the Hutu and Tutsi feud in Rwanda, the Ife-Modakeke conflict was basically centred on ethnicity. But unlike the Rwandan crisis, the Ife-Modakeke experience was an intra-ethnic clash which was a corollary of the pre-colonial ones: the issues of local government creation and property rights were mere smokescreen or subterfuge to escalate the age-long conflict. For instance, during the war, there existed ethnic marks of differences in which mark-bearing Oyo-Yoruba were differentiated from the Ife-Yoruba or other non-Oyo people during the *Oyo l'Oyo nje* part of the war. This is the same way the Hutu were differentiated from the Tutsi through skin colours and identification cards.

While the Modakeke people were at war with Ile-Ife on the basis of Ife people's right of ownership of their own property, they were suppressed and equally faced economic discrimination in Gbongan. The Modakeke people in Gbongan were not allowed to own palm tree, a symbolic economic tree which was the most buoyant agricultural holding of the period in history, and this did not lead to war. Rather, the Modakeke migrants were to own the tree in lease on behalf of an aborigine; a situation that is reminiscent of the host-settlers scenario in Ife territories and farms. This offers an intriguing dynamic of how intra-ethnic identity was constructed in which Ife's rights of ownership were resisted in their own land while Gbongan's rights of ownership of property were accepted ostensibly on the basis of Oyo/non-Oyo disparity. Was this because Ife is a non-Oyo settlement?

This work has demonstrated how Gbongan coasted through the theatre of conflict given her complex affinity with Ife and Modakeke. The work equally discussed the place of indigenous diplomacy, construction of ethnic identity and how entangling alliances and war-mobilizing intra-ethnic attachment portend serious dangers for socio-economic development, national cohesion and peaceful cohabitation among the different ethnic groups in Yorubaland. Highly diverse nations such as Switzerland, Belgium, Malaysia, and Tanzania have shed the toga of ethnic prejudices and have become relatively peaceful whilst

some seemingly homogenous nations in Africa such as Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi are constantly at war.⁷¹ As such, this paper hereby recommends that:

- i indigenous diplomatic practices, rather than ethnic alliances, should be given priority of place in the event of conflict in Yorubaland, Nigeria and Africa at large. This will go a long way to reduce the incidents of conflicts in Africa.
- ii deliberate policy interventions should be implemented to blur the lines of ethnicity, reduce incidence of conflicts and attract socio-economic development to the Ife-Modakeke conflict area. Ethnicity should rather be a veritable mobilizing tool for unity, to bargain for social welfare and national development than a bitter source of division more so that the country is in serious soul-searching mission for peace and stability as a necessary precondition for socio-economic development.
- iii the process of proper integration must be put in place to destroy the root of conflict emanating from landlord-tenant relationship reflecting in the creation of local government areas. For instance, the Afijio Local Government in Oyo State is made up of people who had not been assimilated but thoroughly integrated into the Oyo social system even with Oyo tribal marks but their ancestry remains of Gbagura-Egba stock in Ogun State from where they sought refuge in Oyo following the Owu and Ijaye wars.⁷²
- iv local militias and war veterans should be demobilised, re-engaged and reintegrated into the society of peace and meaningful employment to discourage violence, militancy, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons.⁷³

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24. Interview with Ademola Adeyeye, Sarun Oodua, at Ooni palace 22nd of June, 2013.
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44. See page 21 of the Programme Souvenir for the Coronation of the Ooni of Ife, Oba Okunade Sijuwade, Olubuse II on Saturday, December 1980.
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A Study in Spatial Focal Points and Social Contestation of Urban Life in Lagos: A History of Glover Memorial Hall, 1889-1960

Mufutau Oluwasegun Jimoh

Introduction

Place naming reflects the power of political regimes, nationalism, and ideology. The symbolic and socio-political aspects of their production must also be taken into account.¹

On the June 21, 1887, Sir Alfred Moloney, the Governor and Commander of the Colony of Lagos, laid the foundation of Glover Memorial Hall. The ordinance that established Glover Hall in 1889 charged it with the responsibility of promoting the social, educational and cultural values of the people of Lagos by promoting and maintaining the hall for public meetings and any such purpose as may be deemed necessary. Prior to that period, Lagosians were desirous of a befitting public hall where they could socialize and enjoy their new found status as her majesty's citizens enjoying the rights and privileges of a new Victorian era. Though a Yoruba settlement, the demographical configuration and the social character of the new society fuelled the demand for a new social order. By 1887, the Lagos population consisted of the indigenous Awori, Ijebu, Mahin, Hausa, Nupe and trans-Atlantic migrants from Brazil and Cuba. The most dramatic impact of this cross-continental migration was on the lifestyle and existing culture of the indigenous people of Lagos. These migrants not only swelled the population, they also imported their ways of life in terms of music, food, dress, religion and consumption pattern which were imbibed by the indigenes.

On Monday, 12 August 1903, Lagosians witnessed an epoch-making event,

when the first motion picture to be shown in Nigeria was viewed at Glover Memorial Hall in Lagos under the auspices of Mr. Balbosa of Barcelona, Spain. The event was managed by Nigeria's Herbert Macaulay who later dominated the political narrative of Nigeria in the twentieth century. A few years later, Mr Balbosa left Lagos to continue showing films in other West African countries. However, his departure did not mark the end of film screening in Lagos, as a British merchant, Mr Stanley Jones, took over the business in November 1903 and began to show films in the same Glover Memorial Hall. While the hall was noted for hosting such events, its major contributions to Lagos historiography transcend its role as an entertainment space. Though built through communal effort to memorialize one of the most beloved colonial governors of Lagos, it was one of the early symbols of colonial modernisation and a legacy of Victorian Lagos.

Colonial buildings in Nigeria have attracted paltry historical scholarship. The historical and cultural importance of these buildings is yet to be explored by social, cultural and architectural historians. Beyond their socio-cultural importance, these buildings represent an important phase in Afro-European relations. In other parts of Africa, the essential character of these buildings and the politics behind their design has received much attention from scholars who see colonial buildings as part of an imperial modernisation project and a self-perpetuating project.² In some cases, modernity and tradition--the two flanks of colonialism,--have been interrogated by those who believe that such an exercise could reveal much about colonial construction and utilization of spaces across different time and space. Within the larger colonial urban study, spatial and built space were symbols of colonial social control, an elite vision of modernity and the social condition of the subalterns; a binary vision of a colonial city which was categorised by Franz Fanon as a division between the colonized and the colonizer.³ The contestation of built space goes beyond the bipolar division advocated by Fanon. In twentieth century, Lagos, it was contestation between the colonial government and the Lagosians on one side and between the educated elite who were mostly Saro/Aguda and the traditional elite on the other.

Tim Livesy's study on buildings at the University of Ibadan has shown that modernisation in the colonial sense was a product of multifaceted process with different segments of the colonial office having different ideas of what the architectural design of the University of Ibadan buildings should look like. However, colonies became a theatre where metropolitan ideas were designed and implemented. Therefore, colonial buildings are not just symbols of modernisation as argued by Livsey; they are representations of the socio-political imagery of the colonial office and their perceptions of the Africans.⁴ By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, spatial space politics were no longer dominated by the colonial office, as their conception and execution were increasingly challenged by the African peoples who sought to influence the policies and programme of the colonizers. Modernity and development became a negotiated process between the colonised and the colonizers and this was the case in the development of spatial space in the twentieth century Lagos.

One of the most important works on Lagos history, Kristin Mann (2007) explored the development of Lagos from a simple Awori farm to the British most important holdings in the West Coast of Africa. Mann not only showed how different forces shaped the political and economic character of the city, she enriched our understanding on the economic forces at play. The importance of Glover to the development of Lagos was emphasised. Glover not only successfully expanded the economy of Lagos, he created new political and economic class and used them to negotiate for political loyalty within and outside Lagos. However, the scope of the work excluded this important phase of Lagos history. This building not only reminds us of the elite monopolisation of built space, it also reminds us of how Africa engaged in selective preservation of colonial memory in a cosmopolitan city like Lagos.

Nazomi Sawada thesis raises important questions on the rationale behind the preservation of iconic monument in colonial Lagos. She categorised these monuments as symbol of memorialisation. Beyond this categorisation, I argue further that monuments symbolise class, race and power relations in the global south. The recent agitations in Ghana for the removal of Ghandi status from the

University of Ghana, Legon campus indicate the question of race in African history. What informs the choice of memory to be preserved is informed by the class and race questions. Monuments in African history represent different shades of colonial past. Its preservation reminds Africa of colonial power and knowledge regime that shape its built environments.

Power and Knowledge- The Twin Pillar of Colonial Domination

Anbe Njoh has adequately interrogated how power and knowledge regulate the notion of urban planning and built space. He emphasised the role of power and knowledge in regulating the colonial land scape. Colonial monuments in colonial space are representations of power which emphasised racial superiority. The choice of memory to be preserved through monuments was not determined by the ordinary people, but rather by the colonial agents and local elite. In colonial spaces, monuments that preserve colonial memory are not just commemorative; they are symbols of power and knowledge; of class and social stratification.

