

Non-Alignment in Nigeria's Foreign Relations, 1960-1979: A Comparative Analysis of Precept, Praxis and Motivational Factors

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In sum, there has been continuity in the meaning and application of non-alignment. What has changed is the style of application largely accounted for by Nigeria's ascendancy as the leading power in Africa ... What is important is the capacity to retain the nation's independence of thought and action (within the limits of its resources, to be sure!). And this Nigeria has been able to do both under Balewa and during the post-war military rule.¹

Introduction

In the history of international relations, the twentieth century stands out as the period with the most transformative developments: European rule of African and Asian peoples, the world wars and the consequent collective security arrangements (the League of Nations and the United Nations), the Cold War, with its associated arms race and revolutionary technological developments, and the emergence of new states in the South. The coincidence of the two latter developments, that is, the fact that it was during the height of the Cold War that most of the new states emerged, led to the emergence and adoption of non-alignment. This point becomes even clearer when represented as the clash between the desire of the Cold War powers (the Soviet Union and the United States) for worldwide influence and the tenacious subscription of the new states to an absolutist conception of sovereignty (and avoid the fate of subjugation by the imperialistic Cold War powers akin to that of European colonialists from which they had just emerged). The apparently inevitable inference that non-alignment was therefore a function of the Cold War has met with critical but hardly historical responses, as, for example, that non-alignment preceded the Cold War.² As a historical

outcome, non-alignment “reflected aspirations toward the greatest possible measure of independence, not only in international relations but even more in internal development”.³

Yet, the favoured approach to the study of the foreign policies of these new and non-bloc states towards the Cold War has been the implicit adoption of an ideal definition of non-alignment against which the direction of the pronouncements and actions of these states are determined, and from which a verdict of ‘aligned’ or ‘non-aligned’ is reached. In this regard, the definition usually employed is the equidistant: that a non-aligned state should maintain equal distance (closeness or aloofness) from the Cold War blocs in all spheres of relations. Non-alignment thus becomes the “art of maintaining political equilibrium through the diversification of dependence”.⁴ But the search for an ideal and acceptable definition has itself been controversial. Neither Shepherd’s “components” of non-alignment⁵ nor the criteria for membership of the Non-Alignment Movement⁶ performed the function of universal standards. These attempts have issued in unattainable criteria, as is the case with the former, or too limited as to include virtually all states that claimed seriously or otherwise to be non-aligned, as is the latter.

Even then, the degree of applicability of the standards of non-alignment is questionable because of the diverse nature of the states that professed to be non-aligned – in colonial experience, nature of decolonization, political structure on independence, the orientation of the political leadership, and, above all, proximity to the super-powers. It is, therefore, tempting to support the view that “non-alignment is non-descript – it cannot be defined,”⁷ or even conclude, on account of the “wide variety of distinct, overlapping and inconsistent usages,” that it is “essentially contested.”⁸

To avoid the pitfalls inherent in the idealization of non-alignment, this paper has approached the study of Nigeria's relations with the power blocs during the administrations of Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa, Yakubu Gowon and Murtala Muhammed/Olusegun Obasanjo,

from a historical rather than from an idealistic perspective. A historical perspective is construed here as entailing the analysis of Nigeria's attitude toward relations with the Soviet Union and the United States (within the context of their rivalry) on the basis of its conception of non-alignment under these administrations, that is, on the basis of "what government meant by non-alignment."⁹ This paper therefore seeks to examine, in comparative terms, the factors that determined the pattern of Nigeria's relations with the power blocs, and that influenced the perception and practice of non-alignment under these administrations.

The Perceptions of Non-Alignment in Nigeria's Foreign Relations, 1960-1979

The three major parties (the Action Group – AG, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens – NCNC, and the Northern Peoples Congress – NPC) and their leaders had attempted to rationalize the attitude they hoped to adopt toward relations with the power blocs in the course of campaigning for the elections of December 1959. Generally, they proposed to relate closely with the Western bloc, and to do so with the Eastern bloc only when dictated by Nigeria's interest. In terms of relating relatively with the East and West vis-à-vis Nigeria's status as an independent state, the NCNC stood out as the only party that advocated non-alignment; the others declared outright distaste for it.

As far back as 1949, Nnamdi Azikiwe had proposed as his political objective securing "an effective voice in international affairs which directly or indirectly affect" Nigeria and the Cameroons.¹⁰ The pursuit of an independent role implied in this statement came to characterize references to non-alignment in the NCNC's statements. The NCNC-NEPU (Northern Elements Progressive Union) Alliance's manifesto declared:

*We will maintain a policy of non-alignment with any particular axis of geopolitics, Eastern or Western – a policy which will definitely place us at a manoeuvrable [sic] advantage to be independent in our approach to problems of international relations.*¹¹

"In formulating our foreign policy," the manifesto continued, "we shall neither be partisan nor be neutral but we shall be independent in our attitude."¹²

The AG, and its leader, on the other hand, thought non-alignment, or neutrality as it was generally termed, was opportunistic and anti-West. Having indicated his criteria for preferring the West as a bloc to the East, Awolowo concluded with a stinging condemnation of non-alignment:

In the present world contest, when atheistic materialism is threatening to destroy or stifle all that is best and noblest in man, neutrality in international affairs, whether passive, positive or independent, is an unmitigated disservice to humanity.