Lydia Muthuma offered a refreshing perspective on the significance of monuments to the notion of collective identity using Kenya as reference point. She argued persuasively that; “A certain representation of national identity can be found in the choreography of public space, in the memorials erected to persons and events that are deemed important; important for preservation as public property”.⁵ In Lagos colonial space, historical monuments are not just commemorative but also manifestations of collective and remembered experience. Though colonial Lagos represents socio-cultural diversity, the commonality of colonial experience manifested itself in various forms. Visual representation of these shared experiences is represented in various built environments, heritage sites, buildings, recreational parks and educational institutions.

However, as anti-colonialism developed, built and spatial space acquired different meanings across different space and times. Community halls became

symbols of resistance to colonialism. Consequently, the Africa of 19th century characterised by European-imposed modernity, became in the 20th century the elite-defined modernity.⁶ The central character of town hall squares dates back to pre-modern times. The study of built environment would uncover more about metropolitan thinking among Africans and reveal the idea behind space utilization and building conception and design.

This paper argues that spatial spaces should not be seen in the context of modernity and development alone, they also provided the ground for social contestation between the indigenous elite and the subalterns who challenged the exclusive rights of the elite to its usage. As Fanon argued, the colonial space was divided between the colonized and the colonizer; it became a contested ground during the decolonisation process. Buildings and open spaces provided venues for agitations and grounds to contest colonial legitimacy and later in the twentieth century, they became venues where the elite flaunted their wealth and class. Though these iconic buildings are spread all over Africa, studies on specific contributions of such buildings to the socio-political narratives of Lagos, Nigeria's commercial city are in short supply.⁷

Conscious application of the academic mind to the study of Lagos history has been going on for nothing less than a century and sufficient progress has been recorded in the documentation of its socio-political narratives. Recently, attention seems to be shifting away from its political history which has been dominated by the history of its dynastic struggle in the nineteenth century. New studies have emerged on the social history of Lagos with emphasis on its built environment, sexuality, juvenile delinquency, youths, architecture, livelihood, epidemics control, water and urban livelihood. Through and beyond the study of the famous Glover Memorial Hall with a view to illuminating our understanding of the politics of selective commemoration through building of monuments, we can also glean from the social tension created by the struggle for accessibility to this colonial symbol of modernity.

The arguments and observations that underpin this paper are two-fold. First, in Lagos, one of the buildings that defined the character of the city in the Victorian

era and beyond is the Glover Memorial Hall, a focal point for the anti-colonial struggle in the early twentieth century. Secondly, the building provided ground for social contestation between the indigenous elite and ordinary people who challenged the elite right of exclusivity. The building thus provides us with a methodological framework from which to understand how the politics of memorialization played out in Lagos and by extension British West Africa. Also, the study of Glover Memorial Hall could facilitate the understanding of the dynamics of social configuration and social contestation that characterised colonial societies. Glover Memorial Hall has played a decisive role in Lagos socio-political and cultural history.

By the late nineteenth century, town hall forecourts became the venues for official rallies, political demonstrations, commemorations, festivals and celebrations as well as commercial events such as street markets, outdoor concerts, sports events, or tourist sightseeing. This not only reflected the socio-political imagery of colonialism but also demonstrated and symbolized social dynamics of a given society. "To a greater extent, it reflected the multiple interests of the colonial powers".⁸ Public halls hosted activities that can count on a high level of public and media interest, which makes access a contentious issue.⁹ Thus, as the authority system that governed colonial space, the spatial space in colonial Africa was essentially socio-political. According to Ambe Njoh, "It manifested in silhouettes of struggles between the colonizer and the colonized" and in the case of Lagos, between the elite and the subaltern.¹⁰ Accessibility became problematic, the new elite with new wealth brought about by the new colonial economy dominated social space to the extent that town hall became a status symbol where the elite could flaunt their wealth and claim their rights of exclusivity.¹¹ This phenomenon was a reflection of social stratification and the emergence of a new social order in the emerging modern city of Lagos.

During the inter-war years, the city's social character had fully evolved to the extent that it became a symbol of progress and civilization by British standards. By the 1920s, places of socialization dotted the geographical landscape to the

extent that social space not only became exorbitant, it attracted comment from the vibrant Lagos press.¹² One such social space was the Glover Memorial Hall.



Glover Memorial Hall

Sources: MBC Interactive Archive

People of various races, colour and creeds have, at one time or another, congregated in the iconic Glover Memorial Hall for various purposes over the past 127 years. Besides religious and military, concerts, political meetings, social functions, civil, Assizes, theatricals, boxing matches, literary debates, billiard competitions, have all been held in the famous memorial hall. British sovereignty has even stood on the platform in the hall. Yet, one of the major lacunae in the historiography of Lagos was the total absence of a detailed history of Glover Memorial Hall and its contributions to the socio-political development of Lagos.

At the dawn of the 1900s, the political landscape of what was to later become modern Nigeria was undergoing considerable transformation in terms of the forceful imposition of the Pax-Britannica. The imposition was achieved despite

considerable resistance from Nigerian people who initially fought for political inclusion and later outright independence. Lagos served as the focal point of this emancipation struggle. Resistance to colonial domination predated the emergence of the Nigerian state. The Anglo-Kosoko war of 1851 marked the beginning of an organized resistance movement against colonialism. Between 1908 and 1945, Lagos provided the political space for many organized mass actions, boycotts, and even strikes to press home the people's revolt against colonial domination and racial subjugation.¹³ For instance, in 1908, Drs. John Randle and Orishadipe Obassa as well as Mr. Egerton Shyngle formed a mass-movement known as the People's Union which opposed the introduction of the water rate tax by the British.



Herbert Macaulay.

*Sources: Macaulay Paper, Kenneth Dike Library,
University of Ibadan*

The protest which extended for years proved to the British that Lagosians were not going to allow their right to self-determination to be taken for granted. It was

within this context that in 1922, Herbert Macaulay (The Wizard of Kerstin Hall) formed the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), partly, to actualise the desire of the people for a political platform.¹⁴ A useful observation about the NNDP was that it was not just a political party but also an umbrella body for all anti-colonial bodies including mass movements, trade unions, market men and women, community groups.

While scholars of Lagos history have acknowledged these milestones as important contributions to the development of the Nigerian nationalism, none has recognised the importance of spatial focal points in the development of anti-colonial movement and class contestation. Glover Memorial Hall, perhaps more than any other spatial focal space, played a prominent role in the development of the Nigerian nationalist movement and as a veritable space for social binary in Lagos.

The motley communities in Lagos needed a venue where concerts and literary debates could be held like those in metropolitan Europe and America.¹⁵ In Lagos, the few available social amenities were limited and restricted along racial lines. Concert and orchestra performances were restricted to churches and school halls. Political gathering lacked focal points beyond Enu-Owa which is more of a symbolic cultural point than a political and social space.

The first concert in Lagos was staged in 1866, five years after the island was "possessed" by the imperial government.¹⁶ The concert was staged in a small mission hall by Messers Samuel, Josiah and Dandeson Crowther, son of the late Bishop Ajayi Crowther. They were assisted by a few Saro men from Freetown.¹⁷ These were the first set of elite described by Ayandele as the deluded hybrid.¹⁸ Though derided by Ayandele, they set the pace for the new social order from 1866 to 1900; championed the course of political inclusion, and equally raised the bar for socio-political discourse.

The Victorian idea of modernity was permeating the entire society with new actors flaunting their accumulated wealth brought about by the capitalist economy. This modernity found expression in the establishment of social

organizations. Following the first unsuccessful attempt to establish social organization in Lagos and the construction of a town hall where the elite could converge to deliberate on the socio-political issues confronting the city, the Philharmonic society was established in 1873, a major step towards achieving social cohesion across the ethnic divides.¹⁹ Following the establishment of this society, a new society called "Flower of Lagos" was formed. This was in Phoenix Hall, a small building located off Kakawa Street at No.1 Phoenix lane. It was a building of 66 feet by 28 feet with a gallery on three sides, which was also used for the judicial proceedings of the Supreme Court house, as a theatre, concert hall and a church.²⁰

In reality, the hall lacked the character of a community meeting point. It was exclusively used by the colonial government. It did not have any historical affinity with the community neither did it attract any symbolic individual as patron. A few years after its formation, the society died a natural death due to lack of patronage by the elite and European merchants who were the major players in the social circle of Victorian Lagos. The building was converted for printing works and was later occupied by *Daily Times*, the first Pan-Nigeria newspaper.