It is “no more and no less than the projection, conscious or unconscious of the deepseated prejudices which those countries have towards the countries of the Western Democracies.” He also viewed non-alignment from the Euro-American viewpoint of opportunism, as a policy designed “to play two opposing forces against each other,” and condemned it as “disreputable and dangerous.”¹³ The NPC manifesto, without attempting a justification of its position as the other parties had done, proposed that its government's foreign policy “will have regard to the principles on which it has based its home policy, and will therefore rule out completely any idea of adopting a policy of neutrality in international affairs.”¹⁴

In the short period between the election and formal independence, NCNC members of parliament took the lead in calling for the adoption of non-alignment as a philosophy for the foreign policy of an independent Nigeria. Prescribing a “flexible” foreign policy that “would give room for all situations,” R.O.A. Akinjide went on to outline some elements of such a policy: “That is, if Britain at a particular moment deserves support, we will support her and if Russia at a particular moment deserves support, we will support her provided this support will not jeopardise Nigeria's nationl [sic] interest; ...”¹⁵ Generally, the defence of Nigeria's interests, particularly its sovereignty was the justification adduced for the prescription of non-alignment, particularly by the NCNC members of parliament. “The interest of this country,” according to Kalu Ezera, “demands that our policy in foreign affairs should be nothing more than one of non-alignment.”¹⁶ This was the basis for his condemnation of the proposed pact

with Britain: "the national interests and the preservation of our sovereignty cannot be served by signing any external military pact."¹⁷ This notwithstanding, some other NCNC members thought Nigeria should adopt non-alignment, not because it was a strategy of preserving its independence, but because the United States had determined that it is in the interest of the West that African states should adopt non-alignment. M.T. Mbu, for example, argued that "no nation today can fully say she is neutral; whether she likes it or not her interest is still protected by other blocs, and Nigeria can well be accommodated and be protected within the Western bloc." Nevertheless, "If the greatest exponent of free democracy can encourage the African states to be non-aligned to any bloc, what else can the African states say themselves."¹⁸

The AG hitherto had shown no sympathy for non-alignment. But as part of the re-orientation of its policies, its spokesman on foreign policy, Anthony Enahoro, enunciated a principle that amounted to a change of attitude towards non-alignment, but which sought to differ from the NCNC's; this he called "independent alignment." He argued that non-alignment, in the way it had been advocated, was "concerned ... with the military aspects or consequences of a policy of total alignment;" but since "One can speak of alignment in the military sense, in the economic, as regards a system of government," the goals of non-alignment as proposed are indeed limited – "a dangerous oversimplification." Because Nigeria was in the Sterling area or the gold standard, it was economically aligned: "We are aligned with the State ... which believes in the same things we believe," he submitted.

But having allowed for all these commitments, there is one important reservation which Nigerians wish to make and it is this one reservation which is now advanced as the broad definition of non-alignment. Members wish to be free to do business with the whole world; we want to make friends; we do not want to be dragged into NATO or into a watertight bloc. But this is not non-alignment ... the appropriate package label for all these beliefs, our commitments, our desires and our reservations, is independent alignment ...¹⁹

This Enahoro recommended to the prime minister, and to the House. It should be noted that the NCNC's interpretation of non-alignment, from the party's manifesto and the statements of its members was not as limiting as suggested by Enahoro. Perhaps, his claim that non-alignment had been limited to "military aspects" was necessitated by the fact that during this period, the issue of military alliance with extra-African powers and its likely consequences had dominated the deliberations of the House.

In spite of the fact that the NPC formed a government with the NCNC, and that the latter favoured a policy based on non-alignment while the former ruled out its adoption, the foreign policy speech of Balewa of August 20, 1960 adopted for Nigeria a policy based on non-alignment (although this term was not used). While this could be taken as an indication of the influence of the NCNC on national policy, the debates in the House between January and August 1960 on the meaning and scope of, and constraints on Nigeria's sovereignty, however, ensured that Nigeria's foreign policy was anchored on self-interest rather than sentiments.²⁰ According to Balewa,

We shall ... endeavour to remain on friendly terms with every nation which recognizes and respects our sovereignty ... and we shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone; so far as it is possible the policy on each occasion will be selected with proper independent objectivity in Nigeria's national interest. ... We consider it wrong for the Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs.²¹

And in the course of the debates on his speech, Balewa restated that Nigeria would not join any bloc, that "Nigeria will follow an independent line no matter from where the truth comes."²²

The government's policy towards the power blocs was further clarified by the foreign affairs minister, Jaja Wachukwu. Restating that "Nigeria will not blindly follow the lead of any nation," he explicitly declared that the government's policy was based on non-alignment: "The Government reserves her freedom of action at all times to determine every policy in the best interests of Nigeria. This Government will not associate itself as a matter of routine; that

is what is called non-alignment.” The government's conception of non-alignment, according to Wachukwu, meant in effect that,

If for instance X produces a programme which is in accordance with our interest and we examine it and it suits our interest at a particular time, we will be with him at that time. But that is no guarantee that when he produces another thing which we think is not in our interest, that we will be with him.²³

He also distinguished the government's understanding of non-alignment from neutrality: Nigeria's policy “is not one of neutrality ... We are not aligned to anybody, but we are not neutral,” for the status of neutrality “means that we are cut off from everything and that we do not want to associate with anything at all!”²⁴ This clarification did not however discourage those parliamentarians that preferred the term neutrality, with its implications, to characterize the government's foreign policy. Yerima Balla, for example, thought Nigeria's policy was that of maintaining “a purely neutral position, not supporting any particular power or group.”²⁵ It could, therefore, be said with certainty that Nigeria adopted the principle of non-alignment as a basis for its relations with the power blocs on August 20, 1960.

The administrations of J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi and Gowon appeared to have devoted less time to theorizing about non-alignment than restating that Nigeria's foreign policy would continue to be based on it. Non-alignment, by perception under the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime was not very different from that under previous regimes. The foci remained the defence of sovereignty and the capacity for independent action. In an interview on October 24, 1975, Joseph Garba restated Nigeria's commitment to a foreign policy based on non-alignment: “We want to be positively neutral in the sense that we want to take an independent stand on major issues and don't want to sit on the fence.”²⁶ Nigeria's adherence to such a principle is underpinned, according to him, by

a realization that there are times when our interests may not coincide. We cannot pursue our national objectives without taking cognizance of their (the superpowers) interests. And they have also realized that in the pursuit of their African policies, Nigeria's views cannot be ignored.²⁷

Although Garba rather opted for the term neutrality, but the distinction between neutrality and non-alignment was generally recognized. This is evidenced in Obasanjo's speech while welcoming Henry Jablonski of Poland to Nigeria in October 1977: "we in Nigeria believe that a policy of non-alignment with military power blocs should not lead to abstinence or negative reaction to events in our continent or elsewhere in the world."²⁸

From the above, it is apparent that no Nigerian administration between 1960 and 1979 doubted the utility of non-alignment as a principle of diplomacy; their conceptions were virtually the same. Even though the criticism of Balewa's policy toward the Cold War has been on the basis of equidistance,²⁹ the government did not think that non-alignment mandated equal relations. It was on the foundation established by Balewa that successive administrations erected their foreign policy, though under the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration, Nigeria embarked on a more aggressive pursuit of national interest, displayed for example over the question of Angolan independence. It should be noted that even before the Angolan question blew up, Garba had indicated that the administration was going to be more assertive: "Nigeria ... has got to a stage where we want to make an independent assessment of international issues," and "the present Government is probably going to be more aggressive."³⁰ This seemed to have given a new edge to the conception of non-alignment: the powers in the pursuit of their interests in Africa have to align with Nigeria's interests, or encounter obstacles. It was this element of competition with the powers that was absent in the conception of non-alignment by previous administrations.