By the mid-1870s, the Melodramatic Society was inaugurated in Lagos. The society was dominated by young, energetic and vibrant young men of mixed race. They had been raised in metropolitan Europe and imbued with Victorian ideas and culture. Herbert Macaulay, a foremost nationalist in Nigeria who was to later establish the first political party, was the General Secretary.²¹

For the first time in the history of Lagos, the society brought together people from across the racial divide. A few months after its formation, Dr. J. Desmond McCarthy, a colonial surgeon together with other Europeans, mostly merchants and civil servants, joined the society.²² The society's name was later changed to the Melodramatic Society and Lagos Isthmian Club.²³ However, the society lacked a permanent meeting place because Lagos lacked a town hall that could hold concerts and operas performances. At that period, schools, and chapel premises were set aside for secular concerts and dramatic entertainment as well

as operas which were not only utterly devoid of any religious tendency, but also seemed to enter into undisguised competition with ordinary music hall and the theatre.²⁴ Perhaps the plausible reason for this synergy between the space of worship and secular social gathering might be due to the fact that the concerts and other performances were staged to raise funds for religious purposes. This relationship between the church and the secular society was however, criticised by a section of Christendom. In 1881, the Wesleyan church expressed strong reservation for:

some places, chapel, and school premises, set apart as they are, for the worship and service of God, have been unlawfully abused by the holding therein of entertainments which were not only devoid of religious tendency but seemed to enter into undisguised competition with the music hall and the theatre.²⁵

The Church went further by rallying the members of the church against what it considered to be "mistaken and dangerous policy."²⁶ In what appeared to be a clear division within the 'body of Christ', the Wesley church criticised the Methodist school for the songs and the use of the school premises for entertainment. The Church noted that "the spirit which these entertainments foster is wholly at variance with the spirit that Methodist sought to cultivate".²⁷

By the late 1870s, the community of Lagos began to feel the need for a properly built town hall that would cater to the new elitist taste for social and musical concerts that would reflect the growing status of the city as the 'Venice of West Africa'. By the 1870s, the demographical configuration of the town had changed and the new colonial economy had ushered in a new social order. Wealth accumulation also brought about new consumption patterns. In the early twentieth century, the elite who had been trained in metropolitan cultures and ethos now socialised in cinemas, attended concerts and operas. Lagos was no longer that horrible commercial centre for the export of slaves; it was the 'Liverpool of West Africa' and the "Venice of West Africa" a title that symbolized its new commercial and social wealth. Perhaps the editor of *Lagos Observer* newspaper was speaking the mind of the average Victorian elite when

the paper noted that "If Lagos did not have music in their churches, the pews would become vacant, music and entertainment houses would flourish in consequence."²⁸

The Death of 'Oba Globbah' and the Building of Glover Memorial Hall

The death of Governor Glover and the need to appreciate his contributions to the development of Lagos led to the formation of a committee that would oversee the building of a hall in his memory. "A tough old fighting veteran of the old school has just passed away in Sir John Glover"²⁹ On the 8 October, 1885, the *Pall Mall Budget* a London news medium broke the news of the demise of arguably the most genial colonial governor in Lagos and provided the following clue about his stewardship:

After peaceful service in Elbe and the Weser, he was sent off to the West Coast of Africa in 1857 where he remained with short intervals of absence till 1872. Fifteen years on the West Coast spent in surveying lagoon battling with pirates, waging war with hostile tribes, suppressing the slave trade, and maintaining a Roman peace on the Gold Coast, constitutes a noble stroke of work for England, which day she remembers with gratitude.³⁰

His death marked the end of an era. It was a huge loss to the British imperial project in the tropics. He was one of the few men who understood the dynamics of Lagos culture, a very sophisticated Victorian elite and pantheon of commercial merchants. On the 2nd of October, 1885, the *Standard*, another London newspaper ran an editorial that highlighted his contribution to the course of the imperial government. The paper commended his contributions to the Asante war, and the Niger Expedition which started in March 1857 and lasted till March 1861. Glover was a one-time member of the British Navy. He was commended for the entrenchment of the British rule along the West Coast. The reaction of Lagosians to his death was perhaps represented by most of the

newspaper editorials of the time. The editorial of *The Lagos Observer* on 19 November, 1885 captured the mood of the community. According to the newspaper;

A good and generous man, and an able governor has now finished his earthly career, the noble-hearted Sir John Hawley Glover is no more; he whom no danger could swerve from the path of duty, who was to the people of this island a benefactor was stricken down by the hand of death in London on the 30th of September, and the sad intelligence has thrown his friends and admirers in this settlement into grief and sorrow. He was an Englishman in whom was the embodiment of the true gentleman.³¹

While most newspapers concentrated on his exploits in other climes, a few remembered that Glover had shot to fame first in Lagos before he cemented his position as an empire builder with his victory at the Ashanti war. Arriving in Lagos as a naval commander, he soon assumed the governorship, after filling, in rapid succession, several high offices, and in 1863 received his plenary appointment as Governor of Lagos and its dependencies.³² Glover commenced his reign in Lagos with such unprecedented fervor, the quality of which would soon endear him to a sophisticated Lagos populace. He was a Governor known for his loyalty to the improvement of Lagos trade and saw Lagos as a potential rival port to that of Tripoli and Benghazi in Libya.³³

In a clear departure from the attitude and character of colonial agents, Glover cultivated the friendship of Africans in Lagos and built a client-patron relationship, a mechanism he effectively employed to rule the Lagos political space. Though this friendship was reciprocally beneficial, he relied on the leading personalities in Lagos to negotiate treaties with the chiefs in the interior of Lagos. According to Mann,

Glover's African clients gave him a power base in the town and surrounding territory." He recognised the abilities and influence

of his local client to reach out to people on the fringes of Lagos who might naturally be suspicious of the British colonial officers to drive his policy of expansionism.³⁴

For instance, he was not only sympathetic to Eleko Kosoko, Oshodi Landiju Tapa, and their leading supporters, who were driven to exile by the British Navy in 1851 following a dynastic struggle within the ruling royal family, but also built a mutually beneficial relationship that he mobilized to the administrator's advantage when necessary.³⁵ Through his clients Glover extended his control and built inter-personal relationships with leading indigenous figures in places like Ereko, Epetedo, Olowogbowo, Oke-popo, Oko-Awo, Aroloya, Enu-Owa, Isalegangan, Isale-Agbede and outlying communities to the east and west of Lagos. This relationship provided him with the channels of communication with the African population.

Personalities like Oshodi Landiju Tapa, I.H. Willoughby and *Ogbeni* Taiwo Olowo played prominent roles in extending and entrenching Glover's influences beyond the geographical space of Lagos.³⁶ On the other hand, Africans who were loyal to Glover benefited from this extensive network among European merchants in Lagos. The dignities of Lagos chiefs were restored and they were incorporated into the new colonial economy and regional commodities market.

At the death of Glover, the people of Lagos who were desirous of having a befitting hall for social activities, decided to build a memorial hall to perpetuate the name and memory of the man commonly referred to as '*Oba Globbah*'. As part of the activities to mark the golden Jubilee year of the reign of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, Mr. John Otonba Payne chaired a meeting of eminent Lagosians on the 20 January, 1886, where the decision to build a memorial hall was taken.³⁷ It must be noted that, in appreciation of '*Globbah*', individual donations were called for by the chairman. The donation of the strategically important piece of land along the commercially viable Marina area of Lagos, underscores the importance of the project to the people.

Although this singular gesture by the people to immortalize the memory of the man regarded as one of the builders of nineteenth century Lagos, can be regarded

as part “of construction of history and visualizing charismatic figures,” beyond this, it also represents the elite construction of politics of social exclusion.³⁸ Construction of memorial and historical monuments explained how Lagos society was configured in the late nineteenth century. It emphasized how the elite chose to preserve their privileged position of socio-political and economic exclusivity.

There were two conflicting accounts of the ownership of the land on which the hall was erected. According to Ogedengbe Macaulay, Herbert Macaulay's son and a journalist, and Adekunle Alli³⁹ “Alfred Moloney offered the old customs warehouse which also accommodated the customs office and the government printing office at the corner of the Marina Street to the committee for erection of the public hall in Glover's memorial for which the Lagos public had already subscribed nearly £2,000”. The second account offered by Nevil Miller claimed that:

The patch of land on which the hall now stands was donated by Madam Tinubu in appreciation of the governor's works: in his eight years as governor, Sir John famously built a settlement at Ebute-Meta for refugees from the Egba-Dahomey war; he was instrumental to the construction of Broad Street and also helped in extending the Marina.⁴⁰

Though these two accounts were quite conflicting, however, it only confirmed the affection of the populace towards Glover and the seriousness which the people attached to the project.

The Lagos populace expressed joy for the 'generosity' of the Governor. Their address was delivered by the Secretary of the Board of Trustees Mr. W.E Cole. The new governor expressed his delight with the initiatives. Commenting on the address delivered by the representatives of the community, Governor Moloney noted that:

Gentlemen, I accept, with sincere gratification and pleasure, your address. I agree with you that in view of all the past and

present circumstances and in grateful memory of one of Her Gracious Majesty's former representatives, whose name GOLOBAH, remains not only a household word in the Yoruba country, of which Lagos is the attractive focus and should be the binding knot, but has been, and is still, generally applied to his successors of whom I am proud of myself one, the inauguration, connection with which we are collected here today may fittingly be associated with celebration of the 50th anniversary of our queen's reign.⁴¹

The initial plan was to build a hall that would provide a social space for the emerging modern society with its new found wealth and elite. The hall was conceived and financed by the people of Lagos, the colonial government later altered the initial plan to accommodate, not just the town hall, but also public library, reading room, and a museum.⁴² The governor noted that this amendment was "for the future enlightenment of the many, particularly the rising and the future generations, in the different stages of our social and commercial development (local and neighbouring)". The Governor went further by acknowledging the role of the trustees in the realisation of the project.