The Practice of Non-Alignment in Nigeria's Foreign Relations, 1960-1979

Of all the Nigerian administrations between 1960 and 1979, Balewa's has been the most attacked for not conforming to the dictates of non-alignment. It has been claimed that the administration "exhibited an unveiled preference for pro-west relations and a clear antipathy towards the Eastern bloc ... in spite of the avowed principle of non-alignment in the

East-West cold war;”³¹ and that it was “so rabidly pro-British and concomitantly pro-Western that it demonstrated open hostility towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and showed overt abhorrence for anything communist.”³² “On almost all cold war issues,” Aluko too has concluded, “Nigeria sided with the United States against the USSR.”³³ The criticisms would seem to have absorbed the equidistance framework of the early critics of the Balewa administration's foreign policy rather than proceed on the basis of a critical examination of those criticisms.

Thus, according to Aminu Kano, “All Western countries and the Latin-American countries are included in our passports, but we find that all countries behind the so-called Iron Curtain are excluded. And yet our policy is one of non-alignment.”³⁴ E.O. Araka found a contradiction in Nigeria's claim to be non-aligned and the level of diplomatic representation granted countries of the East and West: “one is sceptical at times in accepting really that the Government policy is one of non-alignment. One wonders at times whether Soviet and American Embassies in Nigeria are given the same facilities in this country.”³⁵ And Joseph Tarka noted that “our Government had given NATO exclusive concession for the use of secret radio frequency in certain parts of Nigeria,” and asked: “Are we actually practising the honest non-alignment policy which our Government professes?”³⁶ And yet again, I.A. Brown had alleged that Nigeria was to receive a bribe of £80 million from the United States to advocate the seating of the two Chinas in the UN “in order to enable America to retain its military base in the island of Formosa.”³⁷

The basis for which the administration was adjudged ‘aligned’ was essentially that it conceded to the West what it denied to the East. Nigeria under Balewa would have been considered non-aligned if it had balanced its relations with the West with those with the East: permitting the Soviet Union, for example, to operate radio frequencies in Nigeria, or allow equality of diplomatic representation. It follows that the proponents of equal relations as

implying non-alignment will, for example, view the fact that the Soviet Union had twenty-eight diplomats in Nigeria by May 1976, and the United States twenty-seven as an indication of Nigeria's non-aligned status.³⁸

It must, however, be recognized that issues which are strictly bilateral have no immediate relevance for non-alignment. That Nigeria discriminated against the Soviet Union did not itself amount to a negation of non-alignment; after all, the defence of national interest, the justification for the adoption of non-alignment, was used to justify the manifestations of such discrimination. Even in the vexed matter of discriminatory issuance of passports, Balewa pleaded national security: "There is a very large number of undesirable people in and outside this country whom we should like to restrict their movements."³⁹ The limited nature of Nigeria's relations with the Eastern bloc countries was not because it was an aspiring member of the Western bloc, or held brief for its interests in Nigeria. The image of the Soviet Union, for example, in government circles necessitated the arms-length relationship with it. According to Wachukwu,

If any nation fails to recognize our sovereignty, if any nation keeps on inciting people to disaffection, engineering people to practice subversion, although we may not declare war against her, yet our attitude to such country cannot be exactly what it would be in regard to a country that co-operated with us.⁴⁰

This was the government's perception of the Soviet Union and its interests in Nigeria. The fact that Nigeria had more in aggregate relations with the West than with the East, or pro-West and anti-East as commonly preferred, did not, therefore, mean that it was not non-aligned, or 'aligned' with the West.

Nevertheless, this could not be easily said for the contraction of the defense agreement with Britain. Idang⁴¹ and Orobator⁴² have indicated the ways in which the agreement infringed on Nigeria's sovereignty, and undermined Nigeria's claim to be non-aligned. Although the government continued to defend it in the name of national interest, its abrogation would seem to be an indication that it misinterpreted Nigeria's national interest

with regard to the pact issue. Yet, the point must be made that the agreement had limited utility as a guarantee of Nigeria's external security; after all, Balewa had advertised Nigeria as "a peaceful country which has no territorial ambitions and no intention of attacking her neighbours," and that it appeared there was no evidence that Nigeria would be attacked.⁴³ Contrary to Gambari's delinking of the agreement and internal security,⁴⁴ it was in maintaining administration-friendly foreign military presence and discouraging extreme political exuberance from opposition groups that the agreement had its true motivation and relevance. Also worth mentioning are the claims that Nigeria under Balewa was teleguided from London,⁴⁵ and Washington,⁴⁶ claims that completely negated the practice of non-alignment since they implied part-cession of Nigeria's diplomatic independence; these claims were denied.⁴⁷

Unlike the Balewa administration which had to establish the basic outlines of and procedures in Nigeria's external relations, the Gowon administration simply built on an already existing foundation. The most important development with relevance for non-alignment was the civil war, during which period Nigeria was subjected to, and tolerated the influence-drives of the East and West, to the extent that they aided efforts at prosecuting the war. The recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1971 and the exchange of diplomatic representation with East Germany in 1972, rather than being in "pursuit of the policy of non-alignment,"⁴⁸ as Aluko put it, represented a reciprocation for Eastern bloc support during the war, and perhaps mollify critics who saw their continued non-recognition as proof of Nigeria's alignment. In spite of Abegurin's insistence that Nigeria's non-alignment did "not mean remaining equidistant between the major powers," but that "while remaining on friendly terms with the Great Powers, Nigeria retains her independence of judgment on matters of international concern," he nevertheless argued that after Gowon's

visit to Britain in 1973, a similar visit had to be made to the Soviet Union in 1974 to "give meaning to her stated main foreign policy objective of nonalignment."⁴⁹