However, by the 1920s, Glover Memorial Hall had acquired the character of a focal point for the resistance movement where historical rhetoric that would later define the shape and character of nationalism in Nigeria was made. Arguably, the seed of the Nigerian independence struggle was planted when Macaulay announced the formation of Nigeria's first political party in the hall. Within Lagos, during the inter-war years and at the early stage of the decolonisation period, the Hall served as the focal point for political aspirants who addressed and mobilized their supporters for political actions. By the turn of the 1930s, the geographical skyline of Lagos was dotted with cinemas, such as the Le Coliseum, Regal, Rex, Royal, Capitol, and Odeon. Yet none of these relaxation centres could rival the iconic Glover Memorial Hall. The space was not limited to socio-political events alone, films and cultural shows were regularly staged in the Hall.

In the 1930s, it became the benchmark for the elite to show their new status as bookings of the hall became highly competitive in a society that was basically driven by status, wealth, and family affiliation. Arguably, the social character of the hall was more defined in the 1930s than at any other period. Although Lagos at this period was not short of prestigious social halls as many hotels and public-private halls dominated the social skyline, however, none could match the historical and socio-political prestige of Glover Memorial Hall. Social, political and cultural group competed for space in a period largely remembered for economic recession.




Figure 1: Campaign Card of the Nigerian National Democratic Party

Source: Oged Macaulay Private papers, file 7

By the 1920s, new class of Lagosians had emerged on the social scene to challenge the elite exclusivity to the social space. However, the elite who would also not allow its privileges to be trampled upon acted to preserve its prestige by

controlling the mode, time and who used the hall and for what purposes. The hall was built by the Victorian elite whose ideas of modernity reflected metropolitan ideals. In the 1930s, young people and ethnic associations began to compete with them. The character of the city in the twentieth century was remarkably different from that of the Victorian era where socialization was an exclusive preserve of the privileged few who had the opportunity of an early education in metropolitan Britain.

On the 7 January, 1941, the Zumral-Tul-Deen Islamic society booked the hall for a programme for three hours between the hours of 9pm and 12am.⁴³ This society was made up of people of diverse social backgrounds coming together under the religious umbrella to socialize and create a distinctive identity from other Islamic social organizations. Owing to the limitation of social space for such a gathering the most obvious space was Glover Memorial Hall. The “society's play started at the scheduled time, and the necessary play continued”.⁴⁴ Interestingly, at about 10.00pm, Sir Adeyemo Alakija sent one of his assistants to “tell the players to stop the drumming as he said, it was causing him a great inconvenience and the message was not ignored and the drumming was stopped.”⁴⁵ Glover Memorial Hall was a public institution duly paid for, with a public notice of the event duly advertised. Sir Alakija belonged to the upper echelon of Lagos society who set the rules of social engagement. It is important to note that, while the drumming was stopped, by 11.30pm. Alakija telephoned the central police station at Custom Street to complain about the “miscreant” at the hall. A detachment of police officers invaded the hall and forced the organizers to abandon the programme.⁴⁶ The colonial response to this episode underlined the collaboration between the elite and the state. In a memorandum sent by the superintendents of police to the commissioner of the colony, he noted that the

A complaint was received from Mr. Adeyemo Alakija and they proceeded to the hall at about 10.05 pm. At the time of their arrival they (the people in the hall were making noise and were beating drums. They were told to stop and they did so. Later at

about 11.50 a message was received from S.P colony and they again went to the hall where they found the people in the hall making a noise but not drumming. On the occasion they asked the people to leave the hall.⁴⁷

Alakija was not acting alone in this particular case, he represented the interest of the Lagos elite who sought to restrict the usage of the hall to more charitable events and exclude the subalterns from using the hall.⁴⁸ While Sir Alakija and the colonial government were intolerant of drumming, essential components of social function in African society, the hall was struggling to cope with the demand for cinema and live performance shows.⁴⁹ Social functions organized by the elite fell into the category of civilization, while that of subalterns constituted a nuisance to be disrupted by the use of the coercive power of the state.



Sir Adeyemo Alakija

For instance, on the 4th April 1941, the Young Auxiliary Association located at No. 44 Idumagbo Mosque wrote to the secretary of the Glover Memorial Hall demanding for a refund of an hour fee. The organization had earlier paid for three hours (9-12 pm) to use the Hall for a religious gathering. However, two hours to the end of the event, they were evicted by a detachment of police officers from Custom Street police division who claimed to be acting on the order of the colony's chief superintendent of police.⁵⁰ While record is silent on the reason for such punitive action by an agent of the state, one can only speculate that he was acting to protect the interest of the elite who sought to monopolize accessibility.

The contestation over the use of the Hall was not limited to the social circle alone as it assumed an ethnic dimension in the period under review. Contrary to the general belief that ethnic rivalry in Nigeria was a product of colonial independence arraignment, ethnic antagonism pre-dates the decolonisation era. The Ibo-Yoruba animosity in Lagos manifested in the use of public space for social gathering and political activities.


On April 13, 1949 the *West African Pilot* newspaper owned by Nnamdi Azikiwe, a foremost Nigerian politician of Igbo extraction, alleged that the Igbo “have been banned from the use of Glover Memorial Hall whenever members of the Nigerian Youth Movement are in the hall” by the trustees of the Hall who are Yorubas.⁵¹ The trustees reacted through their secretary on one occasion that the Igbo never booked for the use of the hall through Mr. Jaja Nwachukwu for the lecture of the Igbo State Union.⁵² On June 1, 1949, the *Pilot* retracted its story by clamming that “facts have come to our notice which shows that the report was inaccurate”.⁵³ It is however important to understand that the hall was caught in the web of ethnic politics that engulfed the Nigerian Youth Movement in the 1940s. The fuss over the use of the hall indicates that buildings are not just symbols of modernity; they also represent socio-political interest. If the Yoruba believed that the building belongs to Lagos, their right of exclusivity was resented and contested by the Ibo whose influence and population in Lagos was becoming noticeable at that time. The controversy merely revealed the socio-

political tension in Lagos within the ranks of the nationalists whom scholars have submitted formed a granite coalition against colonialism.

On August 23, 1941, a social gathering was arranged by the African staff of the Railway Stores Department in honour of Mr. W.J Lardner who was promoted to the position of stores superintendent.⁵⁴ The event was hosted at the Glover Memorial Hall. The event was duly licensed by the police and the police band was on stand to entertain the guests composed of Africans and Europeans. At about 5 p.m. local time, a young man who was later identified as Mr. George formerly a labour leader with the Public Works Department Kaduna and secretary of L.T.C. and now a paid Assistant Secretary of N.C.N.C., rushed to the Hall and

On the top of his voice angrily addressed the men that they ought to have realised that a mass meeting in connection with the Agricultural Bill was on and that they were a really very cheap assembly and useless Africans to interrupt the mass meeting with a police band in what he regarded as currying European favour in British West Africa.⁵⁵

The contestation between N.C.N.C. and the Public Works Department's workers clearly demonstrated the deep division within the Lagos social terrain in the twentieth century. If accessibility to the hall was the exclusive preserve of the elite in the nineteenth century, this right was challenged by the people of other classes who needed the hall for social activities other than the "charitable and profitable" use advocated by the elite. The N.C.N.C. activities should be seen within the wider context of social struggle within the colony. It is however, intriguing to note that while the party and the workers collaborated in the struggle against colonialism and jointly advocated for political participation and later decolonisation, they differ remarkably in their social life and grouping. The elite, both Europeans and Africans, controlled the social space and tended to frustrate the usage of the hall for activities which lay outside their view of civilization.



Source: Herbert Macaulay Collections. Kenneth Dike Library, University of Ibadan

During this period, accessibility became difficult as social, political and cultural events competed for space in the hall. Drama, cultural festivals, political events and cinemas filled every available space through the week. The elite paid for every available spot sometimes three months ahead of the events. Social events that symbolized status and class dominated the schedule of the hall.

Though built by the elite to perpetuate the name of a colonial governor, the memorial hall symbolizes the character of the city where the resilience of tradition stood consistently in contrast with the eroding force of colonial modernity. In the nineteenth century the Saros, Agudas and the African educated elite of the nineteenth century monopolized the use of the Hall for personal, political, and elite centered activities. According to Aderinto, "the hall was built by the elites whose idea of modernity reflected metropolitan ideals."⁵⁶

From the 1930s, young people and ethnic associations began to compete with the educated elite for social space within the colony. However, in the interwar years, the demography and social configuration of Lagos was remarkably different from that of nineteenth century. Differences in perception between these classes resulted in social-class tensions in the twentieth century Lagos.

Conclusion

This paper shown that the expansion in the economic activities in Lagos and the new economic realities expanded the scope of social interaction beyond the circle of Saro and the Brazilian emancipado (Aguda) and the Aguda and a few Yoruba intelligentsia who had dominated the social space for much of the nineteenth century. By the twentieth century, new groups who wanted to carve a social identity for themselves and expand the scope of social interaction challenged the elite monopolization of accessibility to the Glover Memorial Hall; a symbol of modernity. This challenge underlined the social tension within Lagos society. While earlier writers have painted a picture of social harmony among different groups in Lagos, this paper argues that tension existed among different class formations within Lagos society over accessibility to social space. In other words, socio-physical development of Lagos was a product of negotiated process among different actors across different time and space. A study of Glover Memorial Hall thus reveals that in spite of the tension that pervaded the relationship between the colonized and the colonizers, Lagosians recognised the importance of preserving the memory of a colonial agent who accommodated their interests and sought to advance their economic power. The history of the Hall shows the social history of society in transition and the indigenous people who participated in this transition through the politics of spatial space.

Endnotes

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Beyond Political Intrigues: The Context of Nigeria's Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with Israel in 1992

Charles Adediji Ogidan

Introduction: Contextualizing the Israel-Palestinian-Arab Conflict

At independence in October 1960, Nigeria by reason of its human and natural resources, and because of its shared continental relationship with Afro-Arab countries, was drawn into the conflict between a relatively young nation of Israel and its large hostile Arab neighbours. The contest for the ownership of Palestine between mostly Palestinians¹ and Palestinian Jews and their new exilic arrivals began on April 19, 1936 first as Palestinian revolts against the British mandate in Palestine and the demand for independence as a strategy to prevent Jewish immigration to Palestine.² Tagged “the Great Revolt”, the rebellion became extended because of the involvement of the Arabs in the war against Palestinian and exilic Jews. The revolt was finally suppressed in August 1939 without the Palestinians being able to achieve their dream of the establishment of a state.³

A second attempt to achieve this goal by the Palestinians on November 30, 1947 led to what began as “the Palestinian War” but ended up becoming the catalyst for the declaration of a state by the Jews on May 14, 1948.⁴ Supported by five Arab nations of Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Transjordan (now Jordan), the Palestinians and the Arab Nations' Holy War Army were further fuelled by foreign volunteers from Pakistan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen.⁵ When that theatre of conflicts ended on July 20, 1949, the new state of Israel was victorious and gained control of a large chunk of the contested Palestine. Millions of Palestinians were forced into exile. About seven hundred thousand

new Jewish immigrants many of who were forced out of Arab/Islamic nations replaced the fleeing Palestinians in the new state.⁶ The conflict thereupon assumed a semblance of a geostrategic/geopolitical colouration that has led to several other wars since then. These includes the 1956 Suez Canal War between Israel, Britain and France against Egypt, the 1967, 1973, 1982, 2006 and some more geostrategic wars after that.

The involvement of the Soviet Union, Britain and France in the 1956 Suez Canal war began to give it inter-continental colouration. The Soviet Union (an ally of Egypt) had particularly sought to use the war to gain a major inroad to the politics of the Middle East. It threatened to deploy nuclear weapons against Western Europe if the 'Tripartite' coalition did not cease their aggression against Egypt. The United States of America which was not carried along by the 'Tripartite' was thereupon threatened with a possible imposition of economic sanctions if the countries failed to withdraw from Egypt.⁷ Their consequent withdrawals became a watershed in systemic politics as it became obvious that both Britain and France had lost its major power role to the United States of America and the Soviet Union in global power equation. At a sub-regional level, the withdrawal marked the first Arab state victory over Israel, albeit, a diplomatic success than conventional military victory.

The 1967 six-days war was the most disgraceful defeat suffered by the relatively larger Arab armies against the smaller state of Israel. Israel did not only defeat the combined forces of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinian people, it captured strategic territories it could not conquer in the 1947-1949 war.⁸ These included the Gaza Strip from Egypt and the Palestinians, and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt thereby reversing Egypt's 1956 victory by registering its presence at the bank of the Suez Canal. Israel also drove back Jordan from the rest of the West Bank and seized the all-important ancient city of East Jerusalem from Jordanian control. It also subdued Syria, wrestling the strategic Golan Heights out of its control. Israel succeeded in decimating ninety percent of Egyptian Air Force in three days; killed about twenty thousand members of its opponents' armed forces; destroyed their facilities; gained

control of the religiously important East Jerusalem and silenced the remaining member of the coalition, Iraq, which opted to remain mute in view of its allies' misfortunes.⁹ Not only was this a disaster for these nations and the Arab/Islamic world in general, the conquest of the Gaza Strip placed Israel in direct control of the Palestinian people. Israeli direct administrative control of East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip opened a new theatre of Arab/Palestinian conflicts with Israel which is the introduction of civil disobedience and terrorism which were not just aimed at the Jews in Israel but all over the world.

The Yom Kippur war of 1973 triggered the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the consequent sub-Saharan African diplomatic rifts spats with the state of Israel and the subsequent African countries' severance of diplomatic relations with Israel in support of the Arabs. Egypt and Syria supported by Jordan and Iraq launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, 1973 on the Holiest day of the Jewish calendar. Although Israel once again established its military supremacy over its Palestinian/Arab neighbours, the 1973 conflict however dealt some heavy blow on its assumed invincibility in the region. Also, the fact that Anwar Sadat (the Egyptian leader) had dispensed with the services of the Soviet Union just before the new war in 1973 was an indication of the fact that he probably had other motives for triggering the war.¹⁰ Despite Israel's success against Egypt at the battle fronts, Egypt eventually secured the return of its territory, the Sinai Peninsula through, a strategic military alliance with the United States of America and the United States financial commitments to the Afro-Arab state through the Camp David Accord of 1978.

Nigeria severed diplomatic relations with the state of Israel on October 25, 1973 as a response to alleged Israeli aggression against Egypt following the occupation of the Sinai Peninsula during the 1973 Yom Kippur war. By this decision, the Arabs through their North African brethren, succeeded in ostracising Israel not just from Nigeria but from most African countries that took similar decisions. The state of Israel did not just accept the decision. It embarked on multi-dimensional diplomatic efforts aimed at reversing this trend. While some sections of the Nigerian society were not in tune with the

decision of the Federal government to lock Israel out of Nigeria, serious evidences of Israeli intransigence, not just against Egypt but the notion that Israel's continued occupation of Palestinian and Arab lands contravenes international law, principles, statutes and conventions (upon which the fundamental objectives of Nigerian foreign policy rests), were employed by successive Nigerian governments from 1973, to maintain the decision and to keep Israel out of Nigeria.

Beyond the above rhetoric, evidences abound which showed clearly that Nigeria maintained robust exchanges with the Jewish state while official diplomatic relations had been severed. This study seeks to examine the factors that were adduced and which aided the formal restoration of official diplomatic relations with Israel on May 5, 1992. The study argues that the factor of charismatic leadership rather than hard-headed realism motivated the adoption of the new Nigerian foreign policy decision. It showed that image perception couched as national interest by the military government of General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida was the motivating factor for this decision. Every other explanation adduced by the government were so employed to justify the new policy decision just as various excuses were used to keep Israeli out of Nigeria while the diplomatic break lasted.

Systemic Variables of Nigeria's Relevance to Israel

As noted by Tunde Adeniran, "The World has indeed moved from the age when individual communities existed with very little to do with their external environments".¹¹ Whereas Israel, at its inception, attempted vigorously to court the friendship of other new emerging states in systemic politics variously grouped as Third World countries, concerted efforts of Arab/Islamic countries to lock her out of the fora began to yield results as it was kept out of the Asian movement, Afro-Asian movement and later the Non-Aligned Movement. Thereupon, it turned to and began to rely on its western allies, especially the United States of America to break the attempted diplomatic strangulation.

Between 1960 and 1973 when it succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with many African countries, it employed the offer of technological assistance, especially in agriculture and agronomics, as the bait to attract the attention of technologically backward African countries including Nigeria. To counter this, Arab countries especially the OPEC cartel offered African countries concessionary oil price to cushion the post-1973 oil price rise. However, Robert Anton Mertz and Pamela Macdonald Mertz in their analysis of Arab aid to Sub-Saharan Africa established the fact that Arab aid to Sub-Sahara Africa reached its peak in 1976.¹² They showed that the Arab donor countries promised bilateral assistance to sub-Saharan African countries in pursuance of their individual country's foreign policy objectives.¹³ However, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the two largest Arab Middle East aid donors to Africa and Nigeria in particular did not only condition their financial donations to African countries specifically for the study of Arabic language and culture, but emphasized that the utilization of the donation should be primarily channelled towards the continued propagation of Islam.¹⁴ Also, none of the four multilateral Arab financial institution created for the purpose of giving financial aids to poor, impoverished African countries, gave any official aid or assistance to the Federal Government or to African countries with any form of dealings with Israel. Nigerian governments and other African countries in this category, could also not obtain any bilateral financial assistance from the three Arab bilateral agencies through which the three Arab countries of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Fund for Development), Kuwait (Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development) and the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi Fund for Development) offered bilateral aids to countries in need of their assistance.

Israel did not fare better in its relations with African countries as it became evident to many African countries that, offer of technological assistance notwithstanding, its interest in African, Asian and Latin American countries was basically aimed at securing their favourable votes on the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict at the United Nations General Assembly. In fact, Israel's attention was more tuned to the buoyant European and American economies. However, the end of the 'East-West' conflicts and the break-up of the Soviet

Union meant that global attention would be diverted from cold war rhetoric. Consequently, Israel began to show renewed serious interest in the Third World countries as the absence of the cold war rivalry could lead to a re-direction of global focus on the Israel-Arab-Palestinian conflict. It can be recalled that this was the scenario shortly after the Second World War when Israel's conflicts with the Arab/Palestinians occupied the attention of the United Nations Organisation. Coupled with an emerging New International Economic Order and the quest of Third World countries to redirect global economic flow to their states, Israel diplomatic foothold in Nigeria, Africa and other Third World countries would only improve its economy and international reputation and not the other way round.