Just as it had been revealed that some Western countries operated communication stations in Nigeria in the first half of the 1960s, in 1975, it was again claimed that the CIA operated a monitoring station in Kaduna.⁵⁰ The close working relationship with the United States had led some to the conclusion that Nigeria apparently toed its line because of a bribe of £86 million, the same relationship with the Soviet Union in 1975/76 over Angola led to the allegation that Muhammed had received a bribe of ₦ 25 million, and the claim that in "foreign affairs, the Mohammed Government was at its most socialist."⁵¹ In fact, Nigeria's stand over the Angolan problem was interpreted as alignment with the Soviet Union, and a negation of non-alignment.⁵² But as Obasanjo was to argue in January 1976, Nigeria's stand was, in fact, an expression of its non-aligned status:

it is very uncharitable of those who ... equate our stand on Angola to commitment and alignment with one side in the ideological 'cold war' thereby insulting our intelligence as they know very well and show in practice through their own policies of shifting alliances in their national interest that ... there are no permanent friends but permanent interest. And we have only acted to protect our national interest and the interest of Africa as we see it in Angola.⁵³

In the end, the question of Nigeria's status is not answered by the absolutes of 'aligned' or 'not aligned', but rather by the degree of passivity or activity of the defence and projection of Nigeria's sovereignty, itself an important function of the personality of the particular policy executor.

Non-Alignment in Nigeria's Foreign Relations, 1960-1979: the Internal Motivational Factors

A study of the internal-motivational factors in Nigeria's relations with the power blocs would entail an examination of the significant influences on its relations with the blocs. Considered important are the strength of the economy and the personality outlook of the heads of state. It is a truism that the weaker a state's economy, the less assertive and more cautious that state would be with respect to its relations with stronger economies, particularly

where the latter could play the role of benefactors. The explanation for this is that since such a state has to depend substantially on external finance to augment its own resources, it must sustain the goodwill of potential benefactors. It necessarily has to tolerate the policies and actions of a potential benefactor, and avoid policy decisions or actions that may irritate such a power, if that source of aid is to be retained. Consequently, a state with a weak economy is more susceptible to external influence.

Nigeria in the first half of the 1960s fitted the above framework. Dependent mainly on the export of agricultural produce for which it had other competitive producers, Nigeria, for the better part of this period suffered balance of payments deficits. In 1963, it recorded a deficit of £12.6 million, in 1964 £43.4 million, and in 1965 £12.1 million. In 1963, the value of Nigeria's export to the EEC and Britain was 77.4% of total export, and import from 55.8% of total import.⁵⁴ It was to secure its traditional market that, despite criticism of the European Economic Committee as neo-colonial, it had to enter into negotiations with the Community for special non-associate membership.

An implication of this weak state of the economy during this period was the reliance on foreign aid and loans to execute the country's development programmes. For its low internally generated revenue content, the 1960-61 budget had been christened "Foreign Assistance Budget."⁵⁵ The 1962-63 budget was not more inward-looking. This was in spite of the general apprehension, even in government circles, concerning the conditions thought to be usually attached to such assistance. In the 1962-63 budget speech, for example, Festus Okotie-Eboh, the finance minister, had expressed the government's appreciation to Czechoslovakia, West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States for their assistance to Nigeria, and had hoped that they were "forerunners of much bigger assistance," an indication that the dependence was going to be of a long-term nature.⁵⁶ In recognition of

the fact that strings were usually attached to aid packages, he had emphasized that Nigeria would only go to those countries “which are willing to offer it freely.”⁵⁷

While other factors, as ideological outlook of the leadership, for example, could have contributed to what has been described as Nigeria's “veiled subservience” to Western interests under Balewa,⁵⁸ the fact that it was dependent on Western capital and assistance necessitated a friendly disposition towards relations with the West in general. An indication of the policy implication of such dependence was contained in Lyndon Johnson's reference to the “painful upheaval” suffered by Nigeria (referring to the January 1966 coup) and the hope that “she too will still maintain a responsible and progressive course,”⁵⁹ suggesting that political trends in Nigeria were unsavoury. This apparently innocuous statement appearing in the midst of a discussion on foreign aid indicated that American patronage could be withdrawn if ‘responsible’ order was not restored. Yet, this is not to suggest any inevitable connection between economic dependence and a particular foreign policy orientation.⁶⁰ Such monocausality will be unable, for example, to account for Nigeria's severance of diplomatic relations with France in 1961, and its anti-American pro-MPLA policy in Angola in 1975/76.

For a period of about twelve years beginning in 1966, Nigeria recorded no deficits in balance of payments despite the civil war. Although after the war, mention was still made of foreign assistance for Nigeria's development, this was limited to the years immediately after the war, and was necessitated by the demands of reconstruction. By 1973, with a balance of payments surplus of ₦992.6 million, it was apparent that Nigeria could survive without having to seek foreign financial assistance, and tolerate the influence-attempts of any power that may be consequent. As Akinyemi noted in 1974, “The oil boom has just about ensured that no country, the United States included, could use foreign aid of any sort to demand a special relationship with Nigeria.”⁶¹

Nevertheless, the significant improvement in the balance of payments position in 1973 (57.3% over that for 1972) appeared not to have made any impact on the perception of Nigeria's status in international affairs. Gowon still talked about the inextricable bond that held Nigeria and Britain together. In fact, in 1974 when Nigeria recorded the highest balance of payments surplus (₦ 4.6 billion, or an increase of 75.5% over the 1973 figure), Gowon still lamented that "Nigeria was far from wealthy," and "only potentially rich."⁶² Hence Akinyemi's negative assessment of Gowon's use of Nigeria's improved economic strength:

Nigeria was in the happy financial situation of absolute freedom to choose with whom she would do business. Unlike her position in the early 1960s, when Nigeria had to conduct herself in such a way as to be acceptable to Western countries whose finances she needed, Nigeria is now able to demand acceptable conduct from countries whose citizens want to bid for contracts in Nigeria. This was the point that Gowon's administration missed altogether.⁶³

To demonstrate that economic strength may be predicated on objective indices, but it is its perception that is relevant in the motivation of policy, with a less impressive balance of payments in 1975 (₦ 1.2 billion, or a fall of 70.4% compared with the 1974 figure), Muhammed had declared on January 1, 1976 that the Nigerian economy was "strong and buoyant."⁶⁴ And only about three months after, Obasanjo recast Gowon's earlier assessment: "although this country has great potential, she is not yet a rich nation."⁶⁵ In that year, Nigeria recorded a surplus of ₦ 1.6 billion. Muhammed's belief that the country's economy was strong influenced the confidence with which he handled issues that had elicited caution from his predecessors and successor. It would appear, therefore, that the perception of the strength of the economy was as important as the actual strength.

Another significant influence, and, perhaps the most crucial on Nigeria's relations with the power blocs between 1960 and 1979, was the personality outlook of the heads of state. "States," it has been argued, "do not make decisions; individual people do;" and when they do, "their personalities play a role in the final outcome."⁶⁶ In fact, when reference is made to the categories 'radical', 'dynamic', 'cautious' or 'conservative' with regard to

Nigeria's foreign policy, it is largely to the personality type of the head of state, and its consequent imprint on foreign policy. The analysis attempted here is indeed sketchy, but reflects the basic personality outline of Balewa, Gowon, Muhammed and Obasanjo.

Balewa has been described as "A calm moderate man, with a knack for compromise, and a personality that was more calculated to placate than to provoke."⁶⁷ He is also said to have been "a good and honest man,"⁶⁸ "a very conciliatory man"⁶⁹ who "lacked the fire and venom of a charismatic leader."⁷⁰ He shared with Gowon the elements of caution, conciliation and compromise. According to Gutteridge, Gowon is a "modest man who reluctantly accepted the responsibility of Head of State as a military duty and ... possessed generally the opposite qualities to those required for success in the Nigerian political jungle."⁷¹ But unlike Balewa who appeared to have held *de facto* powers, particularly with respect to the conduct of foreign affairs⁷² (presumably explaining why Nigeria's foreign policy under him was non-assertive), Gowon appeared to have come under the influence of the so-called "super Permanent Secretaries." According to the testimony of a senior civil servant, for example,

If you went to Lagos you could speak to civil servants there. The key ones run things. It is frightening they have so much power. If Gowon says something and Ebong or Ayida (Permanent Secretaries for Economic Development and Finance Ministries respectively) don't agree, next day he changes it.⁷³

Cronje and First also testify to the influence exercised by these permanent secretaries. According to First, they were primarily responsible (with the British and American envoys) for sustaining Nigeria's unity during the crisis that emerged after Aguiyi-Ironsi's assassination.⁷⁴ Cronje not only shares this view, but goes further to describe the permanent secretaries, notable Alison Ayida, Philip Asiodu, Abdul Atta, as "the King-Makers."⁷⁵

It was perhaps for their seemingly limitless influence that Muhammed had banned them from participation in executive council deliberations on August 13, 1975, unless specifically invited by their commissioners, and their presence would only be in an "advisory

capacity.”⁷⁶ This step was to foreshadow the near-total centralization of power in the head of state. Although the same day, he had proposed the democratic principles of collective decision-making and responsibility for such decisions,⁷⁷ his authoritarian but affable personality, however, became an obstacle in the implementation of such principles. He had, for example, on his accession to power warned his colleagues that “once he took a decision they would have to support him” otherwise “they should be prepared to take back the job from him.”⁷⁸ His initiative in personally selecting Nigeria's envoy to Angola, a step that became necessary to give immediate effect to his Angolan policy evidenced his attitude towards perceived obstacles. Sotumbi's description of Muhammed as “an idealist,” to whom “obstacles were ... not insurmountable,” and “debates and exchange of views about important issues were a waste of time,”⁷⁹ is matched by Akinyemi's observation that he was “a visionary who believed in taking risks, calculated or otherwise.”⁸⁰ And according to Awolowo,

He was tough, dogged and fearless. He was frank to a fault and, like all those cut out for greatness, he was constant and unchangeable ... Murtala was almost invariably guided by the dictates of his heart. And whenever there was a contradiction in the dictates, he readily acknowledged his faults with dignity and without any show of fawning regret.⁸¹

In contraposition, Obasanjo is a “pragmatist,” who is prepared “to argue his point of view and reach decisions by consensus,”⁸² a trait somewhat similar to Gowon's. He has been described as “the administrator *par excellence*, cautious and calculating,” and above all “secretive.”⁸³ His reluctance to accept the mantle of leadership on Muhammed's death, as his declining to serve as an ex-officio member of the Nigerian Society of International Affairs (Muhammed had accepted),⁸⁴ put him in the same category as Balewa, and perhaps reflects a high level of caution.

None of them showed any real inclination towards socialism. Muhammed, for instance, was at best a populist. The ideological orientation of the others, being essentially

Western liberal, was reflected in Nigeria's relations with the power blocs; they argued that the socialist ideology had no relevance for Africa. Even Gowon that had had to turn to the Soviet Union for supply of aircraft and heavy guns during the civil war expressed the belief that "Africa must be free from ideological influences which have no cultural basis in the continent itself."⁸⁵

The implication of these traits for Nigeria's practice of non-alignment is clear: the degree of assertiveness of the personality of Nigeria's leaders, without prejudice to other factors as the strength of the economy, for example, determined the assertiveness or otherwise of Nigeria's foreign policy toward the power blocs, and consequently the degree of aggressiveness of the defence of its freedom of action. While the non-assertiveness of previous leaders made Nigeria's foreign policy apparently complementary to that of the powers, between 1975 and 1979, particularly under Muhammed, its policies competed with those of the powers. This connection between an assertive personality and aggressive non-alignment is not far-fetched. Indicating the relationship between personality and a state's practice of non-alignment, Mates notes: "The new countries became non-aligned first in the consciousness of their political leaders and statesmen and only afterwards in the practice of their international behaviour."⁸⁶ This link appeared to have been appreciated by the Gowon administration as evidenced by the analysis of Nigeria's foreign policy in the Second Plan:

Before the civil war, there was a general tendency on the part of Nigeria to view the conduct of external policy rather narrowly, in terms of the projection of an image of international good behaviour and diplomatic correctness. The underlying principle of non-alignment ... often lacked, in practice, a dynamic personality and suffered from excessive caution in making new friends and pursuing national interest that may offend old ones.⁸⁷

Although the government then proposed to give its foreign policy "a new content and a new style," the limitations imposed by a cautious and conciliatory personality like Gowon's could not be overcome.

A factor considered very significant in accentuating Nigeria's non-aligned status has been the civil war. Two lines of reasoning could be discerned from the arguments proffered by proponents of this view. First, that Nigeria during the war felt disappointed by the initial refusal of Britain to supply it with arms, and the sustained refusal of the United States to do same, coupled with the preparedness of the Soviet Union (which hitherto had been regarded with suspicion) and these led to a re-appraisal of Nigeria's 'special' relationship with the West, and also to a breakdown of the "psychological barrier against the Soviet Union."⁸⁸ There was thus a movement towards a mid-position.⁸⁹ Second, that the uncertainty and disappointment in procuring arms motivated Nigeria to place "much more emphasis on independence in the conduct of its relations with the great powers," and to "reduce reliance on any power bloc ... by diversifying her external trade and source of foreign aid."⁹⁰ For both, the civil war was "the midwife" to Nigeria's "birth as a non-aligned nation."⁹¹

It is conceded that the problems in Nigeria's relations with the United States and Britain at the beginning of the war, and the cordial relations with the Soviet Union had the potential of drastically changing the orientation of Nigeria's relations with the power blocs; however, they did not.⁹² The only aspect of relations in which there was tangible diversification as a result of the war was military cooperation. However, the relationship between diversification and non-alignment is usually defined in terms of equidistance. Hence Ogunbadejo concluded that "Nigeria's importation of arms from both the East and West to prosecute the civil war gave some credibility to its stated foreign policy of non-alignment."⁹³ The contention of this work is that the civil war, by creating avenues for the interference of the power blocs and thereby undermining Nigeria's sovereignty, constituted a violation of its non-aligned status. It was the negative impact of the involvement of the powers on Nigeria's sovereignty that made the government, immediately after the war, to seek to reassert its control over the country's affairs, by, for example, making it mandatory for all relief effort

from outside Nigeria to be channelled through Nigerian government agencies. As Enahoro had warned, "The condition that will justify foreign presence in the liberated areas no longer exists." It was in this context that Enahoro made the much publicized remark that "The effect of the Nigerian war on our foreign relations has been to re-enforce our non-alignment."⁹⁴ The remark was made in answer to a question as to whether improved relations with the Soviet Union meant alliance with it; and the response implied that rather than leading to alliance, the support of the powers for Nigeria had re-enforced its desire to be independent of both East and West. After all, he argued, socialist countries supported the government as they supported Biafra, and non-socialist countries did the same.

Conclusion

The de-emphasis of the military aspect of the superpowers' relations with the West African sub-region made the predominant objective of their policies to be limited to the acquisition of mutually exclusive political leverage. Non-alignment, as a response to this drive for political influence, when considered as a policy of balancing relations between East and West loses the basis for its adoption; non-alignment gave expression to the desire of new states, like Nigeria, to retain, to a great extent, their freedom of action in the formulation and execution of both their domestic and foreign policies. The particular expression of non-alignment depended on such variables as the country concerned, its geo-strategic relevance to the power rivalry, the policy preference of its leadership, and the intensity of the rivalry.

Studies of Nigeria's foreign policy towards the power blocs in the context of their rivalry employing non-alignment as an explanatory tool have been idealistic and unhistorical. They have not only approached the subject from the perspective of the targets of the policy – the power blocs, by adopting the equidistance interpretation, they have ignored the perceptions of non-alignment by Nigeria's leaders, the perceptions that shaped policy, as the basis of their analyses. Thus, Stremlau thought that between 1960 and 1967, "official

pronouncements of Nigeria's non-aligned status also had little political content," presumably because Nigeria "usually supported Western positions in the United Nations and was reluctant to extend even formal diplomatic ties to the Soviet Union." But for the post-1967 period, "Nigeria has demonstrated readiness to support either the West or the east, depending upon which decision is in the best interests of Nigeria and of Africa."⁹⁵

The latter position has been much influenced by the pattern of international support for the federal government during the civil war and the fact of military rule. A fitting response to the tradition of analysis of pre-1967 Nigerian foreign policy that Stremlau represents is Anglin's conclusion that "if the Nigerian Government, after careful consideration of the merits of a particular question, leans to one side or the other, there is no need always to assume that it does so because it has succumbed to some sinister outside pressure."⁹⁶ If non-alignment, as Nigeria's administrations between 1960 and 1979 defined it, means the defence of Nigeria's sovereignty and capacity for independent action, then Nigeria under these administrations was non-aligned.

The international behaviour of any state is most importantly determined by its capabilities. The conception of capabilities has been so objectivized that the foreign policy of a state becomes so readily predictable. This model of capability/behaviour is not as simple as it appears. Capabilities may be objective and quantifiable, but they must be perceptually filtered before they become policy resources. Power is its perception: "Power is what people think it is."⁹⁷ It is not objective strength or weakness that motivates policy, it is its perception. For Nigeria, the official definition of non-alignment in terms of the defence of sovereignty, of the capacity to act in the national interest, pervaded Nigeria's administrations from 1960 to 1979. However, the manifestation of the capacity for independent action has been influenced more by the character of the leadership, particularly the personality of the heads of state than objective conditions, as the paper has demonstrated. It is thus possible to argue that the

degree of assertiveness of the personality of Nigeria's heads of state was a crucial determinant of the assertiveness of its international behaviour. While it is true that there was a "continuity in the meaning" of non-alignment, its application, not just "the style of application," has varied according to the personality of the particular head of state far more than "Nigeria's ascendancy as the leading power in Africa."⁹⁸

Endnotes

¹ O.J.B. Ojo, "Continuity and Change in Nigeria's Non-Aligned Foreign Policy", *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, 7(1 and 2), 1981, 50.