Evidences abound showing clearly that turbulent debates on Nigeria's ostracism of Israel or the need to reverse the decision commenced immediately after the severance of relations in 1973. The country was evenly divided on the debates for sustenance of the decision or its reversal. While most people from the Southern region would want an immediate reversal, an Islamic dominated Northern Nigeria would prefer that the Jewish state be kept in abeyance from the country. It was also obvious that the policy decision was not mutual as Israel was unwilling to renege on its interest in Nigeria. It therefore kept up pressure on subsequent Nigerian governments towards the reversal of the decision. While it was initially unwilling to reverse the actions that led many African countries to embark on severance of diplomatic relations because of what it termed as its national interest, Israel sought to be recognised as the aggrieved and not the aggressor in its conflicts with the Arab/Palestinians. It began to argue that it was fighting a survival battle in the midst of hostile neighbours. To demonstrate this, and with the help of the United States of America, it returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt after the Camp David Accord of 1978, and expressed the willingness to extend same hand of fellowship to the Palestinians after peace talks. In the bid to prevent sub-Saharan African countries from reversing its ostracism of Israel in Africa as its avowed Afro-Arab opponent, Egypt, for whom most African states severed ties with Israel mostly in 1973, had made peace with Israel through the Camp David Accord of 1978. In order to

guard against the reversal of Nigeria and other African countries decision on Israel, the remaining Afro-Arab members of the Organisation of African Unity began to put up new narratives on why Israel should be kept out of Africa. Israel's relations with apartheid South Africa became that weapon. However, Egypt and the Western powers had begun to make significant progress on proposed talks between Israel and its main antagonist in Palestine, the Palestinian people. Since Nigeria had always been voting in favour of pro-Palestinian/Arab resolutions at the United Nations Organisation, the proposed talks between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) (the main representative of the Palestinians) if it materialises would render irrelevant the continued ostracism of Israel in Nigeria and Africa. The likelihood of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians became very certain by 1991. The likelihood of peace in the Middle East consequently opened the road for Nigeria to focus its attention on exploiting any opportunity that relations with Israel would provide for its ailing economy.

On the other hand, diplomatic relations with Nigeria was of strategic importance to Israel because of the promises of economic benefits which relations with Nigeria posed for Israel. Apart from the promises of Nigeria's crude oil reserves (a ready alternative for growing Arab hold on the global crude oil market), Nigeria's huge population was a factor that even the developed countries of the world could not ignore due to the promise of ready market for industrial outputs. It had also become very evident that Nigeria was already commanding some influence and respect not just among African countries but among 'Third World' countries in general. Arab/Islamic countries had successfully blocked Israel from membership of and participation in 'Third World' where it naturally belongs. Any ally that could reverse this trend would be welcomed. Generally referred to in international circles as a sub-regional power (within the West African confine) and a motivator of events in the African continent, Israel assumed that it would gain an automatic inroad back to the rest of Africa if it (Israel) succeeded in getting Nigeria to renew diplomatic relations with her. Femi Aribisala re-echoed this notion when he wrote inter alia:

Nigeria's leadership role in black Africa also means that it is the diplomatic gateway to Africa. The re-establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel by Nigeria can safely be expected to presage similar moves by other African states. Rapprochement with Nigeria can thus be expected to lead to the attenuation of Israel's international ostracism, especially in Africa.¹⁵

Bolaji Akinyemi contended that the U.S.A. also subscribed to this assertion. He claimed that the United States of America was involved in attempts to link him with Israeli officials.¹⁶ The former Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Shamir further added fuel to the notion when he informed General Ike Nwachukwu (Nigeria's External Affairs Minister) in 1991 that Israel places much importance on relations with Nigeria.¹⁷ This probably accounts for the quick return of General Ike Nwachukwu's visit to Israel by Ambassadors Yagar and Shamir, plus ten other Israeli special envoys to Nigeria on August 10, 1991.¹⁸ The visit of the American Vice President, Danforth Quayle, to Nigeria on September 8, 1991,¹⁹ led to insinuations by a section of the Nigerian media that Abuja was being considered as a probable venue of the proposed Middle East peace talks. President Ibrahim Babangida further fuelled the rumour indirectly, when he told the press that Nigeria needed to remain continually relevant to major trends around the world, while this rumour were being circulated in country.²⁰ To counter this obvious diplomatic breakthrough, Arab/Islamic countries attempted to play up nuclear issues in order to prevent these rapprochements and in order to continue to taint Israeli reputations in the Third World. Sayed Atoaldent, Iranian Vice-President, announced at an Islamic conference on October 25, 1991 that "Since Israel continues to possess nuclear weapons, we, the Moslems, must co-operate to produce an atomic bomb, regardless of UN attempts to prevent proliferation."²¹

More concrete on the Israeli part however was its economic interest in Nigeria. As revealed by Israeli officials, Israel had always sought to benefit from Nigerian penchant for religious pilgrimages.²² While the birth of Islam can be traced to Mecca and Medina (Saudi Arabia), two of Islam's most important sites,

the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa ("the remote") mosque in Jerusalem makes the city the third most holy Islamic city after Mecca and Medina. Mohammed, the founder of Islam was believed to have been translated to heaven from the site of the Dome of the Rock, while the Al-Aqsa Mosque was identified as "the Remote Place" mentioned in the Koran.²³ Through such historic/religious "facts", the Jewish government in Israel occasionally open up Jerusalem and some other religious centres in Israel to all Pilgrims and Tourists irrespective of religion or creed. This consequently increases tourist flow to Israel as well as increased revenue. Israel therefore began to target not just Islamic pilgrimage from Nigeria to Israel but Christian pilgrimages as well.²⁴ There was marked increase in the number of Nigerian pilgrims to Israel from 1990 when Nigeria indicated her interest to restore ties with the Jewish state. While 593 Nigerians visited Israel in 1990, the figure rose to 888 in 1991; 1,865 in 1992, and 3,000 in 1993 (a year after the restoration of diplomatic ties).²⁵ Going by the official Israeli estimation that Nigeria Muslim annual pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia was around 50,000 annually, it hoped to double the figure in its annual estimate of both Christian and Islamic pilgrimages to Israel from Nigeria.²⁶ This was based on the assumption that Jerusalem is sacred to the Christian and Islamic faiths.

The Restoration of Diplomatic Ties

Indications that Nigeria would fully restore relations with Israel under the government of Babangida began in 1986. *Agence France Presse* (AFP) reported in February, 1986 that Nigeria and Israel were making arrangements to restore diplomatic relations.²⁷ During the 1987 U.N. General Assembly meeting, *Davar*, an Israeli newspaper, and several other Nigerian newspapers reported that Shimon Peres (the Israel External Affairs Minister) and Bolaji Akinyemi (Nigeria's External Affairs Minister) met and agreed to restore low-level diplomatic ties.²⁸ These statements and the visit of David Kimche (a Director in Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in 1986 were denied by Nigeria while Israel usually acknowledged such meetings.²⁹ Matters relating to Israel

were still considered highly sensitive in Nigeria, yet Bolaji Akinyemi (Nigeria's External Affairs Minister) further confused the nation when he acknowledged in 1986 that Nigeria was trading with Israel³⁰ and also in 1987, that his meeting with Shimon Peres was a mere routine practice in diplomacy. The acknowledgement of such a meeting was believed to be one of the reasons why he was suddenly removed from office.³¹ By 1989, Nigerian newspapers reported that President Babangida met with the Israeli President, Chaim Herzog, during the burial of Emperor Hirohito in Tokyo, and that he gave the Israeli leader the likely conditions that would necessitate Nigeria's restoration of relations with Israel. However, President Ibrahim Babangida merely replied reporters on his return that future developments in the Middle East would be the guiding factor in determining whether or not relations were to be restored with Israel.³² The report of the *Agence France Presse* (AFP) that a senior Nigerian official went on secret diplomatic mission to Israel and signed several agreements that could lead to the renewal of diplomatic relations, was simply ignored by the government.³³ At last, the likelihood of Israeli interest in buying Nigerian crude oil at a time when the economy was in jeopardy due to the late 1980s to early 1990s oil glut and fall in crude oil price, was used to prepare the minds of Nigerians for the renewal of relations.³⁴ President Babangida however only confirmed the already over-publicised contacts with Israel after the visit of General Ike Nwachukwu and others to Israel in August 1991.³⁵ Relations were finally restored on May 5, 1992.

Reasons for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations

Both external and internal factors influenced Nigeria's decision to renew diplomatic relations with Israel, despite the fact that South Africa was yet to totally abandon Apartheid and Israel was yet to return all occupied Arab Lands. The Newswatch suggested that President Babangida instructed his External Affairs Minister, Bolaji Akinyemi to embark upon the process of restoring relations with Israel right from the first year of his rule (1985), and that the United States encouraged this move.³⁶ While this assertion cannot be

substantiated with any official record, the fact that Bolaji Akinyemi embarked upon a series of meetings with Israeli officials during the U.N General Assembly meetings, and continued to do so till he ceased to be the External Affairs Minister gave it some element of credence.

The unconditional release of Nelson Mandela from prison by the South African government in February 1990, followed by series of other reforms aimed at scrapping apartheid policy in South Africa further encouraged Nigeria to embark on friendly talks with Israel. By April 9, 1992, Nigeria had hosted the South African President Frederick De' Klerk.³⁷ Consequently, the new narratives by members of the Afro-Arab countries in the Organisation of African Unity that African states should be wary of Israeli collaboration with apartheid government of South Africa and that Israel rendered technical assistance to South Africa's in its quest for nuclear technology became inconsequential. Also, the Middle East Peace Conferences were also held in October 1991 at Madrid, Spain.³⁸ These developments signified the removal of some of the hindrances to the renewal of Nigeria's relations with Israel. Although, the relations were not restored until 1992, months after the Middle East peace talks began, the sudden desire to fully restore relations in 1991 was speculated to have been motivated by Nigeria's bid to host the talks. President Babangida indicated this in an interview in August 1991 when he said that "as the largest black nation, Nigeria must remain continually relevant to major trends around the world".³⁹ Alex Akinyele, Nigeria's Information Minister under President Ibrahim Babangida also asserted that "the chance (of Nigeria hosting the Middle East Peace Talks) is very large because Nigeria has always played a role in the establishment of peace in troubled areas".⁴⁰ That the talks were finally held in Madrid (Spain), denied the Babangida government of any importance which the government might have hoped to ascribe to Nigeria through the hosting of the Middle East Peace talks in Abuja. The selection of Spain and not Nigeria for the Peace talks could therefore have necessitated the delaying of the renewal of relations with Israel from August 1991, when it was strongly pursued by General Ike Nwachukwu, till May 1992, when it was finally affected. That the Nigerian government probably intended to acquire some level of

importance in global affairs by hosting the 'Peace talks' is further buttressed by the fact that President Ibrahim Babangida's Chairmanship of the OAU, when Nigeria finally restored relations with Israel, was blown out of proportion by government propaganda. Such position of importance was desired in order to prove that Nigeria was still of ultimate relevance in global events as asserted by President Babangida in August 1991.⁴¹ (More so, since its publicity could reverse the dwindling reputation of president Babangida both domestically and internationally, over the accusation that he had "hidden agenda" aimed at remaining in power indefinitely in Nigeria).

The role of religion cannot be totally divorced from the decision to renew relations with Israel. Though Adekunle Ajala argued that religion was not a basic factor that aided Nigeria's decision to re-establish relations with Israel,⁴² as a public officer under the services of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Nigeria's foreign policy think-tank), such an argument could well represent the attempt of the Federal government to downplay the role of religion in the matter. Two Nigerian newspapers, *The Guardian* and the *Nigerian Tribune* linked the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) issue to the Nigerian decision. Both papers argued that the renewal of relations with Israel was intended to placate the Nigerian Christians who were opposed to President Ibrahim Babangida's decision to commit Nigeria into the much hated and the much opposed OIC.⁴³ Expectedly, the Federal government did not respond to the publications. While the reports can be construed as being speculative due to the absence of convincing evidence by the two newspapers, the role of religion in its broader sense in the decision cannot be casually dismissed. Since religion is a sensitive issue that can permanently divide a nation, particularly a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society like Nigeria, the attempt of the Federal government to downplay the role of religion, especially in its policy decisions on Israel, can be better understood. The official recognition that were accorded Christian pilgrimages to Israel and the fact that such pilgrimages were subsidized by the Federal government meant that the plight of the pilgrims in Israel would be reported back to the Federal government, and it would be the responsibility of the Federal government to address such complaints. First,

Nigerian pilgrims to Israel had complained of poor treatment and neglect while in Israel. Such treatments according to newspaper reports were borne out of the complaint of Israeli tourist guides, that Nigeria did not recognise their country. Not only this, such pilgrims usually face other problems which the presence of a Nigerian embassy or consular office could have easily solved, were it to be that Nigeria had such in Israel.⁴⁴

Second, the fact that Nigerian Muslim pilgrims to Saudi Arabia usually had direct flight to Mecca while Nigerian Christian Pilgrims must necessarily make detours to Rome simply because of an absence of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Israel, was unsatisfactory to Nigerian Christian Pilgrims to Israel. Direct flight from Lagos to Israel could be completed in seven hours and would cost less than the Nigerian-Rome-Israel trip. The religious factor could therefore have aided the decision of the Federal government to re-establish diplomatic relations with Israel, particularly since the joint visit of the Ooni of Ife, Oba Okunade Sijuwade, Olubuse II and the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero to Israel in 1984 had already signified that such a move would most likely not be opposed by some sections of the Islamic North.⁴⁵

Nigeria's economic interest could be regarded as the most important motivator of the decision to re-establish relations with Israel. It was becoming evident from around the 1980s that the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) dictation of crude oil market price had begun to wane after the initial control it wielded following the 1973 Arab/OPEC oil block. This was made evident by its inability to dictate crude oil price during the Gulf War (Iraq-Kuwait War). Analysts believed that crude oil had reached its lowest price by 1992. The inability of OPEC to curtail price depreciation removed the last vestige of Arab-OPEC leverage on the Nigerian state. Conversely also, the harsh effect of the Structural Adjustment Programme on revenue generation (due to the devaluation of the Nigerian currency), forced Nigeria to begin to look for other ways of shoring up its foreign currency earnings. The *Daily Times* reported that Israel's willingness to buy 40% of Nigeria's annual crude oil production was confirmed during the visit of General Ike Nwachukwu to Israel

in August 1991. In fact, General Ike Nwachukwu reportedly had discussions with Mr. Abraham Agmon the Director-General of the Israeli Fuel Corporation.⁴⁶ Not only this, indications were also rife that Israel could be interested in purchasing coal from Nigeria since Israel relies on coal for 25% of its energy generation.⁴⁷ If these reports were anything to go by, the economic hardship which Nigeria was experiencing due to the crash of crude oil price could be reduced if relations with Israel were restored. Furthermore, the Nigerian media reported that Nigeria could best serve the role of the market outlet of Israeli products to the rest of the West African sub-region.⁴⁸ Added to these, the pro-Israel lobby groups in Nigeria had already exposed the Nigerian government to the tremendous opportunities that await Nigeria through the acquisition of Israel's relatively cheap technological know-how for Nigeria's march towards industrial development.

Also, there were speculations that Israel could help Nigeria to secure favourable response of the industrialised countries to Nigeria's economic problems; particularly the International Financiers which Nigeria owed so much. Such helps were expected to be rendered by the powerful Jewish community in the West. *The Guardian* credited the following statement to General Ike Nwachukwu during his visit to Israel in August 1991:

We know for instance that you have the command of financial institutions of the world through your kith and kin in several industrialised and highly developed economies and we believe that your influence can bring some meaningful investment to support such development programmes.⁴⁹

During the August 1991 visit, General Ike Nwachukwu's 15-man delegation included specialists in Agriculture, water resources, and defence.⁵⁰ This suggested that talks on Israel's technical assistance to Nigeria began during talks on the re-establishment of relations.

Without prejudice however, much as the already discussed factors aided the renewal of relations between Nigeria and Israel, the role of leadership idiosyncrasies in the decision must not be underplayed. Nigeria re-established

the relations under a military regime. The military is known for its disregard for institutional structures, dictatorial traits and non-accountability for any action embarked upon. Despite the calls and struggles for the renewal of relations with Israel, the military could still have stayed the decision, if it so wished. That Babangida desired to re-align Nigeria with Israel (whether for personal gain or for the corporate interest of Nigeria) is a major factor in Nigeria's decision to re-establish diplomatic relations with Israel. According to Chief Alex Akinyele, Nigeria's Information Minister during the Babangida regime.

... the personality of our president reflects in every event. I will not be surprised if we are about to close ranks with Israel in an attempt to have (sic) a tab on Israel and thereby be able to achieve our objective ...it's a matter of leadership; that's all ... General Babangida, like a soldier himself, he goes on, he doesn't give up, he is not afraid of failure, because he has done many things which past leaders in this country would not do. And we are the better for it.⁵¹

Conclusion

This study examined the political intrigues of Nigeria's re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 after nearly nineteen years of undefined relations with the Jewish state. It noted that unlike Nigeria, Israel's interest in Africa and indeed Nigeria was mostly motivated by political and strategic considerations: its desire to curtail Arab influence in Africa. Consequently, Israel was persistent in its quest for cordial relations with Nigeria. The study established the fact that the changing dynamics of international politics of the Middle East in the early 1990s such as rapprochements between Egypt and Israel; the Madrid Peace Conferences between Israel, the Palestinians and Arab countries; South Africa political reforms; the economic realities of the Nigerian state in the early 1990s and; the desire of the Nigerian Military leader, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida for global (systemic) relevance among other

factors facilitated the restoration of ties between Nigeria and Israel. It further argued that Nigeria's attitude and behaviour towards Israel on the other hand were not necessarily planned, articulated and well-executed policies. The study postulated that successive Nigerian governments allowed thawed relations with the Jews for so long, not necessarily in the countries' national interest but in order to satisfy its Afro-Arab neighbours and because powerful elements in Nigerian government circles were not desirous of cordial ties with the Jewish state. Given the factor of a pro-Arab and pro-Islamic Northern Nigeria, the federal government was forced to tread cautiously on the matter. Consequently, the internal wrangling, religious sentimentalism, leadership predilections and over-considerations for external stimuli that informed the severance and delay in reversing that decision again played crucial role in President Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida's decision to re-establish relations with Israel. Apartheid system of government in South Africa was crumbling while Israel and the Palestinians were already deeply involved in peace talks variously daubed as the Madrid Peace Conferences. In order to also appease a Christian dominated Southern Nigerian population that were already insinuating Islamization agenda in the country, diplomatic relations with Israel became an appeasement policy in the long run.