² K.P. Misra, "The Conceptual Profile of Non-Alignment", *Review of International Affairs*, XXXI, 726-727, 1980, 12.

³ Leo Mates, "Nonalignment and the Great Powers", *Foreign Affairs*, 48(3), 1970, 525.

⁴ R.C. Good, "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in New states", in *Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs*, edited by L.W. Martin (New York: Praeger, 1962), 11.

⁵ George W. Shepherd, Jr., *Nonaligned Black Africa: An International Subsystem* (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1970), 8.

⁶ See O. Jankowitsch, and K.P. Sauvart, ed., 1978. *The Third World without Super-Powers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries*, Vol. 1. (New York: Oceana Publications, 1978), XXXI-II.

⁷ F.O. McOliver, "MNCs and Foreign policy-Making Processes (1)", *Sunday Observer*, 24 September 1978.

⁸ Steven Lukes, *Essays in Social Theory* (London: Macmillan, 1977), 6.

⁹ Ojo, "Continuity and Change in Nigeria's Non-Aligned Foreign Policy", 31.

¹⁰ P. Harris, comp., *Zik: Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 314.

¹¹ *Manifesto of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons and the Northern Elements Progressive Union Alliance for the 1959 Federal Elections* (Yaba: The National Headquarters of the NCNC), 21.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ O. Awolowo, *Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 310-311.

¹⁴ *NPC Federal Government Policy, 1959* (Kaduna: The General Secretary, NPC), 2.

¹⁵ Federation of Nigeria, *House of Representatives, Debates*, hereafter *HR Debates* (Lagos: Federal Government Printer), 16 January 1960, p.98. He had made this remark in support of Balewa's reference to his preference for a "flexible" foreign policy. See *ibid.*, 14 January 1960, 122.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2 April 1960, 122.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 12 April 1960, 337. See also 13 April 1960, 407, and C.A. Odigbo's submission that "if you are allied with somebody ... it means that you are committed to him in one form or another. You cannot definitely be independent any longer and yet at the same time be allied to somebody," 405.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 16 January 1960, 103.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 13 April 1960, 402-403. Some NCNC members thought this a "confusion of terminology". See Odigbo, *Ibid.*, 405, and Mbu, *Ibid.*, 410.

²⁰ See Ehimika A. Ifidon, "The Soviet 'Threat', National Security Politics and the Dynamics of Parliamentary Opposition in Nigeria (1958-1960)", *Nigerian Journal of the Humanities*, No.12, 2005, 58-77.

²¹ Federation of Nigeria, *HR Debates*, 20 August 1960, 289.

²² *Ibid.*, 24 November 1960, 196.

²³ *Ibid.*, 4 September 1961, 336-337.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1 August 1963, 48.

- ²⁶ Interview on NBC-TV, in O. Oyediran, ed. *Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1975* (Lagos: NIIA, 1978), 188.
- ²⁷ "Nigeria's Foreign Policy and the National Interest", address by the Honourable Commissioner for External Affairs, Brigadier J.N. Garba, at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, on 10 February 1978.
- ²⁸ *A March of Progress: Collected Speeches of General Olusegun Obasanjo* (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information), 231.
- ²⁹ A notable exception is O.J.B. Ojo's "Continuity and Change in Nigeria's Non-Aligned Foreign Policy", *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, 7(1&2), 1981, 31-53.
- ³⁰ Oyediran, ed. *Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1975*, 187-188.
- ³¹ S.T. Okajare, "A History of Nigeria's Foreign Relations, 1960-2000", in *Essays in Contemporary Nigerian History*, edited by S.O. Arifalo and Gboyega Ajayi (Akungba-Akoko: The Department of History and International Studies, Adekunle Ajasin University, 2003), 169.
- ³² W. Alade Fawole, *Nigeria's External Relations and Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966-1999* (Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 2003), 43.
- ³³ Olajide Aluko, *Ghana and Nigeria, 1957-70: A Study in Inter-African Discord* (London: Rex Collings, 1976), n.168, 222.
- ³⁴ *HR Debates*, 27 March 1962, 268.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, 28 March 1962, 243.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 3 April 1962, 399.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, 14 April 1962, 864.
- ³⁸ See *Diplomatic and Consular List*, May 1976 (Lagos: Ministry of External Affairs).
- ³⁹ *HR Debates*, 27 March 1962, 169.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 4 September 1961, 336.
- ⁴¹ Gordon J. Idang, "The Politics of Nigerian Foreign Policy: The Ratification and Renunciation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement", *African Studies Review*, 13(2), 1970, 227-251.
- ⁴² S.E. Orobator, "The Place of Ideology in the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement, 1960-1962", *Journal of the Nigerian Political Science Association*, Issue 4, 1985, 89-105.
- ⁴³ *HR Debates*, 14 January 1960, 29.
- ⁴⁴ I.A. Gambari, *Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Nigeria under the First Republic* (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1980), 39.
- ⁴⁵ See J.O. Odebunmi's criticism, *ibid.*, 3 April 1965, 419.
- ⁴⁶ See I.A. Brown's criticism, *ibid.*, 14 April 1962, 865.
- ⁴⁷ See Wachukwu's denial in *ibid.*
- ⁴⁸ Olajide Aluko, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy in 1971", *Sunday Sketch*, 9 January 1972.
- ⁴⁹ Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign policy under Military Rule, 1966-1999* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 53-54.
- ⁵⁰ *Daily Times*, 20 October 1975. According to Haroun Adamu, the station was the Foreign Information Broadcast Service: "Manifest Destiny", *Daily Times*, 26 October 1975.
- ⁵¹ Martin J. Dent, "Corrective Government: Military Rule in Perspective", in *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria*, edited by S.K. Panter-Brick (London: Frank Cass, 1978), 128.
- ⁵² The February 1976 coup-plotters had proffered as a reason for the coup the restoration of the principle of non-alignment.
- ⁵³ *A Call to Duty: A Collection of Speeches by Lt.-General Olusegun Obasanjo* (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information), 35

⁵⁴ See Federal Office of Statistics, *Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1964* (Apapa: Nigerian National Press), Table 8.6.

⁵⁵ Also tagged "Loans Budget" by W. Briggs. *HR Debates*, 11 April 1960, 314-315.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 29 March 1962, 285.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 286.

⁵⁸ F.C. Ogene, "The Face of Nigeria's Foreign Policy", *Africa Now*, No.7 (October 1981), 150-151.

⁵⁹ *Africa Diary: Weekly Record of Events in Africa* (New Delhi: Africa Publications), 1960, 2768.

⁶⁰ This delinking is explored in Douglas G. Anglin, "Nigeria: Political Non-Alignment and Economic Alignment", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 2(2), 1964, 247-263. See the response by Bassey E. Ate in "Nigeria: Economic Alignment and Political Non-Alignment Revisited", in *Nigeria's Economic Relations with the Major Developed Market-Economy Countries, 1960-1985*, edited by R.A. Akindele and B.E. Ate (Lagos: NIIA, 1988), pp.283-286.

⁶¹ A.B. Akinyemi, "The Post-War Foreign Policy, 1970-74: Confidence and Continuity", *New Nigerian*, 1 October 1974. Also see his view that Nigeria's economy was invulnerable, and it could thus play a more active role in world politics in *Daily Sketch*, 12 August 1976.

⁶² *West Africa*, 22 April 1974, 477.

⁶³ A.B. Akinyemi, "Nigerian Foreign Policy in 1975: National Interest Redefined", in Oyediran, ed. *Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1975*, 109.

⁶⁴ See his New Year Message to the Nation in Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., *Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1976-77* (Lagos: NIIA, 1981), 243.

⁶⁵ See Budget Speech, 1976/77, *A March of Progress: Collected Speeches of General Olusegun Obasanjo*, 33-38.

⁶⁶ Raymond Birt, "Personality and Foreign Policy: The Case of Stalin", *Political Psychology*, 14(4), 1993, 607.

⁶⁷ Gordon J. Idang, *Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 1960-1966* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), 48.

⁶⁸ Jerome Udoji, *Under Three Masters: Memoirs of an African Administrator* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1995), 82.

⁶⁹ Gambari, *Party Politics and Foreign Policy*, 47.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁷¹ W.F. Gutteridge, *Military Regimes in Africa* (London: Methuen, 1975), 133.

⁷² He is, in fact, described as a "super-foreign Minister", having held the portfolio between independence and July 1961, and again from December 1964 to January 1966. Under him, "the Ministry of External Affairs tended to play no more role than a contributory role in the political process that culminated in foreign policy decisions": Idang, *Internal Politics and Foreign Policy*, 113-114.

⁷³ H. Bienen (with M. Fitton), "Soldiers, Politicians and Civil Servants", in *Soldiers and Oil*, edited by S.K. Panter-Brick, 47.

⁷⁴ Ruth First, *Power in Africa* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 320.

⁷⁵ Suzanne Cronje, *The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War, 1967-1970* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972), 241.

⁷⁶ See Muhammed's speech at the inauguration of the Council on 13 August 1975, in *A Time for Action: Collected Speeches of General Murtala Muhammed* (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information), 15.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* A justification for the overthrow of Gowon had been the "lack of consultation" which characterized the affairs of state", hitherto a collective responsibility" (*Daily Times*, 31 July

1975). There had been a crucial instance when Gowon overrode the decision of the Federal Executive Council (Muhammed was a member) by appointing I.G. Ordor as General Manager of the NNOC. See F. Turner, "Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup", in *Soldiers and Oil*, edited by Panter-Brick, 188-190.

⁷⁸ Abiodun O. Sotumbi, *Nigeria's Recognition of the MPLA Government of Angola: A Case Study in Decision-Making and Implementation*, Monograph Series, No. 9 (Lagos: NIIA, 1981), 23.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 16-17.

⁸⁰ A.B. Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy", in *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966-1979*, edited by O. Oyediran (London: Macmillan, 1979), 161.

⁸¹ Quoted in O. Dare, "Ramatism: A Study in Leadership", *The African Guardian*, 20 February 1986, 29.

⁸² Sotumbi, *Nigeria's Recognition of the MPLA Government of Angola*, 17.

⁸³ Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy", 161.

⁸⁴ A.B. Akinyemi, *Farewell to Policy*, Lecture Series, No.35 (Lagos: NIIA), 6.

⁸⁵ *Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs*, 1(1), 1971, 36.

⁸⁶ Leo Mates, *Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy* (Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1972), 75.

⁸⁷ *The Second National Plan, 1970-74: Programme of Post-War Reconstruction and Development* (Lagos: The Federal Government Printer), 78.

⁸⁸ Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy", 152.

⁸⁹ See the exposition of this view in ibid., pp.151-152; Idang, *Internal Politics and Foreign Policy*, pp.153-155; and O. Oriere, "Realities and Fairness in Foreign Policy", *Daily Times*, 2 July 1976.

⁹⁰ Olajide Aluko, *Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p.123. See similar analysis in Gambari, *Party Politics and Foreign Policy*, 147.

⁹¹ *Africa Now* (October, 1985), 88-89.

⁹² For a critical appraisal of the impact of the civil war on post-war foreign policy, see Ehimika A. Ifidon, "The Rhetoric and Economics of Nigeria's Diplomatic Reconstruction, 1970-1975", *Benin Journal of Historical Studies*, 3(1&2), 2001, 1-17.

⁹³ Oye Ogunbadejo, "Nigeria and the Great Powers: The Impact of the Civil War on Nigerian Foreign Relations", *African Affairs*, 75(298), 1976, 29.

⁹⁴ *Morning Post*, 21 March 1970.

⁹⁵ John S. Stremlau, "The Fundamentals of Nigerian Foreign Policy", *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 11(1/2), 1981, 48.

⁹⁶ Anglin, "Nigeria: Political Non-Alignment and Economic Alignment", 263.

⁹⁷ John W. Spanier, *Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 104.

⁹⁸ Ojo, "Continuity and Change in Nigeria's Non-Aligned Foreign Policy", 50.