Endnotes

1. Palestinians is a reference to Arabized people living in Palestine. They are not necessarily Arabs but had adopted the Arabic language and culture due to long years of Muslim conquest and rule before the Ottoman rule of Palestine. The Arabs began to refer to them as far back as the 7th century A.D. as Filastin. See, Alan Dowty, *Israel/Palestine* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 221; Riad M. Nasser, *Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel: The Necessary 'Others' in the Making of a Nation* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 69–72; Oded Haklai, *Palestinian Ethnonationalism in Israel* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 112–145; Hassan Jabareen, “The Future of Arab Citizenship in Israel: Jewish-Zionist Time in a Place with no Palestinian Memory” in, Daniel Levy and Yfaat Weiss (eds.), *Challenging Ethnic Citizenship: German and Israeli Perspectives on Immigration* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 196–220. Seymour Gitin, “Philistines in the Book of Kings” in Andre Lemaire, Baruch Halpern and Matthew

- Joel Adams (eds.), *The Books of Kings: Sources, Composition, Historiography and Reception* (Leiden: BRILL, 2010), 312.
2. Matthew Hughes, "The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39", *English Historical Review*, Vol. CXXIV, No. 507, 314-354
3. Matthew Hughes, "From Law and Order to Pacification: Britain's Suppression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Winter, 2010), pp. 6-22; Charles W. Anderson, "State of Formation from Below and the Great Revolt in Palestine", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 47, No. 1 (Autumn 2017): 39-55.
4. Khalidi Rashid, "The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure". In Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds.), *The War for Palestine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 12-36.
5. Reuven Firestone, *Holy War in Judaism: The Fall and Rise of a Controversial Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 10; Neil Caplan, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories* (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 16-20.
6. Neil Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy: The United Nations, the Great Powers, and Middle East Peacemaking 1948-1954* (Vol. 3), (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 17-33; Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.602-604; "Memorandum on the Palestine Refugee Problem, 4 May 1949", *FRUS*, 1949, 984.
7. Jonathan B. Isacoff, *Writing the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Pragmatism and Historical Inquiry* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 79-95.
8. Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). pp. 211-327; Guy Laron, *The Six Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East* (London: Yale University Press, 2017), 320.
9. Michael B. Oren, *Six Days War*, 211-327
10. James W. Bean and Craig S. Girard, "Anwar Al-Sadat's Grand Strategy in the Yom Kippur War", Washington DC: National War College, June 11, 2018, 21. Washington, DC.
11. Tunde Adeniran, "A perspective on Nigerian-Israeli relations in the Nineties". (Unpublished Lecture delivered on the occasion of the First Israeli National Day Anniversary Lecture in Nigeria, Lagos: NIIA, April 13, 1994), 1.
12. Robert Anton Mertz and Pamela MacDonald Mertz analyzed the four Arab aid agencies established in the wake of the sharp increase of crude oil prices following the Arab oil embargo of the post 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and its devastating effects

on poor struggling African countries. These are the Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa (SAAFA); Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to Arab and African Countries (AFTAAAC); the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA) and; OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID). All the four aid agencies opted to release funds meant for African countries to three Islamic institutions such as Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Solidarity Fund and the Muslim World League. The policies of the three institutions did not only make Islam and Islamization a cardinal principle to access their funds, membership of the Islamic Conference became a principal condition for the attraction of their funds. Where some of the seven Arab-OPEC countries (Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate) did assist some countries directly, the recourse to bilateral instead of multilateral assistant which the African states expected were further used to pursue the Arab countries' national interest than the actual interest of the receiving nation. Even this window of opportunity was directed at Arab countries than 'Black' African. The 287-page book contained 122-page text and 166-page statistical data analysis. See, Robert Anton Mertz and Pamela MacDonald Mertz, *Arab Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Mainz: Kaiser-Grünwald, 1983), 287.

13. *Ibid.*, 287.
14. Joseph Kenny, 'Sharia and Christianity in Nigeria: Islam and a 'Secular' State', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 26, Fasc. 4. (November, 1996), 338-364.
15. Femi Aribisala, "Thought-piece on the Question of Nigerian-Israeli rapprochement" *Nigerian Forum*. April/MAY, 1982: 525-531.
16. During his tenure as Nigeria's Foreign Minister.
17. "Israeli Prime Minister interrupts his summer vacation to receive Nigeria delegates". *Federal Ministry of Information Press Release No.607*. (Lagos: August 9, 1991).
18. *Nigeria and the World: Foreign Policy highlights, 1991*. (Abuja: Ministry of External Affairs, 1991), 53-62.
19. *Ibid.*
- . *National Concord* Editorial. August 12, 1991, 6.
- . *The Guardian* (Lagos), January 13, 1992, 11.
22. The number of Nigerian pilgrims to Mecca began to climb in astronomical order following Northern Nigerian Government decision to start footing the bill of Muslim pilgrim to Mecca under Sir Ahmadu Bello's administration. The figure which was 15,000 at the beginning of the sixties became 50,000 in the mid-seventies and climbed to 100,000 by 1981 when the federal government began to part-finance the pilgrimages. See, O. E. Tangban, 'The Hajj and the Nigerian

- Economy 1960-1981', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 21, Fasc. 3. (Aug., 1991), 241-255.
23. For details on this see the Holy Quran, Surat Al-Isra (The Journey by Night), Chapter XVII.
 24. "Tourism and Pilgrimages to Israel" in *Israel at the 13th Lagos International Trade Fair*. (Lagos: Embassy of Israel, November, 1993) pp. 15-17. The flow of Nigerian Pilgrims and Tourists to Israel a year after the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel increased. However, most of the people travelling from Nigeria to Israel were mostly from the Christian dominated parts of the country, primarily the Southern part of the country, while those from the Northern region were mostly from the Middle Belt with pockets of core Northern Nigerian minority Christians. The rest could be regarded as official representations.
 25. Information obtained from the Embassy of Israel, Lagos.
 26. Interview with Uri Savir, the Commercial Israeli Attaché to Nigeria
 27. "Ties with Israel to resume", *Daily Times* (Lagos), February 21, 1986 pp. 1 and 2; *National Concord* (Lagos), April 7, 1986, 12.
 28. *New Nigeria* (Kaduna), November 6, 1987, p. 13; *The Guardian* (Lagos), November 11, 1987, 2.
 29. *Ibid*.
 30. "We're in business with Israel - Akinyemi", *Nigerian Tribune* (Ibadan), January 25, 1986, 1.
 31. "Breaking the Ice", *Newswatch* (Lagos), August 19, 1991, 13-17.
 32. *Daily Times* (Lagos), August 23, 1989, 1.
 33. *Daily Times* (Lagos), February 27, 1989, 1.
 34. "Israel Eager to Buy Nigerian Oil", *Daily Times* (Lagos), August 9, 1991, 1.
 35. *Federal Ministry of Information*. Official Press Release No.607 (Lagos), August 9, 1991
 36. "Breaking the ice", *Newswatch*, August 19, 1991, 13-17.
 37. "Pretoria Requests to Join OAU as De Klerk Arrives", *The Guardian*, (Lagos) April 10, 1992, 1.
 38. "Breaking the Ice", *Newswatch*, August 19, 1991, 13-17.
 39. *National Concord*, August 12, 1991, 6.
 40. "Breaking the Ice", *Newswatch*, August 19, 1991, 13-17.
 41. *National Concord*, August 12, 1991, 6.
 42. "What Nigeria Will Gain from Israel", *Sunday Vanguard*, August 11, 1991, 3.

43. *Nigerian Tribune*, September 2, 1991, 4; *The Guardian* (Lagos.), November 17, 1991, 3.
44. *Nigerian Chronicle*, September 11, 1986, 7.
45. The visit was alleged to be personal and not authorised by the government. Consequently, the Emir of Kano, late Ado Bayero was relieved of his Chancellorship of the University of Ibadan, while he and the late Ooni of Ife, Oba Okunade Sijuwade were both suspended from their posts as the Chairmen of their respective state's Council of Chiefs for six months. Their international passports were seized, while the Ooni of Ife was confined to his domain for six months. See, *The Guardian* (Lagos), September 1, 1984, 1.
46. "Israel Eager to Buy Nigerian Oil", *Daily Times*, August 9, 1991, 1 and 23.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*
49. "Nigeria, Israel May Restore Relations Soon", *The Guardian*, August 6, 1991, 1 and 2.
50. "Breaking the Ice", *Newswatch*, August 19, 1991, 13-17.
51. *Ibid.*

